Factors affecting capital program performance audit findings by Nalewaik, Alexia Ann
 
 
 
Factors Affecting Capital Program Performance Audit Findings 
 
by 
 
Alexia Ann Nalewaik 
 
A thesis submitted for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy in Strategy, Programme & Project Management 
 
SKEMA, Lille, France 
 
August, 2012 
 
  
ii 
 
CERTIFICATE OF AUTHORSHIP / ORIGINALITY 
 
I certify that the work in this thesis has not previously been submitted for a degree, nor has it 
been submitted as part of requirements for a degree except as fully acknowledged within the 
text. 
 
I also certify that the thesis has been written by me. Any help that I have received in my 
research work and the preparation of the thesis itself has been acknowledged. In addition,  
I certify that all information sources and literature used are indicated in the thesis. 
 
 
Alexia Ann Nalewaik 
  
iii 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Complex capital programs require specialized management techniques, in order to address 
the volatility, cost overruns, significant delays in completion, and failures with which such 
programs are typically associated. The need is greater than ever for careful oversight, 
especially for programs that expend public monies.  
 
Audit is commonly a statutory or governance requirement on such programs, but traditional 
performance audit techniques and standards may be insufficient for certain types of programs 
and industries, providing a mere illusion of oversight adequacy instead of the assurance that 
is needed. In order to most appropriately define the performance audit scope, phrase the 
solicitation for services, select the audit team, and provide support to the auditors during the 
engagement, public and private sector entity auditees need to understand the factors that 
impact performance audit results and effectiveness. The question becomes one of how 
performance audit can be improved, and stakeholders satisfied regarding program 
achievements, accountability for resource use, transparency in operations, and risk 
management.  
 
The author considered program complexity, governance, project controls, the history and 
evolution of the audit function, stakeholder expectations, assurance, and obstacles to audit, 
and used this information in conjunction with data from a large sample of 775 audit reports 
from complex construction programs, to derive questions and conclusions about performance 
audit results and effectiveness, and comparisons to expenditure audit results. The ultimate 
goal was to define key components in the execution of performance audits, based on the 
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conclusions of the analysis, in order to improve performance audit findings and thus their 
applicability and usefulness. 
 
While this study focused on program performance audit, it was also related to the field of 
program management. Although the data population was concentrated in the area of 
construction programs, conclusions from this research may also be applied to other complex, 
multifaceted or phased activities such as projects and programs in other industries 
(manufacturing, information technology), and also pursuits such as major event planning, 
company launch, mergers, and large program implementations or rollouts.  
 
The research results clearly demonstrated that different types of findings were generated by 
different audit scopes. The author observed that typical audit findings focused on routine 
procedural, accounting, and controls errors. On average, contract expenditure audits 
questioned only 2.65% of expenditures, and performance audits of large complex programs 
questioned only 0.03% of expenditures. The majority (72.56%) of the performance audits in 
the sample yielded no findings or questioned costs. 
 
There were significant positive correlations between: the number of expenditures tested and 
the number of qualitative findings, inclusion of construction experts on the audit team and the 
percentage of expenditures questioned, inclusion of construction experts on the audit team 
and the number of qualitative findings, broader audit scope and the percentage of 
expenditures questioned, and broader audit scope and the number of qualitative findings. Of 
these, auditor expertise and audit scope were the driving factors.  
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There were significant negative correlations between the application of agreed-upon-
procedures and the percentage of expenditures questioned, and the application of agreed-
upon-procedures and the number of qualitative findings. It was determined that the 
significant negative correlation between the application of audit standards and the number of 
qualitative findings was due to other factors, such as the application of agreed-upon-
procedures and the lack of construction experts on the audit team. 
 
Other findings, resulting from review of the data, were unrelated to the research questions yet 
of considerable importance to industry. An extremely high percentage (81%) of the 
“performance audits” instead applied a very limited set of agreed-upon-procedures (AUP) in 
the engagement, According to the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs), AUP engagements could not be classified as audits. Thus, it was inappropriate for 
the accounting firms to apply AUP engagements in lieu of a performance audit, and it was 
especially egregious for them to state in their report that the engagements were conducted in 
accordance with audit standards, as AUP engagements and the specific audit standards were 
by their very nature mutually exclusive. 
 
 
Keywords: Accountability, audit, construction, governance, risk management, assurance 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the current era of cost awareness, austerity measures, and economic strife, stakeholders for 
both public and private sector construction programs demand greater accountability for and 
transparency of expenditures, and expect stricter governance. Where owners need to 
construct more than that for which they have funds available, or are experiencing cost & 
schedule overruns, this is especially true. On complex construction programs, the public 
experience is that such overruns are the norm rather than the exception.  
 
Audit represents one method of independent oversight very often utilized to address such 
concerns; internal audit, expenditure audit, contract audit, project audit, program audit, and 
performance audits are some of the many types of audits conducted in an effort to effect 
oversight and comprehend the current status of the programs. However, variability in audit 
sampling and review techniques, team composition, scope, quality and availability of data, 
standards, and other factors can be shown to impact audit results. Due to these factors, 
intentional or unintentional, the effectiveness of audit may have been limited in its role as a 
controls mechanism.  
 
Available literature on the specific topic of construction performance audit was sparse, and 
often designed by practitioners to teach accountants about the industry of construction, 
instead of providing guidance or instruction in audit techniques and methods. There was very 
little published information available for practitioners and / or academics, and next to none 
for entities audited. Internal audit guidance and financial audit guidance were available, but 
was not wholly applicable in the performance audit sphere.  
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Yet, in order to most appropriately define the performance audit scope, phrase the solicitation 
for services, select the audit team, and provide support to the auditors during the engagement, 
public and private sector entity auditees needed to understand the factors that impact 
performance audit results and effectiveness. The gap in available literature and research 
begged to be addressed, supplementing previous research on financial audit quality and audit 
procurement. To the knowledge of the author, this research is the first to explicitly address 
and conceptualize the factors that affect capital program performance audit results and, thus, 
the potential for changes in procurement, potentially resulting in program performance 
improvement. 
 
BACKGROUND 
 
The research agenda was developed based on the author’s intuitive sense that construction 
program performance audits were not meeting stakeholder expectations and/or the 
performance audit reports did not include the depth and breadth of review promised or even 
implied. This suspicion stemmed from the author’s significant experience in construction 
audit, cost management, and risk assessment, feedback from stakeholders, detailed 
knowledge of the ballot language on which voters approved the bond funding, and the scope 
of work described in requests for proposals / requests for qualifications used to solicit 
performance audit services. Specifically, the author observed that some performance audits 
appeared to generate more qualitative findings and/or questioned expenditures than others, 
and concurrently discerned from review of contracts and published audit reports that certain 
performance audits conducted very simply did not match the scope of work as defined by the 
auditors’ contract and legislative requirements. In some cases, the auditors may have been 
actively prevented from performing their role, through scope reduction or barriers to 
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information gathering. The author has had experience with clients who fought with the 
auditor over every finding, with a goal of achieving an audit with zero findings, only to have 
the Board of Trustees or Citizens Oversight Committee question why there were no findings. 
Still other clients (in the author’s experience) encouraged findings, intending to use them to 
improve project controls.  
 
A desire to further explore the topic led to literature review in the area of performance audit 
and study of available audit reports; interaction with stakeholders such as the public and 
governing boards, interviews of key clients, and informal discussions with clients and peers 
appeared to confirm the initial suspicions. 
 
An increase in the number of grand jury investigations of construction programs (per 
California Penal Code Section 933.5), conducted in response to citizen complaints, appeared 
to corroborate the author’s and stakeholders’ concerns about construction programs. Grand 
jury investigations repeatedly surfaced more serious findings (such as fraud and procurement 
irregularities) than the routine controls errors (or zero findings) reported in performance 
audits and financial audits of the very same programs. Similarly, State and City Controller 
audits of construction programs resulted in jail time for construction program leaders, 
identifying grave issues not discovered by performance audits and financial audits of the very 
same programs. During the time period of this dissertation, a number of ‘investigations’ of 
publicly-funded construction programs by local newspapers occurred, changes in legislation 
mandated stricter performance audit administration through the application of general audit 
standards, and pending legislation mandated transparency in the reporting of expenditures. 
All these actions together indicated a collective punitive and legislative response to perceived 
failures of the existing audit requirements and mechanism.  
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Concurrently, the World Bank undertook in eight countries a pilot program (the Construction 
Sector Transparency Initiative, known as CoST), which was specifically designed to increase 
expenditure reporting transparency and performance accountability on construction projects 
around the world (CoST International Secretariat, 2012, p. 5). Such investment by the World 
Bank, and positive response to the pilot program resulting in a decision in 2012 to establish a 
permanent global program (CoST International Secretariat, 2012, p. 5), was sufficient 
evidence that the problems of accountability on capital projects, and the perceived value of 
performance audits, were global and not just local. 
 
After considerable study and reflection as a practitioner, the author began to write a technical 
paper to summarize observations made to date. However, there was so much information and 
historical background available that it soon became clear one technical paper would not 
sufficiently address the topic, and preliminary observations were contentious enough to 
warrant more in-depth study supported by data … thus the idea of the dissertation was born.  
 
The author has published seven technical papers toward completion of this PhD, which are 
included in the appendices. 
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AIMS AND OBJECTIVES 
 
The objective of the research was to determine which capital program performance audit 
elements influence the generation of qualitative and quantitative findings. 
 
The author began investigating the problem by forming two very broad questions, supported 
by literature review: 
 
 What factors affected audit effectiveness and results? 
 How was an effective audit defined? 
 
Because the first two questions about audit ‘effectiveness’ were vague and quite broad, the 
list of potential factors was exhaustive and the author turned to literature review for guidance. 
In order to clarify these broad questions, more discrete concerns about performance audit 
results were identified through further literature review and then elucidated as several specific 
research questions, which through review of performance audit reports could be answered 
quantitatively: 
 
 Did performance audit scope impact the type or quantity of audit findings (number of 
qualititative findings, or percentage of questioned costs)? 
 If a construction professional was a member of the performance audit team, were 
audit findings affected? 
 Did the application of general audit standards affect performance audit findings? 
 Did a higher percentage of tested expenditures yield more findings? 
 Did a higher number of tested expenditures yield more findings? 
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SUMMARY METHODOLOGY 
 
The research study was conducted by gathering a large sample of 390 publicly available 
statutorily-required performance audits from complex capital programs, extracting factor data 
from the audit reports based on the literature review and research questions, and objectively 
and empirically comparing the effects of different factors on audit results. In addition, data 
from 378 expenditure audits and seven risk-based audits was gathered for comparison 
regarding audit scope. By focusing on facts, and using large samples of data to establish a 
view of the phenomena, know, and explain facts through testing of hypotheses, the research 
stance adopted was Positivist in nature. The theoretical lenses included financial audit and 
agency theory (procurement). 
 
The overall research methodology employed was quantitative, and based on largely 
categorical data. The objective of the study was exploratory, geared towards an understanding 
of the factors that influence audit results, as a first step toward additional necessary research 
in the field of complex program performance audit. 
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SUMMARY RESULTS 
 
The research results  clearly demonstrated that different types of findings were generated by 
different audit scopes. The author observed that typical audit findings focused on routine 
procedural, accounting, and controls errors. On average, contract expenditure audits 
questioned only 2.65% of expenditures, and performance audits of large complex programs 
questioned only 0.04% of expenditures. The majority (72.56%) of the performance audits in 
the sample yielded no findings or questioned costs. 
 
There were significant positive correlations between: the number of expenditures tested and 
the number of qualitative findings, inclusion of construction experts on the audit team and the 
percentage of expenditures questioned, inclusion of construction experts on the audit team 
and the number of qualitative findings, broader audit scope and the percentage of 
expenditures questioned, and broader audit scope and the number of qualitative findings.  
 
There were significant negative correlations between agreed-upon-procedures engagements 
and the percentage of expenditures questioned, and agreed-upon-procedures engagements and 
the number of qualitative findings; these findings essentially supported the earlier finding that 
scope was a determining factor in the quantity and type of findings generated by audits. It 
was determined that the significant negative correlation between the application of GAGAS 
standards and the number of qualitative findings was likely due to other factors, such as the 
prevalence of agreed-upon-procedures engagements and the lack of construction experts on 
the audit team. 
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Other findings, resulting from review of the data, were unrelated to the research questions yet 
of considerable importance to industry. An extremely high percentage (81%) of the 
“performance audits” instead applied on the engagements a very limited set of agreed-upon-
procedures (AUP), and failed to conduct a risk assessment of the construction program. 
According to the American Institute of CPAs, AUP engagements could not be classified as 
audits. It was illegal for the accounting firms to apply AUP engagements in lieu of a 
performance audit, and it was especially egregious for them to state in their report that the 
engagements were conducted in accordance with the required GAGAS standards, as AUP 
engagements and GAGAS were by definition mutually exclusive. 
 
Whilst prior research on program audit and performance audit was limited, the findings from 
this research complemented and added new knowledge to existing theory developed earlier 
on financial audits, and contributed new knowledge to performance audit theory. Findings 
and observations did not necessarily challenge the limited amount of previously published 
literature; rather, they supplemented and expanded upon such works. 
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THESIS STRUCTURE 
 
The figure shown below depicts graphically an outline of the thesis. 
 
Figure 1. Thesis Structure 
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THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL IMPORTANCE 
 
With answers to these research questions, approaches to the procurement, scoping, standards, 
and methodology of construction program performance audit could potentially be improved, 
providing a mechanism for appropriately deep capital program review, which could thus 
effect better control of capital expenditures and performance, and satisfactorily address 
stakeholder expectations and concerns.  
 
Further, the revised methodology may also be applied to other complex, multifaceted or 
phased activities, projects, and programs; to both private and public sector; in non-
construction industries such as information technology and manufacturing; and in other 
endeavors such as major event planning, company launches, and mega-activity 
implementations. 
 
For the academic, results from this study may lead to additional research opportunities, in two 
fields that are underserved: performance audit methodology and stakeholders.  
 
In addition, results from this study may lead to the development of academic curriculum. 
Currently, in construction and project management degree programs, coursework is 
sometimes included on project controls, but not on project audit. Recognition of the 
importance of audit may create an opening  for academic curriculum on the topic, also paving 
the way for textbooks, such that students in construction and project management may learn 
more about project audit, gain needed skills that could be applied daily on projects, and 
potentially choose audit as a career path.  
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For the practitioner, results from this study may be applied on client engagements, effectively 
improving audit results and perhaps forever changing both the professional image of the 
auditor and traditional / perceived limitations of audit. Adaptations to audit team composition 
may well expand the skillset of and create new job opportunities for project controls 
engineers, project managers, and quantity surveyors.  
 
For the stakeholders, results from this study may be used to enable a better understanding of 
audits, thus helping procurers appropriately source and scope audits of large and complex 
projects and programs, creating an opportunity for creating an environment of positive 
change, continuous improvement, risk management, transparency, and accountability, in a 
world where such things are sorely needed. 
 
In government and professional bodies related to audit, results from this study may be used to 
develop true performance audit standards, and expand GAGAS audit standards beyond their 
current scope, thus protecting stakeholders, and also bolstering risk management, 
transparency, and accountability in the use of public funds. 
 
Regarding the supplemental findings which were unrelated to the research questions, it is 
entirely conceivable that these could result in penalties (if not disbarment) for the accounting 
firms and (depending on the source of funding for the expenditures) City-, State-, and 
Federal- level investigations of the construction programs and expenditures. These could 
result in State or Federal agencies seizing control of the subject capital programs, mass 
firings of administrative personnel and program management firms, court-ordered prevention 
of bond fund expenditures and law enforcement investigation and prosecution, as allowed by 
the Education Code (State of California, 2010), and legislative change. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Published construction audit theory, academic papers, and applied research were very 
difficult to find; to compound matters, there was a dearth of information on the specific topic 
of construction performance audit. Thus, literature review on the topic of construction audit 
began necessarily with the history of audit (Heinrich 2002, Anechiarico & Jacobs 1994) and 
financial audit. Much of the literature review, in addition to supporting the research questions 
and developing the theoretical lens, focused on understanding the environment in which the 
construction performance audits were conducted. 
 
AUDIT 
 
An audit can be loosely defined as a review of an organization’s activities or accounts, by 
either an internal or external organization that is presumed to be independent; however, there 
are many different types of audit.  
 
The term ‘public sector audit’ evokes the concept of financial audit, which is traditionally 
focused on financial accountability, internal controls, and fiscal regularity (Glynn, 1996). 
Since the 1950s, public accounting functions have been considered to be satisfactory if they 
can demonstrate (through internal or external audit) that transactions have been conducted 
legally (Shand & Anand, 1996), with formal authorization (Barzelay, 1996), and accurate and 
complete reporting presented according to standardized accounting principles. Outside the 
realm of pure financial auditing, from the 1950s to the 1990s, “the theme of public distrust in 
big government was played out to the accompaniment of calls to ferret out fraud, waste, and 
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abuse” (Newcomer 1994, p. 148). But, at that time, financial audits were focused on 
validating accuracy and approvals.  
 
As a result, there occurred a shift in public agencies, in which the disciplines and functions of 
(internal and external) compliance auditing were developed to supplement the financial audit 
device. The importance of internal control and compliance audit became firmly entrenched as 
primary mechanisms in the detection and prevention of fraud (Jans, Lybaert, & Vanhoof 
2007, p. 5), and the war on deception and waste (Flyvbjerg 2005, p. 27). In the world of 
projects, expenditure audits (testing spent monies for proper approvals) and contract audits 
(testing contract activity against contract terms and, often, expenditures as for expenditure 
audits) became the norm for testing for compliance, and project control began to be seen as 
analogous to financial internal control.  
 
“Internal control comprises the plans, policies, methods, and procedures used to meet 
the organization’s mission, goals, and objectives. Internal control includes the 
processes and procedures for planning, organizing, directing, and controlling 
program operations, and management’s system for measuring, reporting, and 
monitoring program performance”  
(U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007, p. 14).  
 
In their effort to prevent mistakes and fraud, government entities began to establish detailed 
rules (in the form of policies and procedures) for staff to follow when performing routine 
activities (Roth, 1996), and the role of the internal and external auditor evolved to focus on 
legalistic inspection (Wart 1995, p. 435), systems review, and validation of compliance with 
regulations and processes (Davis 1980, p. 35; Goldenberg 1983, p. 518). From there, 
20 
 
government agencies began to establish additional controls that focused on the achievement 
of goals. “The presumption was that adherence to these procedures would produce the desired 
level of performance. … Audits often resulted in recommendations for more controls to 
ensure compliance with established guidelines” (Trodden, 1996). It soon became clear, across 
the board, that the mere application of additional rigid controls could not be held solely 
responsible for performance, and the audit discipline evolved accordingly to include 
additional elements for performance review to supplement the review of compliance.  
 
PERFORMANCE AUDIT AND EVALUATION 
 
In the 1990s, the substantive concepts of economy, effectiveness and efficiency were 
introduced in the context of whether or not overall results were being achieved (Trodden, 
1996). The concept of “Economy” emphasized an element of thriftiness, or prudence in the 
use of funds, “Efficiency” focused on producing expected results while minimizing waste, 
and “Effectiveness” emphasized whether or not the desired result was achieved. Various 
systemic performance measurement mechanisms (Nyhan & Marlowe, 1995) were 
implemented in government agencies, including benchmarking, output measurement, and 
balanced scorecards, often with unintended and unforeseen consequences: because 
management was increasingly judged on their ability to meet specific targets (Glynn, 1996), 
those responsible for the areas being evaluated had a tendency to focus on the narrow 
objectives and specific measures of success that would yield a higher score and thus financial 
awards (Glynn, 1996), instead of managing to improvement in the broader performance of 
the program (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002). Further, in complex organizations, performance 
measures were discovered to need to change over time as situations varied (Walsh, 1996); 
static measures of performance became irrelevant, as simple metrics could not fully and 
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effectively describe current circumstances (Williams 2003, p. 449). “It has generally been 
understood that the promise and potential of performance measures greatly exceed their 
actual usefulness in practice” (Poister & Streib 1999, p. 326). Strict performance 
measurement was soon seen to be in conflict with the search for quality (Bowman 1994, p. 
131), although the practice of performance measurement remains to this day in government 
agencies and on complex capital projects.  
 
And so began development of the disciplines of performance evaluation and audit, vehicles 
for continuous improvement based on the concept of public sector entities as adaptive 
organisms (Leeuw, 1996), which evolved alongside the similar discipline of evaluation 
research (Blalock 1999, p. 118). While for statutory reasons (Sloan, 1996) there remains in 
many performance audit scopes a component of focus on internal controls and financial 
accounting, the practice is not constrained by the limited information available in financial 
reporting (Penno 1990, p. 521). There has from the 1990s to today been a renewal of the 
common global movement toward performance assessment (Trodden, 1996) as a dual form of 
accountability and continuous improvement mechanism (Barzelay 1996; Halachmi 2002, p. 
370).  
 
Performance audits in the private sector were seen to yield both quantitative and qualitative 
findings (Sloan, 1996), with both types of findings used to effect organizational change and 
return on investment in addition to ensuring regulatory compliance. Thus, the performance 
auditor evolved to become an agent of change (Lane 1983, p. 973; Clark 1993, p. 436; 
Goldenberg 1983, p. 519; Brown & Pethtel 1974, p. 325) and critical reflection (John, 
Wardle, & Fairhurst, 2008), where desired.  
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There subsequently surfaced a distinction between the use of performance audit as an 
improvement mechanism, and as a tool for accountability. “Their work can lead to improved 
government management, better decision making and oversight, effective and efficient 
operations, and accountability for resources and results” (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office 2007, p. 2). In contrast to private sector performance audits, while public sector 
performance audits also offer advice or recommendations on operational improvements, “the 
audit is more likely to concurrently represent a form of accountability for the government 
entity” (Waring & Morgan 2007, p. 356). There was much agreement that, in order to be 
considered effective, the value of the performance audit must be recognized by management 
(Williams III, McShane, & Sechrest 1994, p. 538) and utilized to its fullest, instead of simply 
performing the audit to fulfill audit requirements. In order to effect positive change, audit 
findings must be accepted and steps taken to resolve issues identified, including the recovery 
of questioned costs (Wart 1995; Newcomer 1994, p. 152; Danon 1996; Sandberg & Larsson 
1996; Goldenberg 1983, p. 515). 
 
In terms of available literature on performance audit theory, it was seen that  
 
“an awesome volume and diversity of evaluation research literature exists, but the 
performance auditing literature is scant by comparison. Several journals are devoted 
exclusively to evaluation research, but no journals are devoted to performance 
auditing. With the exception of accounting and file review methods which evolved 
from financial auditing experience, the methodological innovations in program 
evaluation have come from evaluation researchers” (Davis 1990, p. 39).  
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Strategic management concepts could conceivably be applied to fill the performance 
evaluation void and include key attributes of program evaluation (Halachmi 2002, p. 372), 
especially in the area of complex capital projects, which bring together internal departments, 
external stakeholders, and long-term goals.  
 
“Strategic management is integrative in nature, in the sense of (a) focusing attention 
across functional divisions and throughout various organizational levels on common 
goals, themes, and issues; (b) tying internal management processes and program 
initiatives to desired outcomes in the external environment; and (c) linking 
operational, tactical, day-to-day decisions to longer run strategic objectives” (Poister 
& Streib 1999, p. 308).  
 
The literature review provided insight into the typical auditor’s skill-set (accounting and 
financial analysis with a systems focus) (Glynn, 1996), and emphasized the differences 
between auditors and evaluators (Brown & Pethtel 1974; Davis 1980, p. 37; Wholey 1999). 
In order to adequately perform their function, performance auditors were seen to need, in 
addition to traditional elements of the audit skill-set, techniques of social science research 
(Roth 1996; Newcomer 1994, p. 148) and scientific investigation / evaluation methods 
(International Congress of Supreme Audit Institutions 2004, p. 25). In the realm of 
performance audits, advanced skills in accounting and finance were perceived to be 
unnecessary, in favor of industry-specific functional knowledge (International Congress of 
Supreme Audit Institutions 2004, p. 37).  
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AUDIT STANDARDS 
 
A review of national audit standards (Brown & Craft 1980; Brown J. R. 1984, p. 260; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2007) led to questions and doubts about their 
insufficiency (Davis, 1980) in terms of providing guidance to audit scope and testing, their 
impact on audit quality (Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail, 2010), the near-complete absence of 
government and industry-wide performance audit standards (Holmquist & Barklund-Larsson, 
1996), and the dearth of formal standards and measures for economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness (Kestenbaum & Straight 1995, p. 201; Glynn, 1996), which are supposedly 
measured by performance audits. The literature review noted that performance audits were 
not even mentioned in the Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards (GAGAS) 
‘Yellow Book’ in the United States until 2003, and the guidelines were enhanced in 2007, 
demonstrating that the practice of performance auditing was essentially unregulated and even 
still continues to evolve as a profession.  
 
Current audit standards, including consulting and attestation standards, created a framework 
for internal and external traditional financialy audit engagement oversight, adding multiple 
levels of administration in order to ‘prevent risk’ in the form of audit failure and litigation 
(Marden & Brackney, 2009), improve documented support for findings, and increase report 
and work-paper quality (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). Agency theory also 
states that agents (the auditors) are by their very nature risk-averse. This causes a bit of a 
conundrum regarding performance audits. Would auditors be risk-averse to loss of future 
work, for identifying too many findings and perhaps making management look bad in front of 
public stakeholders, and thus limit the number of findings in order to protect the principal? Or 
would risk be differently defined by the auditors, as in the risk of litigation, grand jury 
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review, or other public condemnation, in which case they would be inclined to inflate the 
number of findings despite the damage to the principal’s reputation? These questions cannot 
be easily answered. In the world of financial audit, auditors default to the use of GAGAS 
(audit standards) to protect themselves from litigation and audit failure. Recent updates to 
GAGAS mention other types of audit and consulting engagements, but remain largely geared 
towards serving the financial audit community. None of the available standards addressed in-
depth and with procedural detail such issues as: auditor skills, scope, sampling, program risk, 
or testing. These gaps, and auditors’ failure to abide by their own standards, begged the 
question of how requiring the use of audit standards could result in a ‘better’ audit, and how 
past studies of [financial] audit quality in good conscience used adherence to GAGAS as a 
proxy for audit quality. One particular challenge was that “guidelines in performance auditing 
cannot comprehensively embrace all possible approaches, methods and techniques, since in 
practice that would include everything in the social sciences” (International Congress of 
Supreme Audit Institutions 2004, p. 7) 
 
PROJECT MANAGEMENT TOOLS 
 
The discussion then turned to the realm of construction. In attempting to define performance 
audit as applied to complex capital programs, building upon a preliminary concept of audit as 
a project management tool, literature review included the existing application of audit 
techniques and skills in project and program management. This included use of checklists 
developed from AACE International’s Total Cost Management processes and the Project 
Management Institute (PMI) Project Management Body of Knowledge (Project Management 
Institute, 1998), process control mechanisms such as International Standard Organization 
(ISO) certification (Dowd, 2003), stage gate reviews (Webb 2003, p. 3), & PRINCE2 
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(PRojects IN Controlled Environments) project environment control (Huemann 2004, p. 11). 
Techniques similar to those used in audit were also found in risk management (Barzelay 
1996; Rikhardsson, Best, Green, & Rosemann 2006), program evaluation (Goldenberg, 
1983), quality assurance (Bowman 1994; Nyhan & Marlowe, 1995) scenario planning (John, 
Wardle, & Fairhurst, 2008), cost reporting (Rasche & Esser, 2006), and value engineering / 
peer review (Merrow, 1988). In fact, if one were to consider all these methods and 
approaches as specialist forms of audit, “audits and reviews to check the project processes 
and results are the most common methods for quality assurance in projects and programs” 
(Huemann 2004, p. 13), and are “usually indicated when the project places high financial 
amounts at stake” (Muller 2009, p. 34). The literature review thus confirmed that audit skills 
translated well when applied on projects as part of these other mechanisms.  
 
Even the three graces of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness (the three ‘E’s) are 
applicable to project performance (Stretton 2010, p. 6; Watson & Davis 2002, p. 2). Clearly, 
performance audits for complex programs should not be limited solely to validating a 
checklist of project management best practices, and should focus on the three ‘E’s, in 
addition to endeavoring to effect continuous improvement over the lifecycle of the programs. 
Here, performance audit is shown to have close ties to the concept of Kaizen, “a quality 
management technique that aims for constantly looking for opportunities to improve” 
(Huemann 2004, p. 3). 
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GOVERNANCE, STAKEHOLDERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY 
 
The audit mechanism was identified as a necessary part of governance (Keen 2011, p. 9). The 
end goal of continuous improvement efforts is ultimately and necessarily phrased in the 
context of stakeholder expectations. Thus, subsequent literature review explored the concepts 
of governance (Stretton 2010; Klakegg 2009; Keen 2011; Cepiku 2006) and stakeholders 
(Beach, 2009), in order to put accountability expectations (Sloan, 1996) into perspective. 
“Auditing is essential to government accountability to the public. Audits and attestation 
engagements provide an independent, objective, nonpartisan assessment of the stewardship, 
performance, or cost of government policies, programs, or operations, depending upon the 
type and scope of the audit” (U.S. Government Accountability Office 2007, p. 1).  
 
Accountability implies answerability for action or omissions, and responsibility for the 
consequences (Roberts 2002, p. 659). Different accountability concepts were identified, 
including bureaucratic accountability as hierarchical arrangements based on supervision and 
organizational directives, legal accountability due to contractual arrangements, professional 
accountability (also known as reasonable standard of care), and political accountability 
established by responsiveness to elected officials, clientele or customers, and other agencies 
(Roberts 2002, p. 658; Heinrich, 2002). In the public sector, accountability relationships to 
stakeholders tend to both diverge and overlap (Roberts 2002, p. 658), (Rasche & Esser 2006, 
p. 257). Public accountability was seen to be a broader concept than financial accountability 
(Glynn, 1996), where the financial accountability focused on formal mechanisms such as 
regulations and controls, and public accountability included the application of informal 
mechanisms derive from society's mores, its political and social philosophies, bureau 
philosophy and culture, as well as from bureau executives' and managers' professional norms 
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and code of ethics (Roberts 2002; Roth 1996). “The key weapons in the war on deception and 
waste are accountability and critical questioning” (Flyvbjerg 2005, p. 27). The differences 
between mere accounting of expenditures and accountability for performance (Barzelay 
1996; Newcomer 1994) were studied, and that of stewardship (Stretton 2010, p. 2; Cepiku 
2006), with audit as a mechanism for ensuring accountability. This distinction was important, 
as it emphasized the need for audit in addition to accurate accounting, and the need for 
performance audit to supplement expenditure review and reporting. Key to the concept of 
accountability was that of governance. Governance was defined as “the processes by which 
organisations are directed, controlled and held to account. It encompasses authority, 
accountability, stewardship, leadership, direction and control exercised in the organisation” 
(Stretton 2010, p. 2). Although the concept of governance included management 
responsibilities, it could be more broadly defined as being “concerned with the specific 
planning, organizing, resourcing, directing, and controlling of an organization’s efforts for 
the purpose of accomplishing goals” (Klakegg 2009, p. 4); this, in essence, is the traditional 
scope of a performance audit. In the context of a complex capital program, governance must 
include stakeholders, project management, and controls such as policies and procedures. 
 
“Governance networks responsible for delivering public outcomes face an additional layer of 
complexity resulting from their context and in particular, managing stakeholder expectations 
in a political environment” (Beach 2009, p. 4). Literature review on the topic of stakeholders 
yielded additional insight into a number of topics which impact the audit function. This 
included stakeholder attitudes toward risk (Chapman 2003, p. 8), consequences (Behn 2002; 
Roberts 2002), definitions of success (Klakegg 2009, p. 2), continuous improvement 
(Goldenberg 1983, p. 515), and resource use (Roth, 1996). But first, the concept of 
‘stakeholder’ required defining, as the population potentially included any person, group or 
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entity that could impact or be impacted by the project. Given that criteria, the list of 
stakeholders on a complex capital program could potentially be infinite (Rasche & Esser 
2006, p. 257), and the program organization could not realistically be entirely accountable 
and deliver complete concurrent satisfaction to the infinite list of stakeholders. “It remains a 
difficult and demanding task for agencies to determine who their stakeholders are and to 
optimize interactions with them” (Beach, Brown, & Keast 2010, p. 34). In order to adopt a 
project (and thus audit) approach that takes into account stakeholder perspective (Klakegg 
2009, p. 5), one possible model involved prioritizing stakeholders based on their ability to 
impact the program or claim that they have been affected by the program (Rasche & Esser 
2006, p. 257), including fiduciary and contractual relationships, while acknowledging that 
conflicts regarding the concept of project success may exist even in a small population of 
stakeholders due to differing perspectives and goals over different timeframes (Susilawati, 
Wong, & Chikolwa 2010, p. 3; Turner, Zolin, & Remington 2009). “Programmes often entail 
large investments and impact multiple organisational stakeholders; managing decision 
making and organisational politics is often critical to their success” (Shehu & Egbu 2007, p. 
3). On complex capital programs, where multiple powerful stakeholders mean overlapping 
accountability relationships, stakeholder expectations were seen to clash (Beach 2009), 
creating a situation in which a program (also known as a multi-project) could simultaneously 
be both a success and a failure (Mian 2005, p. 5), (Klakegg 2009, p. 2). “A MultiProject lies 
at the intersection between two different worlds, external and internal, with often conflicting 
expectations of the projects, different expertise and knowledge, or even different views on the 
criteria for a successful project” (Vickridge & Abdullah 1999, p. 272). For the purposes of 
this research, the primary stakeholder was defined as the entity procuring the audit services. 
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COMPLEX CAPITAL PROGRAMS 
 
To understand the financial impact of success and failure, a literature review of the enormity 
of current and future infrastructure investment (Airoldi, Biscarini, & Saracino 2010; Daltorio 
2010; Gerritsen 2009; American Society of Civil Engineers 2009; Anjaneyulu 2009) was 
necessary. Understanding was needed, as to where complex capital programs differ from 
conventional projects and why “more planning and skill are necessary to develop, sustain, 
and successfully deliver [these programs] than for a conventional construction project” 
(National Research Council 2000, p. 8). A program was typically defined as a temporary 
organization, created for the performance of complex processes and dedicated to the 
attainment of a specific goal (Huemann 2004, p. 1; John, Wardle, & Fairhurst 2008, p. 6). 
Complex programs tended to attract considerable public attention or political interest 
(Bhaumik 2010, p. 3). Beginning with the concept of performance, then, literature review 
supported the notion that complex projects tended to go awry with greater consequences than 
regular projects, with multi-year schedule slip (McKenna, Wilczynski, & VanderSchee 2006, 
p. 3) and cost overruns of 50%, 100% and greater than 100% (Flyvbjerg 2005, p. 52). Cost 
overruns and schedule slippages were shown to increase in magnitude in accordance with the 
size of the program (Butts & Linton 2009, p. 41; Merrow 1988; Guo 2004, p. 4; Wood & 
Gidado 2008). But cost and schedule were not the only factors to suffer on complex capital 
programs; “inadequate build quality, poor project relationships, loss of reputation, public 
clamour and legal disputation” also were frequent outcomes (Mian 2005, p. 4), many of 
which represented financial risk (Guo 2004, p. 2).  
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There was much information available about critical success factors and key performance 
indicators for programs (Anjaneyulu 2009; Doloi & Lim 2007), but the differences in each 
study population meant that the recommended measures of success differed for each study; 
while there were similarities between the listed success measures, no one study succeeded in 
generating a definitive list for use on all programs. This illustrated the challenges in the use 
of critical success factors and key performance indicators in performance measurement, and 
explains why the flexibility and risk-based nature of performance audit is superior. 
Ultimately, the success or failure of the program was decided by “the client’s decision of 
whether or not to accept it” (Schultz, Slevin, & Pinto 1987, p. 40). The construction industry 
was shown to be highly confrontational in nature (Hall & Holt 2002; Zuo & Ma 2005, p. 4), 
volatile (DeCarlo, 2004), and inherently uncertain due to the changing nature of risk (Guo 
2004, p. 4). All of these elements led to the identification of innumerable characteristics 
which contributed to program success and failure (Mian 2005; Shehu & Akintoye 2008; 
Poon, Potts, & Cooper 2001; Schultz, Slevin, & Pinto 1987; Doloi & Lim 2007; Turner, 
Zolin, & Remington 2009). 
 
The inherent challenges in accountability clarified the need for applying both financial audit 
and performance audit on complex capital programs, with the audit mechanism identified as a 
necessary part of governance (Keen 2011, p. 9), and supported the notion that the 
performance audit scope could reasonably be expected to go ‘above and beyond’ a mere 
accounting of expenditures. “While most audit shops regularly analyze contracts for payment 
issues, far broader reviews are needed” (Ledman 2000, p. 56).  
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However, there was very little agreement in the literature review as to what would constitute 
a ‘broad review’. Although, in the author’s experience, compliance audits are typically 
broader in scope than expenditure audits, including not just review against contract terms but 
also against legislative and regulatory constraints, the situation appeared to call for even 
deeper review which incorporated elements of various audit and evaluation types. 
“Compliance auditing is not displaced by performance auditing. It is incorporated into 
performance auditing. Traditional compliance auditing becomes a reoriented component of 
performance auditing. Part of performance is obeying the law and complying with 
administrative regulations” (Walsh, 1996). One could focus on economy, efficiency and 
effectiveness as three of the more important elements of any program, but such evaluations 
are by their very nature subjective and thus difficult to perform (Glynn, 1996).  
 
The world of the complex capital program is very different from that of government 
management, in which the concepts of performance audit were originally developed. Each 
program is unique, nonrepeatable, diverse, and unpredictable; it changes constantly (Guo 
2004, p. 4). “Traditional control systems can work effectively when the environment is stable 
and the tasks repetitive and predictable. The trouble is the world of work is now so complex 
and uncertain and the changes are so rapid that we cannot develop detailed rules and controls 
to cover all eventualities. Therefore we must rely on the intelligence and the judgement of 
staff in the field coupled with appropriate values, commitment and [concepts of] 
accountability” (Roth, 1996). Complex capital programs are, by their very nature, 
incompatible with traditional project and program management (DeCarlo, 2004) and thus are 
also incompatible with traditional checklist-based program audits and contract audits. “How 
is it possible to exercise adequate control in organizations and settings that demand 
flexibility, innovations and creativity” (Klakegg 2009, p. 7)?  
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RISK 
 
If the objective of the performance audit is ultimately to identify vulnerabilities and 
strengthen program management (Trodden, 1996), this points us in the direction of risk 
assessment, beginning with the identification of crucial functions (Lane 1983, p. 964). There 
was little formal research available in the intersection between risk, governance, and internal 
controls, and this lack of available research was noted (Rikhardsson, Best, Green, & 
Rosemann 2006, p. 13). However, risk identification was shown in the literature review to be 
a necessary step in developing performance audit scope (Waring & Morgan 2007; Dowd 
2003, p. 3; Lazarczyk 2009, p. 3), because risk awareness and mitigation were seen as a key 
element of good governance (Keen 2011, p. 4). In the Deming cycle (plan, do, check, act) of 
risk management, audit could be easily interpreted to be an element of step three (check).  
 
The practice of external audit is typically seen as an ex-post process (Glynn 1996; Shand & 
Anand 1996), in which auditors evaluate what has already occurred. “Common practice in 
organizational research involves collecting performance data at a single point in time. While 
this approach is often a practical necessity, it treats performance as if it were a discrete event. 
Real-world task performance is probably more accurately described as a continuous process 
which ebbs and flows through its own natural cycle” (Steel & Van Scotter 2003, p. 31). Here, 
the typical audit ex-post approach appears to be insufficient; a forward-looking methodology 
is necessary, which considers causality (Williams 2003, p. 446) and the ever-changing nature 
of risk.  
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“As used in performance auditing, risks are events that, if they occurred, would have 
a negative impact on the organization or its ability to achieve its objectives. Auditors 
consider two types of risk: “inherent” and “control” risk. Inherent risks are the 
events that face the organization by the very nature of its activities. Control risk (also 
called vulnerability) is the risk that remains in the activity after the effects of any 
internal controls are considered” (Waring & Morgan 2007, p. 336).  
 
Although reviewing what has happened is unavoidable, and key to identifying the root cause 
of the current situation, the true value of the performance audit is in applying knowledge of 
what has already occurred and framing that understanding in the context of what may occur 
next, and the resulting impact “both with and without program intervention” (Waring & 
Morgan 2007, p. 326). This is similar to operational audits which look both at the present and 
into the future (Lane 1983, p. 962). Circling back to the concept of risk as a key element of 
performance audits, the identification and assessment of risk is by its very nature future-
oriented, although the risks are likewise identified through systematically collected data about 
the current state of the project (Barzelay, 1996). By focusing on areas of critical importance 
and high risk, “the resources of the audit team can be focused on those functions of the 
organization which are of most concern, which are critical to future performance, or which 
are likely to yield the best returns for the audit expense” (Lane 1983, p. 964).  
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CONCEPTS SUMMARY 
 
The table shown below provides an overview of concepts identified during literature review, 
and illustrates how each is associated with the research process. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of Literature Review Concepts 
 
  
Concept Usage in the Thesis
History of Audit
This illustrates the evolution of audit methodology and the context in which performance 
audit theory was developed, where performance audit is the focus of the research
Economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness This describes an objective for which the sample population audits were conducted
Performance Audit This is the type of audit studied, and the focus of the research
Audit Standards This describes the conditions under which the sample population audits were conducted
Project Management Tools This describes alternate applications of audit tools in the world of project management
Governance This describes the context in which the sample population audits were conducted
Stakeholders This depicts the audience for whom the sample population audits were conducted
Accountability This describes an objective for which the sample population audits were conducted
Complex Capital Programs
This describes the context in which the sample population audits were conducted, and 
the financial impact of project performance
Risk This describes an objective for which the sample population audits were conducted
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3. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
 
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY 
 
The current research study was conducted by gathering a large sample of publicly available 
data from industry, and objectively and empirically comparing the quantitative effects of 
different factors on audit results. By focusing on facts, and intending to use available large 
samples of data to establish a view of the phenomena, know, and explain observed 
regularities through systematic testing of hypotheses, the research stance adopted was 
Positivist in nature.  
 
The overall research methodology employed was quantitative. While a qualitative approach 
might at one time have been appropriate, during the course of this research it became nearly 
impossible to obtain objective survey results about performance audits, due to a rash of 
negative press and investigations of audit programs by the State, City, Inspector General, and 
newspapers. In the author’s experience on three complex programs (all part of the same 
population for this thesis), stakeholders suddenly became unavailable for interview, auditors 
were perceived as intruders instead of trusted advisors, and program team members feared for 
their jobs. There was no doubt that, on these capital programs by 2009, public (and both 
program and project management team) opinion had been skewed against several large 
construction programs in the sample population.  
 
The objective of the study was exploratory, geared towards an understanding of the factors 
that influence audit results, as a first step toward additional necessary research in the fields of 
performance audit and stakeholder management. 
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THEORETICAL LENS AND PRIOR RESEARCH 
 
Agency theory, specifically applied to procurement, formed the basis for the research 
purpose. In the analysis of public sector (government) engagement with the industries of 
construction, principal-agent theory is dominant (Furneaux 2008) and includes the 
procurement of consultancy services (Ogunsina & Ogunsemi 2012, p. 1058). In a principal-
agent relationship in the public sector procurement of audits, the agent (auditor) is contracted 
to and acts on behalf of the principal (management), who are themseves agents (public 
management) acting on behalf of a very large body of principals (public stakeholders) 
(Hughes 1994). The independence of the external auditor, in fact, is often seen as a 
monitoring tool for the public stakeholder principal – public management agent relationship 
(Watkins, Hillison & Morecroft 2004, Adams 1994). The auditor-management relationship is 
subject to the classic agency problems of information imbalance, which leads to the question 
of whether or not the principal’s interests are being adequately served by the agents with 
whom they have contracted (Adams, 1994). This issue is paramount in the procurement of 
audit services, as the audit itself is a feedback mechanism (Adams, 1994) which, if 
compromised, can potentially endanger the client by obscuring risks and restrict 
organizational evolution that would occur naturally as the client acted on audit findings. 
 
Improved audit procurement processes are seen as the solution to improving audit quality 
(Jensen & Payne 2005, p. 27), by improving the available information set and driving the 
selection process. “In the market for audit services, well-developed procurement provides 
managers with information useful in differentiating audit firms, identifies the needs of 
organizations and the audit firms likely to meet those needs, and in many cases identified the 
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audit firm that can do so at the lowest cost” (Jensen & Payne 2005, p. 29-30). In other words, 
improving procurement can supposedly solve the problems inherent in the principal-agent 
relationship. Here, the needs of the organization can be defined as the level of assurance 
provided by the auditor, and the identification of organizational risks. Improvements in 
procurement processes may include not only improved language in the request for 
qualifications (RFQ) or request for proposal (RFP) used to solicit the services, but also the 
attributes scored and the weights assigned to those attributes during the proposal evaluation 
process. 
 
Agency problems are supposedly solved by the concept of professions, in which training, 
credentialing, licensing, certification, mandatory continuing education, and ethics codes 
purportedly raise the bar for performance and competence. Yet, the assignment of the auditor 
may still be tainted during a careful and competitive selection procedure by adverse selection, 
in which the principals are unable to truly evaluate the skills of the prospective auditors. “The 
principals probably could have found someone better but just didn’t know enough to identify 
them” (Shapiro 2005, p. 264). The auditors know far more about themselves (abilities, 
expertise, etc.) and their true type than the procurers, certain auditors may make matters 
worse by misrepresenting their talents, and the auditors selected may even know who would 
have been a better choice for the job. The quality of the agents, such as “productivity, 
diligence, integrity, education, and other soft skills are obscured from the principal” 
(Ogunsina & Ogunsemi 2012, p. 1059). 
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The concept of professions also creates a mechanism to secure a monopoly (Shapiro 2005), a 
situation all too evident today in the performance audit arena, which is dominated by 
accounting firms and their place has been secured in the State of California by lobbying, 
resulting in government regulations requiring the use of accounting-specific standards 
(GAGAS) for bond-funded performance audits. 
 
It was hoped that improved audit procurement processes would shift the focus from audit cost 
to audit quality (Jensen & Payne 2005, p. 27). Fortunately, in public sector procurement, 
selection based on qualification (not lowest bid) is allowed when contracting professional 
services, and thus is is not necessary for the principal to select the lowest-bidding agent. 
 
Due to hidden information, the procurement process will likely attract a number of 
inappropriate applicants. “Principals also have a difficult time specifying an agency contract 
because they may not know what expert services are required or how much of them, what 
procedures ought to be followed, or what criteria are appropriate to limit agent discretion” 
(Shapiro 2005, p. 276). Ultimately, the language used in the RFQ or RFP will determine the 
population of applicants, and the scope specified in the contract will determine the type and 
quality of workproduct delivered, yet the purchasing agents writing the solicitation for 
services might not know enough about the principal’s needs to even elucidate them in the 
advertisement. 
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The procurers don’t know anything about what the auditors are doing once selected, despite 
some effort at oversight and monitoring in the form of periodic engagement status reports. 
“They don’t know what I am reading … whether I have been thorough or fair … if I got 
someone else to write this for me … [and] if I am not working hard enough, if at all” (Shapiro 
2005, p. 264). There is an assumption in agency theory that, because the auditors’ reputation 
is closely tied to the quality of their work, they will to some extend self-regulate their conduct 
and thus self-monitor their workproduct. But which would they prefer to protect; their 
contract with the principal, or their reputation with the stakeholders? Agency theory assumes 
the former. What are the odds that audit errors would ever be discovered? And yet, all or 
none of the above may affect the performance of the project being audited. “Some patients 
get better despite their physicians; the clients of superb lawyers sometimes lose; and bright, 
curious, conscientious students may become great sociologists despite … opportunistic 
professors” (Shapiro 2005, p. 276). 
 
Previous research in the area of audit quality focused specifically on financial audits, and was 
used to inform and guide the hypotheses in this current research on performance audits. The 
predominant research on financial audit quality defined audit quality in terms of the accuracy 
of the audit report (Watkins, Hillison & Morecroft 2004) and level of audit risk, where risk is 
defined as audit failure (Francis 2011) / auditor failure to detect financial reporting errors 
(DeAngelo 1981).  
 
Later research, concerned about the unobservable nature of audit quality (e.g., how would 
one know if the auditors failed to detect accounting and financial statement irregularities, 
except in the case of litigation against the auditor, or business failure of the client?) used 
instead proxies for audit quality (Manita & Elommal 2010, p. 88) such as: audit firm size 
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(Kilgore, Radich & Harrison 2011), audit firm reputation (Kilgore, Radich & Harrison 2011), 
audit firm brand name, auditor industry experience (Jensen & Payne 2005, Low 2004, Bonner 
& Lewis 1990), auditor quality (DeAngelo 1981), length of principal-agent relationship (Deis 
& Giroux 1992), audit hours (Deis & Giroux 1992), rigid adherence to GAGAS (Francis 
2011, p. 126), auditor independence (Francis 2011, p. 126) and audit fees. Audit firm failures 
(such as that of Arthur Andersen LLP) have since called into question (and indeed reversed 
previous research findings) the use of audit quality proxies (Manita & Elommal 2010, p. 88; 
Duff 2004) such as brand name and firm size (Watkins, Hillison & Morecroft 2004). 
 
The hypotheses and research questions, and the previous research upon which they rely, are 
discussed next. 
 
HYPOTHESES AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
 
The dissertation began with two broad research questions, which were in part answered 
through literature review and were used to develop specific research questions and directional 
hypotheses, and identify the data variables to be gathered for research. 
 
 What factors affected audit quality and results? 
The preliminary research questions focused on audit quality and effectiveness from 
the perspective of the procuring entity, both of which were topics affected by diffuse 
networks of influence that are difficult to quantify and as such causes and effects may 
be open to interpretation. Literature review supported the concept that “the quality of 
the results of the audit depends very much on the scope of the methods and the 
professional application of these” (Huemann, 2004). This led to development of 
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specific research questions about the effect of audit scope and auditor expertise, and 
helped to identify some of the specific data to be gathered: a) audit scope / type, and 
b) audit team composition (presence of an industry expert). 
 
 How was an effective audit defined? 
Still focusing on audit results, the author sought information through literature review 
about audit performance measures. Quantitative measures were necessary because the 
stakeholders in the subject population were not amenable to participation in a survey. 
“Primary measures of audit effectiveness include the dollar return per audit and 
number of internal control recommendations stemming from the audit” (Cashell, 
Aldhizer III, & Eichmann, 1999). In previous research on financial audits, the 
detection and reporting of material misstatements was identified as an indicator of 
audit quality (DeAngelo, 1981); it can thus be intuited for performance audits that a 
higher quality audit would detect and report more issues (such as questioned 
expenditures and qualitative observations). This helped develop the research 
methodology, identifying some of the specific data to be gathered: a) the amount of 
questioned expenditures (as a percentage of the total funds expended), which could 
lead to recovered monies or ‘dollar return’ if pursued, and b) the number of 
qualitative findings, which could be applied as a continuous improvement mechanism. 
Thus a research assumption was made that audit effectiveness could be determined by 
the amount of questioned expenditures and / or the number of qualitative findings 
found in the audit report.  
 
The amount of questioned expenditures (as a percentage of total expended) was 
chosen instead of simply counting ‘questioned expenditures’ as one finding because 
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the magnitude of the questioned expenditures was indicative of the strength of 
contract administration and project controls. 
 
More discrete concerns about audit success measures were identified through further 
literature review and elucidated as several specific research questions, which through review 
of performance audit reports could then be answered quantitatively. Thus, the following 
specific research questions and hypotheses were developed: 
 
 How did performance audit scope impact the quantity of audit findings (number of 
qualititative findings, or percentage of questioned costs)? 
 
This specific research question followed on directly from the broad research 
questions, and was further supported by literature review. There appeared to be a 
direct connection between audit scope (likely developed by the client, or the client in 
conjunction with the auditor) and the development (by the auditor, possibly with 
client approval) of the audit workplan. “Audit criteria evaluated depend on the 
approach (scope) used” (Huemann 2004, p. 17). It was noted that audit reports were 
affected by the audit work performed, and were unable to provide more information 
due to limitations of the audit itself. “The audit report will answer the questions posed 
by the audit objectives” (Waring & Morgan 2007, p. 338) … and presumably nothing 
more. There was acknowledgement that a rigid and standardized set of audit questions 
(a checklist) might not be enough to properly assess a program, especially in a field 
such as construction where each program is unique and subject to specific 
circumstances and environment. “It is not good enough to tick boxes [apply agreed-
upon procedures], it is necessary to go deeper, assess quality, and provide feedback” 
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(Huemann  2004, p. 7). Thus, it became clear that care must be taken to appropriately 
broaden the scope of the audits, in order to address stakeholder concerns, risks, and 
performance issues. Indeed, each audit scope should be customized for the program 
itself and take into account any complexity and uniqueness. “Auditing can be 
enhanced by increasing the scope of audits to include technical aspects of the project” 
(Castalia Strategic Advisors 2009, p. 31). 
 
It was interesting to note that previous research on financial audit quality did not 
consider audit scope, although they did consider the hours spent and fees charged 
(which could be analogous to the depth of testing). This may have been because the 
parameters for financial audit were globally well defined and accepted, compared to 
performance audit. 
 
Hypothesis 10: Different kinds of audit (scope) do not yield different types of 
findings. 
Hypothesis 1A: Different kinds of audit (scope) yield different types of findings. 
 
 If a construction professional was a member of the performance audit team, were 
audit findings affected? 
 
This specific research question also followed on directly from the broad research 
questions, with considerable evidence from literature review that auditor skills 
significantly affect the audit workplan. “Auditors' knowledge of the client's industry 
directly affects changes made by the auditors to the planned audit procedures” (Low 
2004, p. 202). And, thus, auditor skills are likely to significantly affect audit results. 
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“For oversight to increase value for money, overseers must be competent to carry out 
the work” (Castalia Strategic Advisors 2009, p. 8). Competence, in this instance, was 
interpreted as industry expertise. “Auditors’ knowledge of the client’s industry 
improves their audit risk assessments and quality” (Low 2004, p. 202).  Especially for 
complex capital programs, there was industry consensus that “the auditor needs 
profound [project / program management] competencies” (Huemann 2004, p. 21), “an 
independent assessor needs to be generally knowledgeable about the area to be 
evaluated” (Dowd 2003, p. 1), “construction contract auditing is complex and is best 
performed by individuals with expertise in construction” (Creech W. D. 2007, p. 2), 
“an attribute of [financial] audit quality consistently recognized as critical is technical 
and industry expertise” (Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail 2010, p. 161), and auditors must 
have “the skills and experience required to undertake its oversight role. Such expertise 
would need to include a high degree of familiarity with the construction sector, and, 
depending on the oversight to be undertaken, some combination of legal, accounting, 
and project management skills” (Castalia Strategic Advisors 2009, p. 12). 
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Due to observations of “deficient audit work conducted by CPAs” (Davis 1980, p. 
36), it was frequently stated in literature review that  
 
“accounting expertise alone is insufficient in addressing the issues of project 
quality or methods. The generally accepted auditing standards, through 
pronouncement SAS 73 (Auditing Standards Board, 1994), allow accountants 
to seek the assistance of third party experts. The accounting community, 
however, interpreted this standard as giving them the option but not require 
them to use a third party expert” (Lazarczyk 2009, p. 2).  
 
It was noted that, despite the clear industry unanimity that specific expertise is needed 
on the audit team, and provisions made in auditing standards to enable inclusion of 
technical experts, “in numerous cases, the audit function is conducted by a CPA 
[certified public accountant]” (Opfer 2006, p. 7), instead of by team members 
proficient in the industry being audited. Thus, this research made a distinction 
between CPAs experienced in construction expenditure review, and construction 
professionals with field experience in the management and delivery of capital 
projects. 
 
Hypothesis 20: Where a construction professional is part of the performance audit 
team, there will not be more qualitative findings than where a construction 
professional is not part of the audit team. 
Hypothesis 2A: Where a construction professional is part of the performance audit 
team, there will be more qualitative findings than where a construction professional is 
not part of the audit team. 
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Hypothesis 30: Where a construction professional is part of the performance audit 
team, there will not be more quantitative findings than where a construction 
professional is not part of the audit team. 
Hypothesis 3A: Where a construction professional is part of the performance audit 
team, there will be more quantitative findings than where a construction professional 
is not part of the audit team. 
 
 Did the application of audit standards affect performance audit findings? 
 
The auditing standards referenced above were mentioned several times during 
literature review, and indeed in some cases mandated by law or by professional 
associations. “A working knowledge of the standards of internal auditing is essential” 
(Creech W. D. 2007, p. 3), and “members of the IIA [Institute of Internal Auditors] 
must perform audits in accordance with the standards” (Creech W. D., 2007).  
 
However, it was also noted in the literature review that, while “auditors typically rely 
on generally accepted auditing standards … these standards do not offer much 
guidance on how to audit projects” (Lazarczyk 2009, p. 2). And, indeed, these 
“standards may represent the lowest common denominator of the practice of the 
profession” (Funkhouser 1984, p. 261), even though past studies of [financial] audits 
have used the application of GAGAS standards as an indicator of audit quality 
(Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail 2010, 161). Thus, a new research question was 
developed, one which questioned the relevance of audit standards. 
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Hypothesis 40: Application of the GAGAS audit standard will not generate more 
qualitative findings than performance audits where no standards are applied. 
Hypothesis 4A: Application of the GAGAS audit standard will generate more 
qualitative findings than performance audits where no standards are applied. 
 
Hypothesis 50: Application of the GAGAS audit standard will not generate more 
quantitative findings than performance audits where no standards are applied. 
Hypothesis 5A: Application of the GAGAS audit standard will generate more 
quantitative findings than performance audits where no standards are applied. 
 
 Did a higher percentage of tested expenditures yield more findings? 
 
Literature review also surfaced some questions about sampling and testing 
methodologies. It was noted that “most audit engagements are undertaken in 
situations where constraints of cost as well as time limit the amount of testing done” 
(Tayi & Gangolly 1985, p. 951). Although “sampling strategies must be appropriate 
to the objective” (Waring & Morgan 2007, p. 345), there was no standard industry 
guidance regarding what percentage of the total dollar value of expenditures should be 
tested, as “the Standards on Audit Sampling do not suggest any guidelines” (Tayi & 
Gangolly 1985, p. 951). In the auditor’s experience, it was common in practice, when 
clients commented on a particularly small number of individual expenditures 
questioned or low number of qualitative findings in the audit, for auditors to respond 
that they were limited by time and cost, and could certainly have identified more 
findings or errors had they been allowed to test ‘more’ expenditures. One was tempted 
to determine whether or not this was actually true. Thus, new research questions were 
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developed, one which questioned whether testing a higher percentage of expenditures 
would yield more findings, or whether there was indeed truth in the concept of a 
representative sample adequately reflecting the characteristics of a broader population 
(Sawyer, Dittenhofer, & Scheiner, 2003). The other considered the difference between 
testing a higher percentage of expenditures and testing a higher number of discrete 
expenditures, and whether testing a higher number of discrete expenditures would 
yield more findings. 
 
Hypothesis 60: Testing a higher percentage of total expenditures will not yield more 
quantitative findings. 
Hypothesis 6A: Testing a higher percentage of total expenditures will yield more 
quantitative findings. 
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Hypothesis 70: Testing a higher percentage of total expenditures will not yield more 
qualitative findings. 
Hypothesis 7A: Testing a higher percentage of total expenditures will yield more 
qualitative findings. 
 
Hypothesis 80: Testing a higher number of discrete expenditures will not yield more 
quantitative findings. 
Hypothesis 8A: Testing a higher number of discrete expenditures will yield more 
quantitative findings. 
 
Hypothesis 90: Testing a higher number of discrete expenditures will not yield more 
qualitative findings. 
Hypothesis 9A: Testing a higher number of discrete expenditures will yield more 
qualitative findings. 
 
DATA POPULATION 
 
Because documentation from taxpayer- funded capital programs was a matter of public 
record, and State of California law required publication of annual audit reports, audit results 
were readily obtained from final audit reports published on the websites of various publicly-
funded schools and community colleges. This data population was directly relevant to the 
purpose of the survey. 
 
With the objective of identifying a homogeneous yet broad data population, the author 
selected audit reports from bond-funded school district construction programs (kindergarten 
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through 12th grade) and community college district bond-funded construction programs in the 
State of California (United States of America), in which the Owner-entities were statutorily 
bound to conduct an annual performance audit. It should be noted that these capital programs 
typically included multiple projects, often across multiple campuses or locations within the 
same district. The figure below shows graphically the data population distribution between 
school district and community college district capital programs. The construction programs 
(both school and community college districts) represented by the data population were 
unilaterally subject to the same public procurement laws, audit requirements, shared-
governance requirements, and State and Federal oversight. They used the same population of 
construction companies and consultants, constructed similar buildings, and generated hard & 
soft costs which were affected by similar taxes and economic conditions. 
 
 
Figure 2. Source Data Composition – Public Entity Type 
 
All the educational entities audited were also required to publish their audit reports on their 
public website, and deliver the final (official) audit reports by March of each year. The 
publication requirement was not met consistently or in a timely fashion by many agencies in 
the State, thus audit reports for some Districts were unavailable at the initial time of data 
gathering, even though the audits were conducted. Not all public agencies abided by the 
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annual audit requirement, and thus audit reports were completely unavailable for certain 
Districts.  
 
In the initial data-gathering phase, 240 official performance audit reports were obtained for 
meta-analysis along with, for comparison purposes, 378 expenditure audit reports. The 
information was collected in an unbiased, first-hand systematic fashion, as described below. 
Two years later, when more official performance audit reports were available, a second data-
gathering effort was conducted, during which 150 additional official performance audit 
reports and seven risk-based audit reports were obtained. This second round of data-
gathering, in addition to expanding the sample population, served to validate the reliability of 
the first data set, as statistical analysis yielded similar results for the first, second, and total 
data sets, thus proving the results to be repeatable and consistent. First-hand observation is 
considered a strong data collection method. The size of the performance audit sample (390) 
was justified with respect to the number of variables (7) in question, using the principle of 
subject-to-variable ratio. The STV was calculated as 55.71. 
 
The data population represented 111 discrete Districts, with the official records (audit 
reports) accepted by the Districts and their Citizens’ Oversight Committees, and publicly 
published between the years of 2002 and 2011. The construction programs that varied in size 
from $3 million to $14 billion in capital improvements. The data population represented $42 
billion in construction, which was one hundred percent (by U.S. dollar value) of available 
data from bond-funded programs in the State of California at the time the data was gathered. 
Data was gathered by first obtaining a list of all community college districts and school 
districts in the State of California, and systematically visiting (in alphabetical order) the bond 
program website for each and every district. The sample was probability based and random, 
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although the data used for analysis was ultimately representative of the entire population of 
available performance audit reports from bond-funded construction programs in the State of 
California. The data collection process was easily replicatable. 
 
The figure below represents graphically the data population of capital programs, by size. 
 
 
Figure 3. Source Data Composition – Construction Program Size 
 
Some of the audit reports were from the same construction programs, where the audit work 
was conducted during different years, with a different population of expenditures, and audit 
work performed by different audit firms or audit team members. There was no consistency in 
the timing of the expenditure or risk-based audits, as the audits in the population were not 
statutorily-required. There was consistency in the timing of the performance audits, as all the 
audits in the population were required to be conducted at fiscal year-end, which for all K-12 
and community college Districts in the State of California was during the month of June. The 
expenditure and performance audits were conducted by many different audit teams and 
companies, which included a range of firm sizes from major audit firms (top 15 in the United 
States, in revenue) to small businesses, and also included internal audit teams for the agencies 
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audited. The figure below represents graphically the population of audit firms that conducted 
the audits, by size.  
 
 
Figure 4. Source Data Composition – Audit Firm Size 
 
The data gathered represented audit reports through March 2011, as audits for each fiscal 
year were typically conducted in July after fiscal yearend on 30 June, and audit reports were 
typically made available to the general public during first quarter of the subsequent year (with 
a regulatory requirement that audit reports be published in March of each year). 
 
Observational data was gathered through careful review of audit reports. By using literature 
review and previous research on financial audits to inform the data to be gathered, assurance 
was provided that the research was measuring what it should measure, and provided 
information relevant to the questions being asked. No specific software was used to 
automatically capture the data; information was gathered by reading each audit report several 
times through.  
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On the first read-through of each report, broad information captured included the capital 
program audited, audit firm, date, description of the scope of work, and audit methodology 
applied. This information was readily found in the ‘scope’ and / or ‘objective’ sections of 
each audit report, and stated explicitly in reports, thus collection of this information could not 
be biased and could be easily replicated and checked. The information was recorded, not 
interpreted. The specific data next extracted from the population of audit reports, in a second 
read-through, identified through literature review, included: audit type, contract type, total 
expenditures to date, dollar value (and percentage) of expenditures tested, expenditures 
questioned (dependent variable), type of audit standards applied, total invoices available, and 
number of invoices tested. This information was readily found in the ‘scope’ and / or 
‘procedures performed’ sections of each audit report, and stated explicitly in reports, thus 
collection of this information could not be biased and could be easily replicated and checked. 
Indeed, previously collected data was spot-checked at the time of subsequent re-reads of the 
reports. The information was recorded, not interpreted. Next, in third and subsequent read-
throughs of each report, the number of qualitative findings (dependent variable) was noted, 
and the various qualitative and quantitative findings were categorized according to type. This 
information was readily found in the ‘results’ or ‘audit findings’ sections of each audit report, 
and stated explicitly in reports, thus collection of this information could not be biased and 
could be easily replicated and checked.  
 
TYPES OF AUDIT SCOPE 
 
For the purposes of discussion, an expenditure audit involved review of expenditures to date, 
both those in the original contract and those incurred through change orders. The scope of 
work would typically involve selecting a sample of expenditures to be tested, and then 
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reviewing supporting documentation (such as purchase orders, receipts, general ledger, 
invoices, and timesheets) related to those expenditures. The auditor would then ensure that 
monies (including reimbursable items) were spent in accordance with the terms of the 
contract, items billed were actually purchased, work invoiced was indeed put in place, and 
labor charges could be traced to both timesheets and payroll records. Labor burden may be 
recalculated, duplicate charges and math errors sought, and more.  
 
In contrast to the scope of expenditure review audits, while a performance audit often 
included elements of expenditure review, the performance audit was expected to assess the 
performance of the subject construction program against industry best practices. The actual 
scope of the performance audit varied according to the construction program and audit firm. 
 
In the population of performance audits reviewed, it was found that a significant number (316 
engagements, representing 81% of the population) of the “performance audits” were actually 
Agreed-Upon Procedures (AUP) engagements, in which only a limited scope was reviewed. 
This revelation was stunning and unexpected; it was known that some ‘performance audits’ 
had a limited scope, but the prevalence of the practice was astounding. An example of an 
AUP engagement report is shown in Appendix C. The scope of work was often derived 
directly and quite rigidly from the requirements of Proposition 39, which required that “the 
school district board, community college board, or county office of education conduct an 
annual, independent performance audit to ensure that the funds have been expended only on 
school and classroom improvements,” as identified by the voter-approved project list shown 
on the bond ballot. (State of California, 2010) Other language adopted as part of the 
Education Code required that the school or community college district establish and appoint 
members to an independent Citizens' Oversight Committee (COC) tasked with reviewing and 
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reporting on capital expenditures (State of California, 2010); this was sometimes tested as 
part of the AUP. The table below shows the agreed-upon procedures (scope) conducted by 
the auditors in the sample population of 316 AUP engagement reports.  
 
 
Table 2: Agreed Upon Procedures Engagement Scope of Work 
 
In contract, the remainder of the performance audits included a scope that expanded beyond 
that of the AUPs, often measuring compliance against requirements established in the 
Education Code. In addition to establishing a Citizens' Oversight Committee (COC), there 
were additional requirements ensuring that bond funds were not spent on administrative 
salaries or other operating expenses, and specifications for the performance of the COC 
which included a) active public reporting on a dedicated website, b) regular COC meetings to 
review bond fund expenditures, and c) specific provisions regarding the member composition 
of the COC. (State of California, 2010) The scope of these performance audits also often 
included elements of expenditure review and benchmarking against industry best practices. 
An example of a performance audit report with such expanded scope is attached in Appendix 
D. The table below shows the scope reviewed by auditors in this population of performance 
audits. 
 
Scope of Work
% of AUP 
Engagements
Bond funds spent on approved projects 100%
COC requirements met 5%
Test administrative expenses 71%
Funds accounting separate 28%
Report fund balance 33%
Compliance with policies, laws and regulations 47%
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Table 3: Performance Audit (non-AUP) Scope of Work 
 
Comparing the audit attached as Appendix C to the audit attached in Appendix D, it was 
astounding that both the AUP engagements and the expanded-scope performance audits were 
accepted as satisfactory for the same performance assessment purpose. 
 
The risk-based audit involved audit techniques applied as a part of a results-based 
management approach, where the auditors included in the program risk assessment 
consideration of organizational and capital program strategic goals, and the client’s definition 
of success. The strategic objectives of the capital program addressed in the risk assessment 
often included program management / project controls best practices as assessed by industry 
experts, and schedule / cost / quality goals. The risk assessment was then used to develop the 
audit scope and plan. Where risk-based audit was performed, ongoing monitoring of 
performance was often a requirement of the program, wherein lessons learned from the audit 
were expected to be integrated into the program on a go-forward basis, and reporting the 
resolution of audit findings was an accountability requirement.  
 
Scope of Work
% of 
Expanded 
Scope Audits
Bond funds spent on approved projects 100%
COC requirements met 78%
Test administrative expenses 78%
Funds accounting separate 8%
Report fund balance 7%
Compliance with policies, laws and regulations 99%
Expenditure review for compliance with contract 85%
Best practices review 80%
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Five risk-based audits were utilized to test and validate the results from this research. There 
were two outliers in the performance audit data, with an extremely high number of 
quantitative and qualitative findings. Upon further investigation, it became clear that the 
scope of the audits (both conducted as special investigations) was more similar to that of a 
risk-based audit, thus those two data sets were included with the risk-based audit population.  
 
DATA LIMITATIONS 
 
Information about the composition and calibre of the various audit teams, in terms of 
construction industry skill-set, years of experience, and education, was not typically 
published in the audit reports. Thus data gathering of this information was limited to 
information obtained directly from the audit firms, and the author’s personal knowledge of 
the firms and teams conducting the audit work (including staffing changes and / or specialty 
subcontracting by those firms). In some instances, the initial proposal by the audit firm was 
available from the clients, showing the resumes of staff expected to conduct the audit. 
 
In the population of 378 expenditure audits, only 114 reported the number of invoices tested, 
and only 100 reported the number of invoices available. Similarly, in the population of 390 
performance audits, only 110 reported the number of invoices tested, and only 23 reported the 
number of invoices available. This lack of data did not significantly impact the analysis, as 
the number of invoices tested and available were not key to the primary research questions. 
However, the auditors failed to provide an accounting of the capital program ‘spending to 
date’ in 65 instances, and failed to report the total amount of expenditures tested in 207 
instances. Because the audit firms were reluctant, nonresponsive, and/or unable to provide 
additional information, these data gaps rendered a portion of the data population useless for 
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the purposes of analysis, and the sheer quantity of missing data called into question the very 
competence of the audit firms and their work. Although audit standards did not require this 
information to be reported, the audit standards did require that supporting documentation be 
kept (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007), and thus it is reasonable to expect that 
any audit conducted according to GAGAS standards should have that information readily 
available. It could be argued that the auditors may even be doing the client a disservice by 
omitting the information from the report; in the author’s experience, more than one client has 
required that this information be added to the report, or questioned whether the number of 
expenditures tested was sufficient to be considered a representative sample. 
 
The table below contains a missing values analysis. Where audit reports contained 
insufficient data, or information gaps, an effort was made to contact the audit firms to obtain 
information about the number of invoices tested, number of invoices available, capital 
program spending to date, and total amount of expenditures tested. Responsiveness from the 
firms was typically poor, indicating either an unwillingness to share information or perhaps 
unavailability of the data due to inadequate workpapers. However, as noted above, while the 
missing data called into question the competence of the audit firms conducting the audits, the 
lack of data did not significantly impact the analysis. 
 
 
Table 4. Missing Values Analysis 
Number 
of 
Possible 
Values
Number 
of Actual 
Values
Number 
of 
Missing 
Values
Percent 
of 
Missing 
Values
Percent of Expenditures Tested 390 178 212 54%
Number of Expenditures Tested 390 109 281 72%
Percent of Expenditures Questioned 390 386 4 1%
Number of Qualitative Findings 390 390 0 0%
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One column was added to the data set, wherein the author subjectively ranked audit quality 
on a three-point Likert scale. Ultimately, this column of data was not used, and instead 
descriptive statistics, cross-tabulations, correlation, and significance were produced with 
respect to audit report contents (output): quantitative findings (percent questioned) and 
qualitative findings. 
 
DATA ANALYSIS 
 
Basic statistical analysis was used to  provide insight into the key factors that correlated with 
an increase in the number of quantitative and/or qualitative audit findings. 
 
As a first step in analysis of audit results, cross-tabulation was used to develop a contingency 
table in a matrix format, displaying the distribution of types of audit results generated by 
different audit scopes. The second step in reviewing the data was the generation of 
descriptive statistics for the variables in the data set. The third step of data review involved 
creating histograms for the percentage of expenditures questioned (which equated to the 
quantitative audit findings) and the number of qualitative findings.  
 
The next step in the data analysis, and test of the hypotheses, was to identify correlations 
between select variables, presented as a matrix. Bivariate correlation procedures were 
applied, using SPSS V18.0, to measure the strength and direction of direct linear associations 
between sets of two variables. The level of significance chosen was p=0.05, yielding a 95% 
confidence level. For the purposes of this study, Pearson correlation values from 0.75 to 1.00 
or from –0.75 to –1.00 were considered to be strong, values from 0.5 to 0.75 or from –0.5 to 
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–0.75 were considered to be moderate, values from 0.25 to 0.5 or from –0.25 to –0.5 were 
considered to be fair, and values from 0 to 0.25 or 0 to –0.25 were considered to be weak. A 
two-tailed significance test was also conducted, as the direction of the effect could be either 
positive or negative. The subsequent step in the data analysis was calculation and 
interpretation of the significance of the correlations.  
 
Contingency tables were developed and chi-square tests (Fisher’s exact test) performed to test 
the hypotheses of association between select categorical variables.  
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4. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
 
As a first step in analysis of audit results, cross-tabulation was used to develop a contingency 
table in a matrix format, displaying the distribution of types of audit results generated by 
different audit scopes. This analysis was done in the initial data-gathering phase, of 240 
performance audit reports and 378 expenditure audit reports.  
 
 
Table 5: Effect of Audit Type on Audit Findings 
(Nalewaik A. , The Need for Assurance in Project Management, 2011) 
 
Most audit findings focused on routine procedural, accounting, and controls errors, and 
neither the expenditure audits nor the performance audits addressed questions about 
economy, effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of expenditures. It was discerned that 
many of the recurring expenditure audit findings were clustered in the sphere of knowledge 
of the typical CPA (certified public accountant). 
 
Audit Findings
Expenditure 
Audit
Performance 
Audit
Contract compliance violation 32.01% 1.67%
Excessive or unallowable charges 27.25% 3.75%
Lack of expenditure support 23.28% 0.42%
Incorrect rates charged 16.67% 2.08%
Inadequate controls or accounting 7.41% 10.42%
Incorrect math 1.32% 0.42%
Duplicated scope of work or payment 0.26% 0.83%
Recommendations for program 
management improvements 0.00% 30.00%
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A second round of data-gathering was conducted, once additional audit reports were made 
publicly available, during which 150 additional performance audits and seven risk-based 
audit reports were obtained. First, the ‘Effect of Audit Type on Audit Findings’ table was 
reprised to include both the new performance audit report data and the risk-based audits. For 
the purposes of the table shown below, the author classified the findings from all 390 audit 
reports. The table illustrated the non-uniformity of the distribution of audit findings across 
different audit types. Of particular import was the revelation that all (100%) of the risk-based 
audits generated findings. 
 
 
Table 6: Effect of Audit Type on Audit Findings, Expanded Data Set 
 
The additional data did not substantially change the results of the initial analysis. The 
expenditure audit percentages remained the same, as the population did not change. The 
performance audit percentages fluctuated slightly, but remained proportionately the same. 
 
Type of Finding
Expenditure 
Audit
Performance 
Audit
Risk / 
Assurance 
Method
Lack of Expenditure Support 23.28% 1.03% 28.57%
Incorrect Math 1.32% 0.26% 28.57%
Contract Compliance 32.01% 1.79% 14.29%
Incorrect Rates 16.67% 1.28% 28.57%
Excessive or Unallowable Charges 27.25% 2.31% 42.86%
Duplicated Scope of Work or Payment 0.26% 0.51% 28.57%
Inadequate Controls or Accounting 7.41% 11.79% 28.57%
Program Management Best Practices 0.00% 23.33% 28.57%
No issues 33.86% 72.56% 0.00%
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Bifurcating the performance audit results into the two categories of AUP and Expanded 
Scope yielded some additional insight, with 81% of the AUP engagements yielding no 
findings. 
 
 
Table 7: Effect of Performance Audit Scope on Audit Findings 
 
On average, contract expenditure audits questioned 2.65% of expenditures, performance 
audits of large complex programs questioned only 0.04% of expenditures, and risk-based 
audits questioned 37.61% of expenditures. For the purposes of this research, at this juncture it 
was determined that expenditure review was a minor element of performance audits, and they 
were not necessarily key to performance audit scope. 
 
These contingency tables were then used to begin answering research questions. 
 
The results from the research are illustrated by the figure below. 
 
Type of Finding
AUP 
Engagement
Expanded 
Scope 
Performance 
Audit
Lack of Expenditure Support 0% 3%
Incorrect Math 0% 1%
Contract Compliance 1% 4%
Incorrect Rates 0% 3%
Excessive or Unallowable Charges 1% 5%
Duplicated Scope of Work or Payment 0% 2%
Inadequate Controls or Accounting 6% 22%
Program Management Best Practices 11% 46%
No issues 81% 13%
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Figure 5: Research results 
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Hypothesis 1A: Different kinds of audit (scope) yield different types of findings. 
 
With the addition of the risk-based audit reports, and segregation of the AUP and 
expanded-scope performance audit results, it became even more clear that, yes, 
the audit type (scope) did impact the quantity of audit findings (number of 
qualitative findings, or percentage of questioned costs) generated. The causality 
was clear. Having demonstrated a significant relationship, the alternate 
Hypothesis was accepted.  
 
The table also demonstrated that the risk-based audit method generated both 
qualitative and quantitative findings (and more findings) in all categories, 
compared to the other two audit methods. This may have been because, having 
conducted a risk assessment, the auditors were evaluating the program in areas of 
known risk, thus targeting areas where problems were likely or suspected. 
 
The average percentage of expenditures questioned (0.04%) on performance 
audits was of interest. Indeed, of the 390 performance audits in the sample 
population, expenditures were questioned in only eight instances. No provable 
explanation was readily available, although practical experience offered a theory. 
By selecting and testing expenditures randomly, singly, out of context, and out of 
sequence, the auditors likely lacked visibility of the expenditure history, 
justification, evolution, and relationship from period to period, and thus may not 
have had enough detailed information to properly question expenditures. The data 
appeared to support this theory, as certain types of potentially high-dollar-value 
findings were not present in the current population of expenditures (Nalewaik A. , 
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The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction Audits, 2011). Examples of 
these types of findings are listed in the publication in Appendix I. 
 
A contingency table was developed and chi-square test (Fisher’s exact test) 
performed to test the hypotheses of association between expanded scope and the 
generation of qualitative findings. Essentially, this expounded on Hypotheses 1A, 
as a new Hypothesis 10A: There is an association between performance audit 
expanded scope, and the generation of qualitative findings. For this combination, 
X2 = 158.770 with p<0.0001, indicating the association between the two variables 
was extremely statistically significant. 
 
 
Table 8: Contingency table testing independence of variables in Hypothesis 1A 
 
The data from the performance audit report sample was entered into SPSS, and descriptive 
statistics generated for the variables studied. 
  
No 
qualitative 
findings
Qualitative 
findings Total
Expanded scope 8 61 69
AUP 276 45 321
Total 284 106 390
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Percent of 
Spending 
Tested 
Number of 
Invoices 
Tested 
Construction 
Experts 
Included 
Expanded 
Scope 
Audit AUP 
GAGAS 
Standard 
Applied 
Attestation 
Standard 
Applied 
Consulting 
Standard 
Applied 
Percent of 
Costs 
Questioned 
Number 
of Other 
Findings 
N Valid 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
Missing 212 281 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 0 
Std. Error of Mean 1.985% 4.707 .018 .019 .019 .023 .025 .012 .010% .324 
Mode 100% 50 0 0 1 0 0 0 0% 0 
Std. Deviation 26.489% 49.142 .354 .382 .382 .461 .501 .241 .191% 6.398 
Variance 701.648 2414.954 .125 .146 .146 .213 .251 .058 .037 40.940 
Range 92% 305 1 1 1 1 1 1 3% 66 
Minimum 8% 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0% 0 
Maximum 100% 311 1 1 1 1 1 1 3% 66 
Percentiles 25 38.65% 37.50 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00% .00 
50 57.64% 50.00 .00 .00 1.00 .00 .00 .00 .00% .00 
75 85.63% 69.50 .00 .00 1.00 1.00 1.00 .00 .00% 1.00 
 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics – Performance Audits 
 
Standard errors in the table were low, indicating there was not a lot of variability in the 
sample except with respect to percentage of total expenditures tested and number of 
individual expenditures tested. 
 
There was a high incidence of reports in which no questioned costs (quantitative findings) 
were generated. 
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Figure 6: Histogram – Percent Questioned 
 
There was also a high incidence of reports in which no qualitative findings were generated. 
 
Figure 7: Histogram – Number of Qualitative Findings 
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SPSS software was then used to determine correlations between the study variables, and their 
significance. 
 
 
Percent 
of 
Spending 
Tested 
Number  
of 
Invoices 
Tested 
Construction 
Experts 
Included 
Expanded 
Scope 
Audit AUP 
GAGAS 
Standards 
Attestation 
Standards 
Consulting 
Standards 
Percent 
Of Costs 
Questioned 
Number 
of 
Other 
Findings 
Percent 
tested 
Pearson Correlation 1 -.127 -.097 -.103 .103 -.185* .123 -.030 .099 -.047 
Sig. (2-tailed)  .207 .198 .170 .170 .013 .103 .688 .189 .536 
N 178 101 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 178 
Number 
tested 
Pearson Correlation -.127 1 .295** .269** -
.269*
* 
-.060 -.110 .281** -.006 .376** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .207  .002 .005 .005 .538 .255 .003 .949 .000 
N 101 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 109 
Construction 
experts 
Pearson Correlation -.097 .295** 1 .854** -
.854*
* 
-.195** -.362** .408** .109* .638** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .198 .002  .000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .032 .000 
N 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
Expanded 
scope 
Pearson Correlation -.103 .269** .854** 1 -
1.00
0** 
-.074 -.414** .385** .100* .635** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .170 .005 .000  .000 .146 .000 .000 .049 .000 
N 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
AUP Pearson Correlation .103 -.269** -.854** -1.000** 1 .074 .414** -.385** -.100* -.635** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .170 .005 .000 .000  .146 .000 .000 .049 .000 
N 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
GAGAS Pearson Correlation -.185* -.060 -.195** -.074 .074 1 -.649** -.170** -.060 -.167** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .538 .000 .146 .146  .000 .001 .237 .001 
N 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
Attestation Pearson Correlation .123 -.110 -.362** -.414** .414*
* 
-.649** 1 -.251** -.084 -.243** 
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Sig. (2-tailed) .103 .255 .000 .000 .000 .000  .000 .098 .000 
N 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
Consulting Pearson Correlation -.030 .281** .408** .385** -
.385*
* 
-.170** -.251** 1 .201** .531** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .688 .003 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000  .000 .000 
N 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
Percent 
questioned 
Pearson Correlation .099 -.006 .109* .100* -
.100* 
-.060 -.084 .201** 1 .229** 
Sig. (2-tailed) .189 .949 .032 .049 .049 .237 .098 .000  .000 
N 178 109 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 386 
Number of 
findings 
Pearson Correlation -.047 .376** .638** .635** -
.635*
* 
-.167** -.243** .531** .229** 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .536 .000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000 .000 .000  
N 178 109 390 390 390 390 390 390 386 390 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Table 10: Correlations and Significance – Performance Audits 
 
The correlation coefficients showed significant positive correlations between: 
 
 The number of discrete expenditures tested, and the number of qualitative findings 
(0.376) 
 Inclusion of construction experts on the audit team, and the percentage of total 
expenditures (by dollar amount) questioned (0.109) 
 Inclusion of construction experts on the audit team, and the number of qualitative 
findings (0.638) 
 Broader audit scope, and the percentage of total expenditures (by dollar amount) 
questioned (0.100) 
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 Broader audit scope, and the number of qualitative findings (0.635) 
 
The correlation coefficients showed significant negative correlations between: 
 
 Application of agreed-upon-procedures, and the percentage of total expenditures (by 
dollar amount) questioned (-0.100) 
 Application of agreed-upon-procedures, and the number of qualitative findings  
(-0.635) 
 Application of GAGAS standards, and the number of qualitative findings (-0.167) 
 
The statistical analysis was then used to address the remaining research questions. 
 
Hypothesis 2A: Where a construction professional is part of the performance audit team, there 
will be more qualitative findings than where a construction professional is not part of the 
audit team. 
 
There was a moderately significant positive correlation (0.638) at the 0.01 level, 
between construction professionals as part of the performance audit team, and the 
generation of qualitative audit findings, resulting in acceptance of the alternate 
hypothesis.  
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This causality may be related to the industry experience of the construction 
professionals, and their understanding of projects, such as: best practices, policies 
and procedures, risk, and more. This supported findings from previous studies, 
wherein auditor’s industry expertise was recognized as an attribute of [financial] 
audit quality (Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail 2010, p. 161). 
 
A contingency table was developed and chi-square test (Fisher’s exact test) 
performed to test the hypotheses of association between construction experts and 
qualitative findings. Essentially, this expounded on Hypotheses 2A, as a new 
Hypothesis 11A: There is an association between a construction professional as 
part of the performance audit team, and more qualitative findings. For this 
combination, X2 = 146.047 with p <0.0001, indicating an extremely statistically 
significant association between the two variables. 
 
 
Table 11: Contingency table testing independence of variables in Hypothesis 2A 
 
  
No 
qualitative 
findings
Qualitative 
findings Total
Construction expert 4 53 57
No construction expert 280 53 333
Total 284 106 390
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Hypothesis 3A: Where a construction professional is part of the performance audit team, there 
will be more quantitative findings than where a construction professional is not part of the 
audit team. 
 
There was also a weakly significant positive correlation (0.109) at the 0.05 level, 
between construction professionals as part of the performance audit team, and the 
generation of quantitative audit findings (questioned expenditures), resulting in 
acceptance of the alternate hypothesis.  
 
This may have been related to the industry experience of the construction 
professionals, and their understanding of payment application, invoice, change 
order, and claims review. This supported findings from previous studies, wherein 
auditor’s industry expertise was recognized as an attribute of [financial] audit 
quality (Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail 2010, p. 161). However, this significance 
was considerably slighter than the correlation between construction professionals 
as part of the performance audit team, and the generation of qualitative audit 
findings, leading to the conclusion that a skilled and appropriately trained CPA 
could also adequately perform expenditure review and compliance testing.  
 
A chi-squared test of these variables was not conducted, as only 9 out of 390 
performance audits (0.02% of the population) yielded quantitative findings. 
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Hypothesis 4A: Application of the GAGAS audit standard will generate more qualitative 
findings than performance audits where no standards are applied. 
 
There was a weakly significant negative correlation (-0.167) at the 0.01 level, 
between the application of GAGAS standards and the generation of qualitative 
audit findings, and thus there was insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis.  
 
This was likely because the audit firms that applied GAGAS standards had audit 
teams comprised primarily of CPAs, and were less likely to have included 
construction professionals on the audit team. The causality was unclear, and the 
correlation may have been due to other identified or unidentified variables, such 
as the weakly significant negative correlation (-0.195) between construction 
professionals on the audit team and application of GAGAS standards (e.g., where 
GAGAS standards were applied, construction professionals were less likely to be 
part of the audit team). This current research did not necessarily disprove previous 
studies which equated application of GAGAS standards with [financial] audit 
quality (Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail 2010, p. 161), and also used rigorous 
adherence to GAGAS standards (auditor quality) as a proxy for audit quality. 
 
Further (see “other results”, below), the data showed that reports from the AUP 
engagements included language indicating that the engagements were conducted 
according to GAGAS standards, even though the two were mutually exclusive. As 
there was a significant negative correlation between the application of agreed-
upon-procedures and the percentage of expenditures questioned (-0.100), and the 
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application of agreed-upon-procedures, and the number of qualitative findings  
(-0.635), where those AUP engagements claimed to have been conducted 
according to GAGAS standards then there would also be a negative correlation 
between GAGAS and both qualitative and quantitative findings. 
 
A contingency table was developed and chi-square test performed to test the 
hypotheses of association between the application GAGAS standards and the 
generation of qualitative findings. Essentially, this expounded on Hypotheses 4A, 
as a new Hypothesis 12A: There is an association between the application of 
GAGAS standards, and the generation of qualitative findings. For this 
combination, X2 = 9.310 with p =0.002, indicating the association between the 
two variables was not significant. 
 
 
Table 12: Contingency table testing independence of variables in Hypothesis 4A 
 
Hypothesis 5A: Application of the GAGAS audit standard will generate more quantitative 
findings than performance audits where no standards are applied. 
 
There was no significant correlation between the application of GAGAS standards 
and the generation of quantitative findings (questioned expenditures), therefore 
there was insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis.  
No 
qualitative 
findings
Qualitative 
findings Total
GAGAS standards 99 20 119
No GAGAS standards 185 86 271
Total 284 106 390
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As accounting firms were more likely to apply GAGAS standards than consulting 
firms, and audit teams from accounting firms were likely to be comprised 
primarily of CPAs, this supported the idea that a skilled and appropriately trained 
CPA could adequately perform expenditure review and contract compliance 
testing. This concept was supportable because the majority of questioned 
expenditures in the audit population were due to contract compliance, 
mathematical, or accounting issues. 
 
A chi-squared test of these variables was not conducted, as only 9 out of 390 
performance audits (0.02% of the population) yielded quantitative findings. 
 
Hypothesis 6A: Testing a higher percentage of total expenditures will yield more quantitative 
findings. 
 
There was no significant correlation between testing a higher percentage of the 
total dollar value of expenditures and the generation of quantitative findings 
(questioned expenditures), and thus there was insufficient evidence to reject the 
null hypothesis.  
 
This was possibly due to the sample selection process used for the audits. In 
practice, an audit team instructed to test a high percentage of expenditures (such 
as 50% or 75%) might judgmentally select high-value expenditures to meet the 
goal, thus testing a high percentage of expenditures yet at the same time testing a 
low number of expenditures. 
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Ultimately, this lack of significant correlation served to emphasize that 
expenditure review was not a key element of performance audits. If control over 
expenditures was truly of concern to the client, then perhaps they should 
commission a separate expenditure audit in addition to the performance audit. 
 
Hypothesis 7A: Testing a higher percentage of expenditures will yield more qualitative 
findings. 
 
There was no significant correlation between testing a higher percentage of the 
total dollar value of expenditures and the generation of qualitative findings, and 
thus there was insufficient evidence to reject the null hypothesis.  
 
As with the previous hypothesis, this was possibly due to the sample selection 
process used for the audits, and the type of data reviewed. In practice, an audit 
team instructed to test a high percentage of expenditures (such as 50% or 75%) 
might judgmentally select high-value expenditures to meet the goal, thus testing a 
high percentage of expenditures yet at the same time testing a low number of 
expenditures. Further, review of qualitative data (such as project team 
composition, and compliance with policies and procedures) is more likely to 
generate qualitative audit findings than review of expenditures. 
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Hypothesis 8A: Testing a higher number of discrete expenditures will yield more quantitative 
findings. 
 
There was no significant correlation between testing a higher number of 
individual expenditures and the generation of quantitative findings (questioned 
expenditures), and thus there was insufficient evidence to reject the null 
hypothesis.  
 
This may have been due to the nature of expenditure review and contract 
compliance testing, proving the expenditure testing sample was indeed 
representative of the whole expenditure population, with respect to contract 
compliance, mathematical, or accounting issues. 
 
Ultimately, this lack of significant correlation served to emphasize that 
expenditure review was not a key element of performance audits. If control over 
expenditures was truly of concern to the client, then perhaps they should 
commission a separate expenditure audit in addition to the performance audit. 
 
Hypothesis 9A: Testing a higher number of discrete expenditures will yield more qualitative 
findings. 
 
There was a fairly significant positive correlation (0.376) at the 0.01 level, 
between testing a higher number of individual expenditures and the generation of 
qualitative audit findings, resulting in acceptance of the alternate hypothesis.  
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This may have been due to the nature of evaluation research and social science 
techniques, whereby a larger population sample yields even deeper insight into 
the dynamics and complexities of the subject being studied, creating context and 
illuminating the circumstances surrounding project performance. In addition, it is 
feasible to test a high number of low-value expenditures, thus testing a high 
number of expenditures does not necessarily mean that a high percentage of total 
expenditures was tested.  
 
One test of internal data validity is to ask the question, “Are the results credible?” In this 
instance, the answer from construction industry audit experts is “yes” for all hypotheses. 
Further, the results can be generalized and transferred to other contexts, which is a test of 
external data validity. 
 
OTHER RESULTS 
 
There was other information gleaned from the statistical analysis and the review of audit 
reports, which was not part of the scope of this research and did not answer specific research 
questions, but which represented some findings that should be significant to the audit 
community. 
 
In the 1980’s, studies of audit perceived that large (national / international) audit firms 
provided higher quality audits than small audit firms (Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail 2010, p. 
156), and size of audit firm was used in studies as a proxy for audit quality. However, with 
the collapse of Enron in 2001, that perception became questionable and subsequent studies 
reversed the previous findings, demonstrating that there was no significant difference in the 
quality of audit based on audit firm size (Iskandar, Rahmat, & Ismail 2010, p. 156).  
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In this current research, review of audit firm size and number of qualitative findings showed 
that larger audit firms generated more qualitative findings that small firms. This was likely 
due to audit scope; in the population of 390 performance audits in the study, 38 were 
conducted by large international, national, or regional audit firms. Of those performance 
audits, 26 (68%) of the audits had an expanded scope, and only one (0.03%) was conducted 
according to GAGAS standards. In contrast, of the 348 performance audits conducted by 
small firms, 301 (86%) of those ‘audits’ were AUP engagements with few qualitative or 
quantitative findings, of which 119 (34%) were conducted according to GAGAS standards. 
This is consistent with the author’s experience, wherein “Big Four” and regional audit firms 
tended to conduct audits with broader scopes which had higher audit fees (revenue) and audit 
hours, whereas smaller firms often conducted agreed-upon-procedures engagements, 
competing on price for the smaller-scope engagements. Interestingly, in previous studies, 
higher audit fees (and thus broader scope) and higher audit hours (and thus deeper testing / 
broader scope) were also asserted to be indicators of audit quality (Iskandar, Rahmat, & 
Ismail 2010, p. 161). The spurious correlation between audit firm size and number of 
qualitative findings did not necessarily imply or assign causality, and other variables (such as 
scope) were likely affecting the results.    
 
Review of construction program size and number of qualitative findings showed that more 
qualitative findings were generated by large construction programs. It was feasible that larger 
construction programs may experience more challenges, and thus more qualitative findings 
would be generated during an audit. However, this could also be due to audit scope. Audits 
on larger construction programs tended to be more broadly scoped and conducted by large 
audit firms, whereas smaller construction programs were audited using agreed-upon-
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procedures engagements. Of the 32 capital programs with bond funding of greater than $500 
million, 14 (44%) of the audits were conducted by large audit firms. In contrast, of the 106 
capital programs with bond funding of less than $500 million, 104 (98%) of the audits were 
conducted by small audit firms. Similarly, of the 245 mid-size construction programs, 221 
(90%) of the audits were conducted by small audit firms. Thus, the correlation between 
construction program size and number of findings was likely spurious, not necessarily 
implying or assigning causality, with other variables such as audit scope affecting the results.  
  
There was a weakly significant positive correlation (0.100) at the 0.05 level, between a 
broader audit scope and the generation of quantitative audit findings (questioned 
expenditures). There was also a moderately significant positive correlation (0.635) at the 0.01 
level, between a broader audit scope and the generation of qualitative audit findings. Exactly 
the same correlations, except negative, were found between the application of agreed-upon-
procedures and the generation of quanitative audit findings / questioned expenditures (-0.100, 
weakly significant significant at the 0.05 level), and the application of agreed-upon-
procedures and the generation of qualitative audit findings (-0.635, moderately significant at 
the 0.01 level). Ultimately, all this proved was that (in a population where either a broad 
scope or agreed-upon-procedures were applied), the AUP served no useful purpose other than 
to show that bond funds were spent on approved projects, and satisfy the statutory 
requirement for a ‘performance audit’, misnomer though it may be. 
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Not only were agreed-upon-procedures not a performance audit; in fact, an AUP engagement 
did not even constitute an audit (American Institute of CPAs, 2001). The fact that audit / 
accounting firms applied the AUP engagements in order to satisfy a performance audit 
requirement was utterly astounding, and indicated that the firms were either unaware that an 
AUP engagement did not constitute an audit (which calls into question the competence of 
said firms), willfully displaced the statutory goal of performance assessment, or bowed to 
client-requested scope in order to win the engagement and, thus, engagement fees (calling 
into question the ethics of said firms). There was evidence in the data that the prevalance of 
AUP engagements remained mostly static over time, with a slight drop in 2010.   
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Figure 8: Prevalence of AUP and GAGAS Audits 
 
Legislation was passed in 2010 at the State level, requiring that GAGAS standards be applied 
on all bond-funded performance audits (State of California, 2010). There was evidence in the 
data (and in the figure above) that the mention of GAGAS in performance audit reports did 
not increase until the legislation was introduced in 2009 and subsequently passed in 2010, 
requiring the application of GAGAS standards on performance audits. Even though GAGAS 
standards were required, the prevalence of AUP engagements in lieu of properly scoped 
performance audits remained. This indicated that, although it was stated in the audit reports 
that the engagements were conducted in accordance with GAGAS standards, the scope of 
work and methodology were indeed not conducted in accordance with the required standards, 
as GAGAS and AUP engagements (which are not audits) are mutually exclusive. 
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It was noted that engagements in which agreed-upon-procedures were applied had a tendency 
to test 100% of the expenditure population, as shown in the histogram below. This would 
have been easy to achieve, as the AUP engagements often tested only whether or not bond 
funds were spent on approved projects; this was one of the agreed-upon ‘procedures’.  
 
With respect to the remainder of the histogram, certain audit firms may have had a 
standardized methodology which governed the percentage of expenditures tested, or they may 
have been given a directive by the client, which would explain the prevalence of audits in 
which 55% of the total expenditures were tested (in the author’s experience, testing “more 
than 50% of the total expenditures” is sometimes a client or audit firm requirement). 
 
 
Figure 9: Histogram – Percentage of Expenditures Tested 
 
It was also noted, in the performance audit engagements, that certain audit firms may have 
had a standardized methodology which governed the number of expenditures tested, or they 
may have been given a directive by the client, which would explain the prevalence of audits 
in which 50 and 60 of the expenditures were tested. 
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Figure 10: Histogram – Number of Expenditures Tested 
 
RESEARCH LIMITATIONS 
 
The research did not address the effectiveness of auditing in terms of long-term impacts to 
the construction program. The true effectiveness of any audit, in terms of recovered monies 
or positive organizational change, requires follow-up on the part of the owner and resolution 
of audit findings. This information would not appear in the original audit report, although it 
may appear in presentations to stakeholders or (more likely) subsequent audit reports if and 
only if the auditor took it upon themselves to report on the status of findings from previous 
audits. This aspect of the study was not controllable, and thus the study reflected only the 
potential effectiveness of the audits, as measured by the number of qualitative and 
quantitative findings, should the owner / client choose to take action. 
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One recurring item in the concept of performance auditing was the consideration of ‘value 
received’ for resources and monies expended (also known as ‘economy’ in the three “E”s of 
performance auditing). For the most part, during the audit process, auditors were unable to 
objectively define and determine ‘value’, and stated so in several reports in the audit report 
population, as the concept as applied was far too subjective and situational. Further, the 
information required to make a determination of value was typically not available to auditors 
except during the course of a very deep audit of a particular situation, in which the detailed 
decision-making process, constraints, and stakeholder input affecting decision-making would 
be reviewed. Any determination of value made with less information and background than 
the above would certainly be subjective and very much reflect the individual opinion of the 
auditor. This same challenge was identified in the World Bank CoST audits (Castalia 
Strategic Advisors, 2009), indicating that the problem of the three “E”s is universal. 
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
IMPLICATIONS FOR ACADEMICS, STAKEHOLDERS, & PRACTITIONERS 
 
The study results had clear implications, in the area of academia and also in practical 
application by both practitioners and program owners / stakeholders. The success of complex 
programs can be very much dependent on their performance from start to finish, and 
management of risks and stakeholders throughout. Pressure for accountability on 
international programs highlighted the strategic role of performance audit as good 
governance, and the literature review furthered an understanding of program performance 
audit as an instrument of continuous improvement. 
 
The findings of this thesis clearly implied that audit scope and methodology need to be 
considered, with regard to how the audit results potentially impact stakeholders and the 
program itself. No studies have empirically addressed this notion and the various factors that 
affect audit results. In this study, five different factors were described, which is a contribution 
in itself to extent research and theory. A new idea presented in this study was that program 
audit results are actually affected by audit scope, team composition, and methodology. 
 
Furthermore, by providing this empirical evidence, the study both drew attention to, and 
provided findings on, variability in audit. This was an area which had not received any 
research attention, even though the importance of audit as an accountability mechanism had 
been repeatedly expressed in prior literature.  
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Of particular value was the project / program perspective which is adopted in this study, and 
the concept of audit as a continuous improvement device. The idea that program performance 
could be evaluated against metrics had been advocated in program management research, but 
had not been applied in the context of audit. 
 
The risk-based audit method was not likely to entirely supercede traditional statutorily-
required audits, but could supplement them. Although the risk-based audit data for this study 
included both audits of contracts and specific expenditure categories, the audits yielded both 
qualitative and quantitative findings. This methodology considerably redefined audit by 
substantially broadening its definition to include any activity that consumed program 
resources, such as human resources, materials, time (schedule), and more. This concept could 
forever change the perception and application of program audit, to include review and 
investigation of program areas not traditionally directly related to expenditures or compliance 
… although, in the end, all program resources (including time) impact program cost. 
 
As it had been demonstrated that technical experts provide necessary value to the audit team, 
opportunities need to be explored for including program audit (both expenditure audit and 
performance audit) as part of standard quantity surveyor, project management, and cost 
engineering academic curricula. In addition to providing a new career path for students in 
these disciplines, the skills and knowledge from such training would also positively impact 
day-to-day program cost management activities (such as payment application approvals, 
change order review and approval, and claims substantiation), reporting, and accountability. 
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As it has become clear from the literature review that performance audit standards do not 
exist, and that the requirements included in GAGAS are intended to protect the audit firm 
from litigation (although the risk assessment component of GAGAS benefits both the audit 
firm and the client), opportunities need to be explored for developing true performance audit 
standards, and expanding GAGAS audit standards to include protections of the owner and 
stakeholders. These new developments would bolster risk management, transparency, and 
accountability in the use of public funds. 
 
FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
The study results created several diverse opportunities for future research in the areas of audit 
methodology, stakeholders, risk, and performance. 
 
The World Bank decision made in 2012 to establish a permanent global construction audit 
program is sufficient evidence that the problems of accountability on capital projects, and the 
perceived value of performance audits, were global and not just local. The findings from this 
research should be tested on a less homogeneous set of capital programs, both nationwide and 
globally, and also in other industries. When undertaking future research, care should be taken 
to note the legislative, regulatory requirements, and standards affecting audit engagements, 
especially outside the United States. 
 
In order to better understand stakeholder expectations regarding performance audits, several 
surveys should be conducted to identify stakeholders, and qualify their perspectives on audit. 
Their reasons for requesting audits could include merely satisfying an audit requirement, 
investigating areas of concern / risk, or using audit as a means toward some other specific 
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end. Their expectations  regarding audit results likely vary from desiring zero findings to the 
other extreme of using audit findings to create organizational change. Their level of 
awareness regarding audit practices also neeeds to be understood, including their 
comprehension of how audit methodology and results are affected by such factors as: the 
solicitation process, scope of work, sampling technique, and team compositon. All these 
issues can be researched through qualitative surveys of the desired stakeholder populations. 
For the purposes of this dissertation, consideration of stakeholders was limited to the tax-
paying public, District governing boards, and government agencies. This selection was based 
on the perceived level of stakeholders’ influence and urgency, as evidenced by State and City 
controller audits and grand jury investigations generated in response to vehement insistent 
public outcry. Further study can be expected to yield more information about these and other 
stakeholder groups. 
 
An assumption was made that audit firms, project management firms, and construction 
companies would be consistent in their inconsistency, thus maintaining a homogeneity in the 
data population. Further qualitative study of the composition and calibre of audit teams (in 
terms of leadership, experience, education, and construction industry expertise) could have an 
impact on the discipline of construction audit. Specifically, much deeper review is needed of 
the correlation between experts and audit effectiveness. 
 
The application of Agreed-Upon-Procedures engagements as performance audits and the 
persistent failure by auditors to conduct risk assessments should be of considerable concern 
to the audit and stakeholder communities. Review of audit methodologies and reports on a 
national and global scale would yield a better understanding of whether the situation is 
limited to solely this data population in the State of California or the occurrence is more 
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pervasive and systemic, and may lead to remedial and punitive action for both the accounting 
firms and the public agencies employing them. Some research has addressed issues where the 
procurement official’s personal objectives override those of its principal” (Soudry 2006, p. 
434). Here, the question is whether or not those in public management might skew the scope 
or results of the audit to protect themselves from criticism by public stakeholders, and the 
resulting lack of accountability. This issue, or inexperience of purchasing agents, may answer 
the question of why AUP engagements appeared to be preferred over expanded scope audits. 
 
As mentioned above, the risk-based audit methodology outlined in this study considerably 
redefined audit by substantially broadening its definition to include any activity that 
consumed program resources. More study of the method is needed to understand its potential 
profound impact.  
 
As it has also been shown that the three “E”s of audit are especially difficult to assess on 
capital programs, and the disconnect between performance audit expectations and actual 
scope of work is likely to persist, a methodology needs to be developed for assessing the 
economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of programs. It is likely that the methodology will 
vary by industry, e.g.: there will be specific criteria for information technology, construction, 
etc. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
On November 7, 2006, the Bakersfield City School District (the “District”) submitted for voter 
approval Measure G, a bond measure to authorize the sale of $100 million in bonds to improve 
school facilities. This measure was submitted to voters under the terms and conditions of 
Proposition 39 (Article XIII of the California State Constitution), which requires a 55 percent 
affirmative vote for passage. Measure G passed with 63.8 percent.  
 
Because the bond measure was passed pursuant to Proposition 39, the District was required to 
establish a citizens’ oversight committee and to conduct two independent audits. The first audit 
is a financial audit similar to a district’s annual financial audit. The second audit is a 
performance audit, which evaluates the effectiveness, economy and efficiencies of the bond 
facilities program.  
 
The District engaged Total School Solutions (TSS) to conduct the annual independent 
performance audit for Measure G and report findings to the Board of Education and the 
independent Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee. This report is the annual performance audit of 
the Bakersfield City School District’s bond-funded facilities program from July 1, 2007, through 
June 30, 2008. 
 
Besides ensuring that the District uses bond proceeds in conformance with the provisions listed 
in the Measure G ballot language, the scope of this examination includes a review of design and 
construction schedules and cost budgets; change orders and claim procedures; compliance with 
law, District policies, and guidelines on facilities and procurement; and the effectiveness of the 
public outreach program and communication channels among the stakeholders; and other 
facilities-related areas. 
 
In accordance with the California State Constitution, the District intends to have a performance 
audit completed annually until all Measure G funds have been expended. These reports are 
designed to meet the requirements of Article XIII of the California State Constitution; to inform 
the community of the appropriate use of funds generated through the sale of bonds authorized by 
Measure G; and to help the District improve its overall bond program. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
 
This performance audit, conducted by Total School Solutions (TSS), is the second annual audit 
of the $100 million Measure G bond program. 
 
TSS, in conducting the audit, reviewed numerous documents produced by District staff and 
consultants and interviewed persons involved in the bond program. Representations made by 
District staff and consultants were used, where appropriate, to make assessments and formalize 
conclusions, which are documented in this report. Each audit component was evaluated 
separately and collectively based on the materiality of each activity and its impact on the total 
bond program. 
 
It is noteworthy that the District passed a previous bond measure, and, as of June 30, 2008, had 
received $18.3 million from the State for new construction and modernization projects, including 
projects funded prior to the passage of Measure G. As of June 30, 2008, $71.5 million remained 
unspent in the Building Fund (bond proceeds) and Other Capital Outlay Funds (state, developer 
fees, deferred maintenance, special reserve), and $66 million of Measure G bonds had not yet 
been sold. While the activities of the facilities program prior to Measure G were not subject to 
this performance audit, because of the prior bond measure and other sources of revenue, 
management systems and procedures were already existing and reviewed by TSS. 
 
The District manages its facilities program in a most cost effective manner, using the traditional 
method of in-house personnel (four full-time equivalent positions), augmented with additional 
services by consultants as needed. The District will internally manage modernization and 
miscellaneous projects, while an outside firm will manage the new elementary school. This 
approach should result in project/construction management costs that fall below industry 
standards. 
 
The District selected six architectural firms for its Measure G projects. The construction 
methodology to be used by the District for the new elementary school to be constructed in the 
future will be multi-prime. However, future modernization projects will utilize the more 
traditional general contractor approach. 
 
As of June 30, 2008, four Measure G modernization projects were still under construction 
(Eissler Elementary, Nichols Elementary, Curran Middle and Chipman Junior High), and the 
remaining four modernization projects were in planning (Evergreen Elementary, Pauly 
Elementary, Voorhies Elementary and Compton Junior High). Two of the three new schools, an 
elementary school and a junior high school in the northeast part of the District, are awaiting site 
acquisition. Other Measure G projects, including replacement of modular classrooms and making 
securing improvements, are in various stages of planning and construction, with eight school 
security fencing projects completed. 
 
A seven-member Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee (CBOC) was appointed by the Board on 
August 22, 2006, to provide oversight of the Measure G bond program, as required by law. As of 
June 30, 2008, the Committee had six meetings to review facilities projects. A CBOC website, as 
required by law, exists, and pertinent information is provided, including bylaws, meeting 
agendas/minutes, facilities projects updates and financial/performance audits. The Committee 
issued its “2006-07 Annual Report” on January 22, 2008. 
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The performance audit identified commendations to the District for various aspects of its 
facilities program, including: 
 
• Maximizing state match revenues by keeping eligibility current and utilizing all available 
state programs. 
 
• Contracting for Labor Compliance Program services to ensure compliance with 
Prevailing Wage Law. 
 
• Establishing and keeping current a CBOC website that provides current information on 
Measure G. 
 
• Providing cost-effective facilities management by utilizing in-house personnel as much as 
possible on modernization and miscellaneous projects and using an outside firm and 
multi-prime contracts for the new elementary school. 
 
• Establishing and updating sources and uses of funds, expenditure reports and project 
status reports to the CBOC for all Measure G projects. 
 
• Keeping change order totals on the four modernization projects under 10 percent, and 
implementing informal bidding procedures for projects under $125,000 to streamline the 
bidding/contract award and change order process. 
 
• Maintaining strong internal controls over payments, with full compliance of all legal 
requirements and internal procedures. 
 
• Adopting the California Uniform Public Construction Cost Accounting Act 
(CUPCCAA), this permits informal bidding for projects under $125,000, and developing 
four internal check-off lists based on project cost and bidding requirements. 
 
• Good communications processes to keep the community and District stakeholders 
informed about Measure G by the use of websites, newsletters, newspaper articles, 
construction signs at sites, and Board reports. 
 
This performance audit identified findings in regard to bidding and procurement, and a number 
of observations and recommendations were made that, in TSS’s opinion, would enhance the 
District’s facilities program.  
 
As noted under commendations, the District adopted CUPCCAA, which permits informal 
bidding for projects under $125,000; however, the audit identified three incidences of non-
compliance with bidding requirements: 
 
• Electrical work at Chipman Junior High School was not informally bid as required. 
 
• A bid notice for the Curran Modernization Project was sent to trade journals 21 days 
prior to bid opening, while 30 days is required. 
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• A bid notice for the Curran Asbestos Abatement and Lead Removal Project was not sent 
to trade journals 30 days prior to bid opening.  
 
Some of the more pertinent recommendations include the following: 
 
• Prepare regular, comprehensive written reports to the Board regarding the progress and 
status of the Measure G bond program, including budget adjustments and potential 
shortfalls. 
 
• Because of time delays experienced by the current practice of Board approval of change 
orders prior to execution, the Board should consider delegating authority to approve 
change orders up to a certain amount and later bring them to the Board for ratification. 
 
It is important that strong systems and procedures be in place and understood by all participants 
in the Measure G bond process. The observations and recommendations made throughout this 
audit report will hopefully help to strengthen those systems and procedures. 
 
It should be noted that this work has been performed to meet the requirements of a performance 
audit in accordance with Article XIII of the Constitution of the State of California. Any known 
significant weaknesses and substantial noncompliance items have been reported to the District’s 
management. This performance audit is not a fraud audit, which would be much wider in scope 
and more significant in nature than this examination. 
 
The readers of this report are encouraged to review the report of the independent financial 
auditors in conjunction with this report before forming opinions and drawing conclusions about 
the overall operations of the bond program. 
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INDEPENDENT PERFORMANCE AUDITOR’S REPORT 
 
 
We have conducted a performance audit of the Measure G bond program of the Bakersfield City 
School District, as of and for the fiscal year ended June 30, 2008. The information provided 
herein is the responsibility of the District’s management. Total School Solutions’ responsibility 
is to express an opinion on the pertinent issues included in the scope of this performance audit. 
 
In our opinion, the Measure G funds are being expensed in accordance with Resolution No. 
XVIII passed by the Board of Education on July 25, 2006. It is also our opinion that, for the 
period ending June 30, 2008, the expenditures of the funds generated through Measure G bonds 
were only for the projects listed in Appendix A, Exhibit A in this report. We have also 
determined that the representations made to the public regarding the availability of state funds 
were true and reasonable and that management’s estimates were reasonable and complied with 
the best practices in modernization and new construction of school facilities. 
 
This performance audit was conducted in accordance with the District’s defined scope of a 
performance audit of the school facilities program. The District is also required to request and 
obtain an independent financial audit of Measure G bond funds. The financial auditor is 
responsible for evaluating conformance with generally accepted accounting principles and 
auditing standards pertinent to the financial statement. The financial auditor also evaluates and 
expresses an opinion on such matters as the District’s internal controls, controls over financial 
reporting, and its compliance with laws and regulations. Our opinion and accompanying report 
should be read in conjunction with the independent financial auditor’s report when considering 
the results of our performance audit and forming opinions about the District’s bond program. 
 
This report is intended solely for the use of the management, the Board of Education, and the 
independent Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee of the Bakersfield City School District, which 
have taken responsibility for the sufficiency of the scope of work deemed appropriate for this 
performance audit. 
 
 
 
 
 
Total School Solutions 
 
November 30, 2008 
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COMPLIANCE WITH BALLOT LANGUAGE 
 
On July 25, 2006, the Board of Education of the Bakersfield City School District approved the 
placement of a $100 million bond measure (Measure G) on the ballot with the adoption of 
Resolution No. XVIII. 
 
The full text of the ballot measure is presented in Appendix A. The following excerpt is 
abbreviated language of the bond proposition as it appears in the ballot: 
 
To improve the quality of education, shall Bakersfield City School District be authorized 
to upgrade restrooms and plumbing systems, renovate electrical systems to improve 
student access to computers/technology, acquire and construct classrooms and new 
schools to reduce overcrowding, make health, safety, and security improvements, 
improve facilities and qualify the District for up to $57,000,000 in State grants by issuing 
$100,000,000 in bonds within legal limits, with a citizens’ oversight committee, annual 
audits, and NO money for administrator salaries? 
 
Measure G, a Proposition 39 general obligation bond measure, required an affirmative vote of 55 
percent of voters. The measure was passed by the voters on November 7, 2006, with 63.8 percent 
of the vote. As required by Proposition 39 and the State Constitution, the District established an 
independent citizens’ oversight committee to provide the requisite oversight and commissioned 
annual financial and performance audits.  
 
As of June 30, 2008, the District has issued $34,000,000 of the original bond and expended 
$5,062,277 of issued bond funds. Total Measure G expenditures as of June 30, 2008, are five 
percent of the $100 million authorization. All of the expenditures of Measure G funds were for 
projects within the scope of the ballot language.  
 
TSS finds the Bakersfield City School District in compliance with the Measure G ballot 
language. 
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DISTRICT FACILITIES PROGRAM 
 
While the scope of the performance audit is limited to Measure G, it is useful to review the 
District’s entire facilities program and other sources of funds to place Measure G into context. In 
addition to Measure G funds, the District has received funds from developer fees, the state 
School Facilities Program, the state Deferred Maintenance Program, and various other sources.  
 
The District funds used to account for facilities revenues and expenditures appear in the table 
below. 
 
Fund Description1 
14 Deferred Maintenance 
21 Building (Land Sales and General Obligation Bonds) 
25 Capital Facilities (Developer Fees) 
35 School Facilities (State Match Monies) 
40 Special Reserve Fund 
 
1 Refer to the following tables for a detailed accounting of funds and for an explanation of the use of the funds. 
 
The table below presents the financial summary of the District’s facilities program for fiscal 
years 2006-07 and 2007-08. As of June 30, 2008, the District’s combined facilities funds have an 
ending balance of $71.5 million. For more detailed data by fund, refer to the Capital Outlay 
Funds tables. 
 
Revenues and Expenditures for Facilities Program (Consolidation of Funds) 
  
Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 2007 
Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 2008 
Beginning Balance $27,206,766 $66,805,327 
   
Revenues 6,800,707 10,767,719 
Expenditures 4,506,109 9,389,480 
Uses 0 0 
Sources 37,303,963 3,349,544 
Net Change 39,598,561 4,727,783 
Ending Balance $66,805,327 $71,533,110 
 
  
Page 8
The Building Fund (Fund 21) is used to account for the District’s Measure G bonds as well as 
funds from previous bond issues and other sources such as sale of land. The cash flows for the 
Building Fund since the passage of Measure G appear in the table below. 
 
Revenues and Expenditures for Building Fund 
 
Building Fund 
Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 2007 
Fiscal Year 
Ending June 30, 2008 
Beginning Balance $2,649,276 $36,832,725 
   
Revenues 732,138 1,630,064 
Expenditures 548,689 5,123,093 
Uses 0 0 
Sources 34,000,0001 0 
Net Change $34,183,449 ($3,493,029) 
   
Ending Balance $36,832,725 $33,339,696 
 
1 Sale of Measure G bonds, 2007 Series A in the amount of $34,000,000 on February 22, 2007. 
 
The District’s outstanding debt is presented in the table below. This table includes prior bonds, 
Measure G bond funds, certificates of participation, and capital leases. 
 
Outstanding Debt 
Capital Debt Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 2007 
Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 2008 
GO Bonds 1    
2001 Refunding $11,636,687 $10,344,748 
2006 Refunding 10,266,886 8,968,789 
2007 Series A (Measure G) 34,000,000 34,000,000 
Total $55,903,573 $53,313,537 
COP 2 2,930,000 2,005,000 
Capital Leases 3 517,984 201,328 
Total $59,351,557 $55,519,865 
 
1Passed on November 7, 2006, Measure G authorized the sale of General Obligation bonds totaling $100,000,000. 
2007, Series A bonds in the amount of $34,000,000 were issued on February 22, 2007. The remaining unused bond 
authority is $66,000,000. The outstanding general obligation bonded debt on the 2001 Series A Current Interest 
Bond is $10,344,748; the 2006 Series A general obligation Bond is $8,968,789. Payments on the general obligation 
bonds are made by the bond interest and redemption fund with local resources (property taxes).  
 
2Certificates of Participation (COPs) are loans, not a source of revenue. COPs are repaid over time from the School 
Facilities Fund (Fund 35) and Self Insurance Healthcare Fund. 
 
3Capital leases are payments of capital outlay expenditures, such as portables, which provide for title to pass to the 
District upon expiration of the lease period. Capital leases are paid by the General Fund. 
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CAPITAL OUTLAY FUNDS 
FISCAL YEAR 2006-07 (AUDITED) 
 
Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 2007 
Deferred 
Maintenance 
Fund1 
Building 
Fund 2 
Capital 
Facilities 
Fund3 
School 
Facilities 
Fund4 
Special 
Reserve Fund 
Capital 
Outlay5 
Total 
 
Beginning Balance $2,030,681 $2,649,276 $6,047,949 $4,575,271 $11,903,589 $27,206,766 
Revenues 1,156,657 732,138 3,797,552 539,754 574,606 6,800,707 
Expenditures 2,681,210 548,689 35,608 1,240,602 0 4,506,109 
Uses 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sources 1,063,631 34,000,000 0 740,332 1,500,000 37,303,963 
Net Change (460,922) 34,183,449 3,761,944 39,484 2,074,606 39,598,561 
Ending Balance $1,569,759 $36,832,725 $9,809,893 $4,614,755 $13,978,195 $66,805,327 
 
CAPITAL OUTLAY FUNDS 
FISCAL YEAR 2007-08 (UNAUDITED) 
 
Fiscal Year Ending 
June 30, 2008 
Deferred 
Maintenance 
Fund1 
Building 
Fund 2 
Capital 
Facilities 
Fund3 
School 
Facilities 
Fund4 
Special 
Reserve Fund 
Capital 
Outlay5 
Total 
 
Beginning Balance $1,569,759 $36,832,725 $9,809,893 $4,614,755 $13,978,195 $66,805,327 
Revenues 1,114,166 1,630,064 1,842,062 5,506,859 674,568 10,767,719 
Expenditures 2,139,304 5,123,093 175,170 1,827,507 124,406 9,389,480 
Uses 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Sources 1,108,244 0 0 741,300 1,500,000 3,349,544 
Net Change 83,106 (3,493,029) 1,666,892 4,420,652 2,050,162 4,727,783 
Ending Balance $1,652,865 $33,339,696 $11,476,785 $9,035,407 $16,028,357 $71,533,110 
 
1The Deferred Maintenance Fund (14) is used for projects identified in the District’s Five-Year Deferred 
Maintenance Plan. Funding comes from a District-match contribution (transfer from the General Fund) and a state-
match contribution. 
2 The Building Fund (21) is used to account for revenues and expenditures from General Obligation bond proceeds 
(Measure G) on acquisition or construction of facilities and from land sales. Measure G, Series A for $34,000,000 
was issued on February 22, 2007. 
3 The Capital Facilities Fund (25) is used to account for developer fees. 
4 The School Facilities Fund (35) is used to account for proceeds received from the State Allocation Board for 
modernization and new construction projects. Other sources include a transfer from the General Fund. 
5 The Special Reserve Fund (40) for Capital Outlay Projects is used to fund facility projects. Other sources include a 
transfer from the General Fund. 
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FACILITIES PROGRAM HISTORY/STATUS 
 
To assist the community in understanding the District’s facilities program and the chronology of 
events and decisions that resulted in changes in scopes and costs for projects, this report 
documents facilities-related events since July 1, 2006. 
 
This table of events simply outlines the events of the past two years however, these chronologies 
may become more important over time to assist the community with understanding the 
development of the District’s bond-funded facilities program. 
 
Chronology of Facilities Events, July 1, 2006 – June 30, 20081 
 
1 Board items that use funding sources other than facilities funds, which include Funds 14, 21, 25, 35, and 40 are 
excluded. 
DATE ACTION AMOUNT 
July 25, 2006 Adoption of Resolution XVIII calling for a $100 million bond 
election to be held on November 7, 2006 (Measure G) 
 
August 22, 2006 Adoption of a Resolution approving bylaws for a Citizens’ Bond 
Oversight Committee to take effect upon voter approval of 
Measure G 
 
August 22, 2006 Authorization of the establishment of a Citizens’ Bond Oversight 
Committee consisting of seven members, to take effect upon voter 
approval of Measure G. 
 
December 12, 2006 Certification of Measure G election results  
January 23, 2007 Adoption of Resolution II authorizing the issuance of up to $38 
million of Measure G bonds (2007 Series A). 
 
February 27, 2007 Adoption of Resolution V confirming the bond sale cost of 
$263,500 for Measure G 2007 Series A (Note: Bonds totaling $34 
million were sold on February 22, 2007.) 
 
February 27, 2007 Approval of agreement to purchase a 41.49 acre site at $153,000 
per acre, for a total price of $6,347,970. (However, subsequent to 
approval of the agreement, the land purchase fell through. Please 
refer to page 22 of the report.) 
 
April 24, 2007 Assignment of architectural firms to Measure G projects, as 
follows: 
 
Ordiz-Melby Architects (Bakersfield) 
New Elementary School 
Curran Modernization 
Voorhies Modernization 
Miscellaneous Trailer Replacement 
Future Projects 
 
BFGC Architecture (Bakersfield) 
Chipman Modernization 
Eissler Modernization 
Nichols Modernization 
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DATE ACTION AMOUNT 
Flewelling & Moody (Pasadena) 
Compton Modernization 
Evergreen Modernization 
Pauly Modernization 
 
Harley Ellis Devereaux (Bakersfield) 
Miscellaneous Trailer Replacement 
Future Projects 
 
Renfro & Cuningham, Inc (Bakersfield) 
Miscellaneous Trailer Replacement 
Future Projects 
 
Integrated Designs by SOMAM, Inc (Fresno) 
Miscellaneous Trailer Replacement 
Future Projects 
May 22, 2007 Approval of agreement with Ordiz-Melby Architects, Inc., for 
architectural services for new elementary school on 18.01 acre 
site.  
 
May 22, 2007 Approval of Five-Year Deferred Maintenance Plan  
June 26, 2007 Approval of agreement with Total School Solutions for Measure 
G performance audit 
 
June 26, 2007 Approval of agreement with Brown Armstrong Paulden McCown 
Starbuck Thornburgh & Keeter Accountancy Corporation, for 
Measure G financial audit 
 
June 26, 2007 Approval of Construction Management Contract with Lundgren 
Management for new elementary school  
 
July 24, 2007 Approval of contracts for abatement work with APC Contractors, 
Inc. (Chipman) and Professional Asbestos Removal Corporation 
(Eissler and Nichols) 
$444,110 
August 28, 2007 
C-1 
Award of contract for Chipman Junior High School 
Modernization to JTS Construction (Funds 21 and 35 – 2 bids)  
$2,923,000 
August 28, 2007 
C-2 
Award of contract for Colonel Nichols School Modernization to 
Omega Construction (Funds 21 and 35 – 2 bids) 
$2,035,000 
August 28, 2007 
C-3 
Award of contract for Henry Eissler School Modernization to 
Colombo Construction (Funds 21 and 35 – 3 bids) 
$1,780,000 
September 25, 2007 
C-1 
Amendment One to Owner/Architect Agreement with BFGC 
Architecture for Chipman Junior High School Modernization 
(Fund 21) (Note: Agreement entered into July 1, 2002. The 
project was delayed due to lack of funding.) 
$214,430 
September 25, 2007 
C-2 
Amendment One to Owner/Architect Agreement with BFGC 
Architecture for Eissler School Modernization. (Fund 21) (Note: 
Agreement entered into July 1, 2002. The project was delayed due 
to lack of funding.) 
$135,534 
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DATE ACTION AMOUNT 
September 25, 2007 
C-3 
Amendment One to Owner/Architect Agreement with BFGC 
Architecture for Nichols School Modernization. (Fund 21) (Note: 
Agreement entered into July 1, 2002. The project was delayed due 
to lack of funding.) 
$160,304 
September 25, 2007 
C4 
Agreement for Architectural Services with Integrated Designs by 
Somam, Inc. for Wayside School additions (Nine modular 
classrooms, modular toilets, site improvements, etc.) 
 
November 27, 2007 
B-3 
Adopt Resolution in Support of Applications for Eligibility 
Determination and Funding under the School Facility Program 
 
November 27, 2007 
C-2 
Approval  to file Notice of Completion for the Asphalt Work at 
Various School Sites within the District  (Fund 14 – 11 sites) 
$291,293 
November 27, 2007 
C-3 
Approval to file Notice of Completion for the New Stage and 
Multipurpose Flooring Work at Stiern Middle School (Fund 14) 
$208,642 
November 27, 2007 
C-4 
Approval to file Notice of Completion for the Relocation of Two 
District Owned Classrooms,  Chavez Elementary School – Phase 
II. (Fund 35) 
$19,907 
November 27, 2007 
C-5 
Approval to file Notice of Completion for New Relocatable 
Classroom at Chavez Elementary School (Fund 35) 
$72,642 
November 27, 2007 
C-8 
Approval to file Notice of Completion for Painting Work at 
Various School Sites Within the District. (Fund 14 – 2 sites) 
$197,450 
November 27, 2007 
C-9 
Approval of Agreement with Golden State Labor Compliance, 
LLC, for Third-Party Labor Compliance Services for the Curran 
Middle School Modernization. (Funds 21 and 35) 
$26,559 
December 11, 2007 
C-1 
Award of Contract – Asbestos Abatement and Lead Removal to 
Janus Corp. for Curran School Modernization. (Funds 21 and 35 – 
4 bids) 
$127,135 
January 22, 2008 
X.3 
Presentation by the Citizen’s Oversight Committee – Measure G 
Annual Report for 2006-07 
 
January 22, 2008 
C-5 
Award of Contract to Black Hall Construction for Curran Middle 
School Modernization. (Fund 21 and 35 – 5 bids) 
$3,775,754 
February 26, 2008 
C-3 
Approval of Change Order No.1 – Eissler Elementary School 
Modernization. (Funds 21 and 35) 
$16,517 
March 25, 2008 
C-3 
Approval to file Notice of Completion – New Access Ramp at 
Garza. (Fund 35) 
$341,000 
March 25, 2008 
C-4 
Approval of Change Order No. 1 – Asbestos Abatement and Lead 
Removal for Curran School Modernization. (Funds 21 and 35) 
$3,675 
March 25, 2008 
C-5 
Approval of Change Order No. 1 – Nichols Elementary School 
Modernization. (Funds 21 and 35) 
$115,089 
April 22, 2008 
C-1 
Approval to File a Notice of Completion for Downtown School 
Seventh Grade Relocated Classroom. (Fund 35) 
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DATE ACTION AMOUNT 
April 22, 2008 
C-2 
Approve Change Order Requests from PARC Environmental for 
Asbestos Abatement and Lead Removal for Eissler School 
Modernization. (Funds 21 and 35) 
$10,940 
April 22, 2008 
C-3 
Award of Contract to Air Mechanical for Garza School HVAC 
(Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning) (Fund 14 – 5 bids) 
$150,828 
May 27, 2008 
B-1, B-3 
Public Hearing and Adoption of Resolution to Levy Level I 
Developer Fees - $2.97 residential and $0.47 commercial (65/35 
split) 
 
May 27, 2008 
B-2, B-4 
Public Hearing and Adoption of Resolution to Levy Level II/III 
Developer Fees - $2.83 residential (new units only) 
 
May 27, 2008 
C-1 
Approval of Agreement for the Purchase of Property at 700 and 
714 Niles Street (APN 014-020-11 & 12) (General Fund – For use 
at District Education Center). 
$800,000 
May 27, 2008 
A-1 – A-7 
First Reading of Facilities Policies and Procedures.  
May 27, 2008 
C-2 
Approval to File Notice of Completion – One New Relocatable 
Classroom for Downtown School Eighth Grade 
$60,000 
May 27, 2008 
C-3 
Approval of Change Order No. 2 – Nichols Elementary School 
Modernization 
$63,593 
May 27, 2008 
C-4 
Approval of Change Order No. 1 – Curran Middle School 
Modernization 
$63,086 
May 27, 2008 
C-5 
Approval to participate in the San Gabriel Unified School District 
Cooperative Bid #16-04/5 for Portable Classrooms – Awarded to 
Silver Creek Industries, Inc. 
 
May 27, 2008 
C-7 
Approval of Five-Year Plan for Deferred Maintenance Program $12,068,598 
June 24, 2008 
A-1 – A-7 
Approval of Facilities Polices and Procedures  
June 24, 2008 
C-3 
Approval of Change Order No. 1 from PARC Environmental – 
Asbestos Abatement and Lead Removal for Nichols School 
Modernization (Funds 21 and 35) 
$8,745 
June 24, 2008 
C-4 
Approval of Change Order No. 2 from PARC Environmental – 
Asbestos, Abatement and Lead Removal for Eissler School 
Modernization 
($2,160) 
June 24, 2008 
C-5 
Approval of Change Order No. 2 for Colombo Construction – 
Eissler School Modernization (Funds 21 and 35) 
$56,149 
June 24, 2008 
C-6 
Approval of Change Order No.1 for JTS Construction – Chipman 
Junior High School Modernization. (Funds 21 and 35) 
$39,750 
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COMPLIANCE WITH STATE LAW, GUIDELINES, AND DISTRICT POLICY 
 
 
Process Utilized 
 
TSS examined standard bid documents, contract documents, District policies, reports, and other 
relevant documentation related to the State of California’s School Facility Program. 
 
Background 
 
There are numerous legal and regulatory requirements associated with the delivery of California 
public school construction projects. Various codes and regulations govern these processes.  
 
This review assesses the overall compliance with standards resulting from these legal and 
regulatory requirements. TSS has developed this assessment of compliance to analyze the 
functionality of the District’s bond facilities program. It should not be viewed or relied upon as a 
legal opinion. This section does not include a review of compliance with the California Building 
Code or other related requirements.  
 
TSS has reviewed the following two distinct categories of requirements: (1) compliance with 
state law and regulations and (2) compliance with District policies.  
 
State Law 
 
Many requirements for the construction of public schools appear in different California Codes, 
accompanied by regulations from various agencies. The Bakersfield City School District 
complies with these requirements through the general conditions in the District’s contract 
documents. The District also provides notices to bidders by referencing and detailing the section 
requirements, as appropriate.  
 
The following items are required to appear in the bid documents:  
 
• Division of the State Architect (DSA) approval for individual project/plans and 
specifications 
• Section 00100 (General Conditions): Notice to Bidders. The Notice to Bidders includes 
the required notification for project identity; date, time, and place of bid opening; 
contractor’s license requirements for type and whether it is current; bid bond and certified 
bid security check requirements; payment bond requirements; performance bond 
requirements; substitution of securities information; definition of prevailing wage 
requirements; statement establishing blind bid process; and a reservation of the right to 
reject all bids.  
• Section 00150 (GC): Bid Bond. A bid bond is present in the package and demanded of 
the contractor on a form prepared by the district, as required.  
• Section 00330 (GC): Non-collusion Affidavit. A non-collusion affidavit form is provided 
and demanded of the contractor.  
• Section 00550 (GC): Escrow Agreement for Security Deposits in Lieu of Retention. This 
item is included as an option, as required.  
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• Section 00610 (GC): Performance Bond. A performance bond for 100 percent of the 
contract price, on a form prepared by the District, is demanded of the contractor and 
included in the bid package. 
• Section 00620 (GC): Payment Bond. A payment bond for 100 percent of the contract 
price, on a form prepared by the District, is demanded of the contractor and included in 
the bid package.  
• Section 00905 (GC): Workers’ Compensation Certification. The contractor is required to 
certify compliance with the state workers’ compensation regulations.  
• Section 00910 (GC): Prevailing Wage and Related Labor Requirements Certification. 
The contractor is required to certify compliance. 
• Section 00915 (GC): Drug-Free Workplace Certification. The contractor is required to 
provide drug-free workplace certification.  
• Section 00925 (GC): Hazardous Materials Certification. The contractor is obligated to 
provide certification that no hazardous materials were to be furnished, installed, or 
incorporated in any way into the project.  
• Section 00930 (GC): Lead-Based Paint Certification. The contractor is required to certify 
compliance with lead-based materials regulations.  
• Section 00940 (GC): Criminal Background Investigation/Fingerprinting Certification. 
The contractor is required to select a method of compliance and to certify compliance 
with criminal background investigation/fingerprinting requirements. 
 
State law does not require the items listed below; however, they are required for state funding. 
 
• Section 009100 (GC): Prevailing Wage and Related Labor Requirements Certification. 
The contractors are required to certify compliance with the State Public Works Contract 
requirements.  
• Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise (DVBE) Participation Certification. The 
contractor is required to certify compliance with the DVBE requirements as set forth in 
the state’s School Facilities Program.  
 
The items below are best practices. They are not required by state law or for state funding. 
 
• Section 00110 (GC): Instruction to Bidders 
• Section 00510 (GC): Notice of Award 
• Section 00520 (GC): Notice to Proceed 
• Section 00530 (GC): Agreement 
• Section 00540 (GC): Escrow of Bid Documentation  
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Prevailing Wage Law/Labor Compliance Program  
 
In California, contractors and subcontractors on public works projects must comply with the 
California Prevailing Wage Law (Labor Code 1720 et seq.). This law stipulates that workers 
must be paid the prevailing rate of hourly wages and fringe benefits, as specified by the State 
Department of Industrial Relations, for the region where a construction project is located. 
 
Traditionally, a school district ensures that the Prevailing Wage Law is complied with by 
requiring contractors and subcontractors to maintain certified payroll records for each worker. 
 
In 2002, enactment of AB 1506 created the Labor Compliance Program (LCP), which added an 
additional requirement to school district construction projects that received state funding from 
Proposition 47 (2002) and 55 (2004). AB 1506 was intended to ensure that contractors and 
subcontractors complied with the Prevailing Wage Law. Under AB 1506, a school district must 
make a written finding that it, or a third-party contractor, will initiate and enforce the required 
LCP, transmit that finding to the State Allocation Board (SAB) and take all appropriate measures 
throughout the construction project to verify compliance. 
 
In November 2007, Proposition 1D passed without the additional requirement of a Labor 
Compliance Program. Subsequent legislation that would have reinstated a LCP (SB 18, 2007) for 
Proposition 1D funding was vetoed by the Governor. 
 
Regardless of whether a school district is required to have a LCP, it must fully comply with the 
Prevailing Wage Law. To ensure compliance with the law, a school district should develop and 
implement policies and procedures to be applied to all construction projects, regardless of the 
source of funding. 
 
Commendation 
 
• The District is commended for voluntarily contracting with a third-party to ensure that its 
construction projects comply with the Prevailing Wage Law. 
  
Page 17
 
District Policy 
 
The District has adopted the following Board Policies (BP) and Administrative Regulations (AR) 
for its facilities program: 
 
BP/AR Description Date of Adoption Date of Revisions 
BP 800.1 School Sites 8/28/79 6/24/08 (Deleted) 
AR 800.1 School Sites 8/28/79 6/24/08 (Deleted) 
BP 800.2 New School Plants 8/28/79 6/24/08 (Deleted) 
AR 800.2 New School Plants 8/28/79 6/24/08 (Deleted) 
BP 800.3 Utilization of School Plants 2/26/80  
AR 800.3 Utilization of School Plants 2/26/80 11/26/91 
BP 800.4 Maintenance and Operations Adopted  
AR 800.4 Maintenance and Operations Approved 11/26/91 
BP 800.5 Civic Center and Recreational Activities Adopted 4/23/91 
   12/18/01 
AR 800.5 Civic Center and Recreational Activities 12/17/74 4/23/91 
   12/18/01 
BP 800.6 Property Records – Appraisals Adopted  
AR 800.6 Property Records – Appraisals Approved  
BP 800.7 Illegal Entry – Damage – Theft Adopted  
AR 800.7 Illegal Entry – Damage – Theft Approved  
BP 800.8 Keys Adopted  
AR 800.8 Keys Approved 11/26/91 
BP 800.9 The California Environment Quality Act (CEQA) of 1970 6/24/75 6/24/08 (Deleted) 
AR 800.9 The California Environment Quality Act (CEQA) of 1970 6/24/75 6/24/08 (Deleted) 
BP 800.10 Architectural and Engineering Services 6/24/08  
AR 800.10 Architectural and Engineering Services 6/24/08  
BP 800.11 Site Selection and Development 6/24/08  
AR 800.11 Site Selection and Development 6/24/08  
BP800.12 Facilities Financing 6/24/08  
BP 800.13 Developer Fees 6/24/08  
AR 800.13 Developer Fees 6/24/08  
 
Observation 
 
• In the first annual performance audit for the fiscal year ending June 30, 2007, it was 
reported that many of the District’s Board Policies and Administrative Regulations for its 
facilities program had not kept pace with changing State statutes and State Allocation 
Board (SAB) regulations. The District has since made significant progress in updating its 
Series 800 (facilities) policies and regulations. As noted above, new policies were 
adopted for 800.10, 800.11, 800.12 and 800.13, and obsolete policies 800.1, 800.2 and 
800.9 were deleted. 
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CITIZENS’ BOND OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 
 
California Education Code Sections 15278-15282 established the duties of a school district and 
its duly formed citizens’ oversight committee with respect to Proposition 39 bond measures. This 
code requires that the governing board establish and appoint members to an independent 
citizens’ bond oversight committee within 60 days of the date that election results are certified.  
 
The Bakersfield City School District Board of Education was proactive in establishing a citizens’ 
bond oversight committee and adopting bylaws on August 22, 2006, contingent upon passage of 
Measure G. (The Board certified Measure G election results after the formation of the committee 
on December 12, 2006.) The District created a Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee with initial 
membership representation from the following seven areas: 
 
• Business Community 
• Senior Citizens’ Organization 
• Taxpayers’ Organization 
• Parent or Guardian of child enrolled in the District 
• Parent of Guardian of child enrolled in the District, plus Active in a Parent-Teacher 
Organization 
• Two additional members 
 
During the first performance audit period (2006-07), the Committee met twice (December 7, 
2006 and March 21, 2007) to organize the Committee and to receive an orientation from the 
District’s bond counsel with respect to the Committee’s duties to inform taxpayers on 
expenditures for the bond-funded facilities, funded projects, and the financial and performance 
audits through its annual report. 
 
During the current performance audit period (2007-08), the Committee met four times, as 
follows: 
 
CBOC Meeting Dates 
July 23, 2007 
October 25, 2007 
January 10, 2008 
April 23, 2008 
 
The Committee prepared a “2006-07 Annual Report,” which was presented orally and in writing 
to the Board of Education on January 22, 2008. 
 
The Committee also has a website, as required by Education Code Section 15280(b), with access 
through the District’s website. The Committee’s website includes information on members of the 
Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee, Committee updates, bylaws, meeting minutes, facilities 
projects and financial and performance audit reports. 
 
Commendation 
 
• The Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee and the District are commended for 
maintaining their respective websites with current meeting and project information and 
for fully complying with law and established bylaws. 
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Findings 
 
• There are no findings in this section. 
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STATE SCHOOL FACILITIES PROGRAM 
 
Background 
 
Board Resolution No. XVIII, dated July 25, 2006, calls for the District to access state school 
facilities funds in conjunction with Measure G: “To improve the quality of education, shall 
Bakersfield City School District be authorized to … qualify the District for up to $57,000,000 in 
State grants by issuing $100,000,000 in bonds within legal limits…?”  
 
Measure G includes the following bond projects, with anticipated state funding: 
 
• Two new elementary schools 
• One new middle school 
• Modernization of outdated school facilities 
• Construction of new school facilities 
 
Based on Resolution XVIII, state funding was an integral part of the design of the Measure G 
bond program. The District has filed facilities applications under the following programs: 
 
 50 – New Construction 
 57 – Modernization 
 
As of June 30, 2008, the District has received the state grants summarized in the table below 
from projects prior to Measure G. (The financial data supplied in the tables came from the Office 
of Public School Construction/State Allocation Board [OPSC/SAB] website, which maintains 
current project status for all school districts). As required in the ballot language and as part of the 
facilities master plan, the District plans to submit OPSC applications for the projects funded 
under Measure G. 
 
State Program SAB# State Grant Amounts District Match 
New Construction 50/001 – 50/0141 $7,330,102 $7,330,102 
Modernization 57/001-57/0052 5,685,115 1,833,822 
Total State Grant Amount  $13,015,217 $9,163,924 
 
1These thirteen schools were funded by the state prior to the passage of Measure G. An application for Thorner 
Elementary (SAB 57/009) was revoked. 
 
2These five schools were funded by the state prior to the passage of Measure G. 
 
As of June 30, 2008, the District has received the State grants summarized in the table below for 
three Measure G projects. 
 
State Program SAB# State Grant Amounts District Match 
Modernization 57/010-012 $5,305,582 $3,537,054 
 
With actions taken to establish new construction eligibility and filing of modernization 
applications, the District is on target to eventually receive up to $57,000,000 in State grants for 
its Measure G projects. 
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STATE NEW CONSTRUCTION STATUS 
 
New construction eligibility was submitted to the Office of Public School Construction/State 
Allocation Board (OPSC/SAB) on February 26, 1999, based on CBEDS enrollment data from 
the 1995-96 to 1998-99 school years. Based on that data, the SAB approved eligibility for new 
construction on June 23, 1999, as presented in the table below.  
 
New Construction Baseline Eligibility (1995-96 – 1998-99 CBEDS) 
Eligibility 
District 
K–6 7–8 9–12 Non-Severe Severe 
Baseline Eligibility 2,188 1,274 0 0 0 
 
After the establishment of baseline new construction eligibility based on CBEDS data for 1995-
96 through 1998-99, the District updated its eligibility annually based on CBEDS data, as noted 
in the table below. 
 
SAB 50-01 Enrollment Certification/Projection 
 
Base Years K-6 7-8 SDC Non-Severe SDC Severe Total 
1995-96 – 1998-99 22,239 5,547 478 333 28,597 
1996-97 – 1999-00 22,027 5,675 556 224 28,482 
1997-98 – 2000-01 20,619 5,790 527 208 27,144 
1998-99 – 2001-02 21,842 5,950 416 306 28,514 
2000-01 – 2003-04 22,988 6,258 616 168 30,030 
2001-02 – 2004-05 23,577 5,931 575 151 30,234 
2002-03 – 2005-06 24,395 5,953 567 165 31,080 
2003-04 – 2006-07 26,679 6,683 544 204 34,110 
2004-05 – 2007-08 26,711 6,739 518 210 34,178 
 
From the above table, it can be seen that the District’s certified enrollment projection reflects 
enrollment growth which, in turn, results in an increase in new construction eligibility. 
 
The District completed new school projects with a combined capacity of 1,205 students as of 
June 30, 2008, for which it received $7,330,102 in funding (50 percent state funding) approved 
before the passage of Measure G. 
 
Based on increased eligibility from recent SAB 50-01 forms and the reduction in eligibility due 
to funded projects as of June 30, 2008, the District has the following remaining eligibility: 
 
New Construction Eligibility (June 30, 2008) 
 
District K-6 7-8 9-12 Non-Severe Severe 
Baseline Eligibility 2,188 1,274 0 0 0 
SAB Approvals/Adjustments 2,398 1,826 0 122 40 
Remaining Eligibility 4,586 3,100 0 122 40 
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Land Acquisition/New Elementary School/New Middle School 
 
On February 27, 2007, the District approved an agreement for the acquisition of 41.49 gross 
acres of unimproved land in the city of Bakersfield, consisting of two parcels: (1) 23.48 acres to 
be held in reserve and (2) 18.01 acres for an elementary school. However, subsequent to 
approval of the agreement, the land purchase fell through. As of June 30, 2008, the District was 
investigating potential sites for a new elementary school and middle school.  
 
On May 22, 2007, the District approved an agreement with Ordiz-Melby Architects, Inc., for 
architectural services for the new elementary school. On June 26, 2007, the District approved an 
agreement with Lundgren Management to provide construction management services for the new 
elementary school. This project is on hold pending the purchase of a site. 
 
The District intends to file an application for 50 percent state funding for the new school sites 
and construction after required regulations of various entities have been met (DSA, CDE, DTSC, 
CEQA) and approvals have been received. 
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Past New Growth Projects of the District as of June 30, 2008 
New School Grade SAB# 
1 
(50/ ) 
SAB Eligibility 
Approval (50–03) 2
Eligibility 
Enrollment
SAB Project 
Approval (50–04)
SAB Fund 
Release (50–05) 
SAB Grant 
Amount (%) 3 
District Match (%)
Amount (%) 
Status 
Elementary Schools         
Casa Loma Elementary K-5 003 06/23/99 120 02/23/00 05/16/00 $657,600 (50%) 
$657,600 
(50%) 
Closed 11/1/02 
Chavez Elementary K-6 011 06/23/99 10 10/26/05 01/30/06 $72,925 (50%) 
$72,925 
(50%) 
Closed 06/07/07 
College Heights Elementary K-6 008 06/23/99 21 12/18/02 01/16/03 $142,296 (50%) 
$142,296 
(50%) 
Closed 08/31/04 
Downtown Elementary K-8 005 06/23/99 40 12/18/02 01/16/03 $228,826 (50%) 
$228,826 
(50%) 
Closed 08/31/04 
Eissler Elementary K-6 012 06/23/99 18 10/26/05 02/21/06  $133,707 (50%) 
$133,707 
(50%) 
Closed 06/07/07 
Fremont Elementary K-6 007 06/23/99 80 12/18/02 01/16/03  $457,652 (50%) 
$457,652 
(50%) 
Closed 10/27/05 
Harris Elementary K-5 014 06/23/99 29 05/24/06 07/26/06   $338,621 (50%) 
$338,621 
(50%) 
Closed 11/13/07 
Horace Mann Elementary K-5 002 06/23/99 120 02/23/00 05/16/00   $657,600 (50%) 
$657,600 
(50%) 
Closed 08/31/04 
Longfellow Elementary K-6 004 06/23/99 140 04/26/00 08/09/00   $828,576 (50%) 
$828,576 
(50%) 
Closed 08/31/04 
Mt. Vernon Elementary K-6 006 06/23/99 200 12/18/02 01/16/03 $1,144,130 (50%) 
$1,144,130 
(50%) 
Closed 01/05/06 
Noble Elementary K-5 010 06/23/99 50 10/26/05 02/21/06   $384,116 (50%) 
  $384,116 
(50%) 
Closed 06/07/07 
Owens Elementary 4-6 001 06/23/99 340 12/18/02 02/07/03 $2,042,522 (50%) 
$2,042,522 
(50%) 
Closed 08/31/04 
Voorhies Elementary K-6 013 06/23/99 37 10/26/05 02/21/06     $241,531 (50%) 
   $241,531 
(50%) 
Closed 06/07/07 
Total    1,205   $7,330,102 $7,330,102  
 
1 A project number is assigned when form SAB 50-04 is filed, which requires DSA-stamped plans and California Department of Education (CDE) approval. 
2 SAB eligibility is based on Forms SAB 50-01 (Enrollment Certification/Projection), SAB 50-02 (Classroom Inventory), and SAB 50-03 (Eligibility Determination). Updated 
forms SAB 50-01 with current CBEDS enrollments must be submitted when SAB 50-04 project applications are filed. 
3 The state grant amount is 50 percent of the total state new construction budget, unless facility or financial hardship applications have been filed and approved.  
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STATE MODERNIZATION STATUS 
 
 
Eligibility for a modernization project is established when the Form SAB 50-03 is filed with the 
state, and the State Allocation Board (SAB) approves the application. A school district designs 
and submits a project to the Division of State Architect (DSA) and the California Department of 
Education (CDE). The district awaits both agencies’ approvals before filing Form SAB 50-04, 
which establishes funding for a project. If financially advantageous, a district may file a revised 
SAB 50-03 to reflect the most recent enrollment data. Once the bidding process for a project is 
complete, the district files form SAB 50-05 to request a release of the state share of 
modernization funds for the project. 
 
The District completed the SAB 50–03, SAB 50–04, and SAB 50–05 processes for five 
modernization school projects as of June 30, 2008, for which the District received State funds 
totaling $5,685,115. Four of the funded projects were approved and funded under the previous 
80/20 program and, therefore, received 80 percent state funding. One project received 60 percent 
state funding match, which has been the state match since April 29, 2002. 
 
During the 2007-08 audit period, the District has completed the application process for three of 
the eight Measure G modernization projects, for which it has received State funds totaling 
$5,305,582. When the District files additional modernization documents with OPSC/SAB, the 
District will receive additional state funding for other Measure G modernization projects. The 
amount and timing of potential future state modernization funding cannot be determined until the 
District files project applications for funding (Form SAB 50-04). 
 
The three tables below outline the current status of modernization of schools in the District: Pre-
Measure G Projects; Measure G Projects; and Potential Future Projects. 
 
It should be noted that the District has recently filed adjusted SAB 50-03 modernization 
eligibility forms for projects not currently having an identified source of District matching funds. 
By increasing eligibility, the District is positioned to receive a greater amount of State grant 
monies when the projects can move forward. 
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Pre-Measure G Projects: Existing Schools as of June 30, 2008 
Existing Schools Grade SAB#
1 
(57/) 
SAB Eligibility 
Approval (50–03)
Eligibility 
Enrollment
SAB Project 
Approval (50–04)
SAB Fund 
Release (50–05) 2
SAB Grant 
Amount (%) 3
District Match (%)
Amount (%) 
Status 
Elementary Schools          
College Heights K-6 003 05/24/00 467 07/05/00 08/20/01 $1,105,389 (80%) 
$276,347 
(20%) 
Closed 08/31/04 
Frank West K-5 005 03/26/03 375 05/28/03 12/05/03 990,101 (60%) 
660,068 
(40%) 
Closed 11/6/07 
Harding K-6 004 10/25/00 611 12/18/02 12/05/03 1,580,081 (80%) 
395,021 
(20%) 
Closed 11/6/07 
Harris K-5 001 07/28/99 463 08/25/99 10/7/99 1,047,769 (80%) 
261,942 
(20%) 
Closed 11/21/02 
Hort K-5 002 07/28/99 425 08/25/99 08/09/00 961,775 (80%) 
240,444 
(20%) 
Closed 08/31/04 
Total Five Schools     $5,685,115 $1,833,822  
1  A “000” indicates that the District filed form SAB 50–03 to establish eligibility. A project number is assigned when form SAB 50–04 is filed, which requires DSA-
stamped plans and CDE approval. 
2  This column presents actual fund releases. For SAB approved grant amounts, see “SAB Grant Amount” column. 
3 The state grant amount is 60 percent of the total state modernization budget for project applications (SAB 50–04) filed after April 29, 2002, unless facility or financial 
hardship applications have been filed. (Applications filed before April 29, 2002, receive 80 percent in state matching funds.) State funding is released to the District after 
the project has gone to bid, a construction contract has been awarded, and form SAB 50–05 has been filed. The District must provide its matching share of the project 
budget. This column shows the SAB approved grant amount. 
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Measure G Projects: Existing Schools as of June 30, 2008 
Existing Schools Grade SAB#
1 
(57/) 
SAB Eligibility 
Approval (50–03)
Eligibility 
Enrollment
SAB Project 
Approval (50–04)
SAB Fund 
Release (50–05) 2
SAB Grant 
Amount (%) 3
District Match (%)
Amount (%) 
Status 
Elementary Schools          
Eissler K-6 011 04/16/084 560 04/23/08 06/19/08 1,343,816 (60%) 
895,877 
(40%) 
PM Complete5 
Evergreen K-5 000 03/26/03 425     
Nichols K-6 012 03/26/03 438 05/28/08 06/19/08 1,565,403 (60%) 
1,043,602 
(40%) 
PM complete5 
Pauly K-5 000 03/26/03 550      
Voorhies K-6 006 04/16/084 548      
Junior High/Middle Schools          
Chipman 7-8 010 04/16/084 796 04/23/08 06/19/08 2,396,363 (60%) 
1,597,575 
(40%) 
PM Complete5 
Compton 7-8 000 03/26/03 758      
Curran 6-8 000 04/10/074 899      
Total Eight Schools     $5,305,582 $3,537,054  
1  A “000” indicates that the District filed form SAB 50–03 to establish eligibility. A project number is assigned when form SAB 50–04 is filed, which requires DSA-stamped 
plans and CDE approval. 
2  This column presents actual fund releases. For SAB approved grant amounts, see “SAB Grant Amount” column. 
3 The state grant amount is 60 percent of the total state modernization budget for project applications (SAB 50–04) filed after April 29, 2002, unless facility or financial 
hardship applications have been filed. (Applications filed before April 29, 2002, receive 80 percent in state matching funds.) State funding is released to the District after the 
project has gone to bid, a construction contract has been awarded, and form SAB 50–05 has been filed. The District must provide its matching share of the project budget. 
This column shows the SAB approved grant amount. 
4 Adjusted SAB 50-03 forms were submitted for these schools. The date is the date of submittal, not the SAB approval date. A new modernization eligibility form was 
submitted for Voorhies Elementary, which had previously been withdrawn. 
5   PM Complete = Application has been processed by the SAB. (Source: OPSC website, project tracking) 
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Potential Future Projects: Existing Schools as of June 30, 2008 
Existing Schools Grade SAB#
1 
(57/) 
SAB Eligibility 
Approval (50–03)
Eligibility 
Enrollment
SAB Project 
Approval (50–04)
SAB Fund 
Release (50–05) 2
SAB Grant 
Amount (%) 3
District Match (%)
Amount (%) 
Status 
Elementary Schools          
Casa Loma K-5 000 07/10/074 50      
Chavez K-6 New School – Not eligible      
Downtown K-8 New School – Not eligible     
Franklin K-6 000 03/26/03 25      
Frank West (Adjusted) K-5 000 03/30/074 425      
Fremont K-6 000 03/30/074 275      
Garza K-5         
Hills K-5         
Hort (Adjusted) K-5 000 03/30/074 537      
Jefferson K-5 000 03/26/03 75      
Longfellow K-6 000 03/26/03 235      
Horace Mann K-5 000 03/26/03 165      
McKinley K-6 000 03/26/03 225      
Mount Vernon K-6 000 03/26/03 300      
Munsey K-5 000 03/26/03 150      
Noble K-5 000 03/26/03 325      
Owens Primary K-3 000 06/30/084 425     
Owens Intermediate 4-6 000 03/26/03 610      
William Penn K-5 000 03/26/03 75      
Pioneer K-6 000 06/30/084 200      
Roosevelt K-5 000 03/26/03 100      
Wayside K-5         
Williams K-5 000 06/30/084 125      
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Existing Schools Grade SAB#
1 
(57/) 
SAB Eligibility 
Approval (50–03)
Eligibility 
Enrollment
SAB Project 
Approval (50–04) 
SAB Fund 
Release (50–05) 2
SAB Grant 
Amount (%) 3
District Match (%)
Amount (%) 
Status 
Junior High/Middle Schools          
Emerson 6-8 000 3/26/03 148      
Sequoia 6-8         
Sierra 6-8 000 06/30/084 81      
Walter Stiern 6-8         
Washington 6-8         
Alternative Schools          
Johnson Community Day 6-8 000 03/26/03 79      
Total Thirty Schools    $-0- $-0-  
1  A “000” indicates that the District filed form SAB 50–03 to establish eligibility. A project number is assigned when form SAB 50–04 is filed, which requires DSA-stamped 
plans and CDE approval. 
2  This column presents actual fund releases. For SAB approved grant amounts, see “SAB Grant Amount” column. 
3 The state grant amount is 60 percent of the total state modernization budget for project applications (SAB 50–04) filed after April 29, 2002, unless facility or financial 
hardship applications have been filed. (Applications filed before April 29, 2002, receive 80 percent in state matching funds.) State funding is released to the District after the 
project has gone to bid, a construction contract has been awarded, and form SAB 50–05 has been filed. The District must provide its matching share of the project budget. 
This column shows the SAB approved grant amount. 
4 Adjusted SAB 50-03 forms were submitted for these schools. The date is the date of submittal, not the SAB approval date. A new modernization eligibility form was 
submitted for Voorhies Elementary, which had previously been withdrawn. 
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PROJECT/CONSTRUCTION MANAGEMENT 
 
The District will utilize the following two approaches to project and construction management: 
(1) a “traditional” method as described below for modernization and other miscellaneous 
projects; and (2) an outside firm for the new elementary school slated for construction. 
 
The “traditional” method involves the following participants: 
 
• Owner Representative (District staff – see below) 
• General Contractor 
• Architect/Engineer of Record (AOR) 
• Inspector of Record (IOR) 
• Consultants (specialists, as needed, such as civil engineer, geotechnical engineer, labor 
compliance consultant, etc.) 
 
District staff that will provide oversight and management of all modernization and miscellaneous 
projects consists of the following: 
 
Staff Position1 Full-time Equivalent (FTE)2 
Facilities Director 1.0 
Assistant Director of Maintenance 0.5 
Supervisor of Facilities & Planning 1.0 
Accounting Technician 1.0 
Secretary 0.5 
Total 4.0 
1 All staff salaries are paid out of the General Fund. 
2 A 1.0 Full-time Equivalent or 1.0 FTE means an employee who works a 
standard 40 hour week ranging from 4 days a week for 10 hours a day to 5 
days a week for 8 hours a day. 
 
The primarily in-house facilities management approach should result in a cost-effective project 
and construction management program for the projects assigned to this team given. 
 
The “outside” method involves hiring a third-party project/construction management firm for the 
new elementary school. As noted earlier, the District approved a contract with Lundgren 
Management on June 26, 2007, to manage the new elementary school project. It is intended that 
the new school be built under a multi-prime approach rather than the traditional general 
contractor approach. Lundgren’s consulting staff currently includes a project manager who is 
actually involved in the project beginning at the time of bidding the various contracts. When 
construction starts, three project consultants are added to the construction management team. By 
utilizing a CM firm and multi-prime approach, the District has the potential of generating 
savings over the traditional construction method. 
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The District has released requests for proposals, has received bids for services, and has 
contracted with consultants necessary for administering a facilities program. These services 
include the following: 
 
• Architect/Engineer of Record (AOR) 
• Inspector of Record  (IOR) 
• Construction Manager 
• Environmental Consultant 
• Legal Consultants 
• Mapping and Demographics Consultants 
• Real Estate Consultants 
 
Architectural Selection Process 
 
The District requested proposals from qualified architectural firms to provide services on 
Measure G projects. Twenty-five firms were selected for interview. Six firms were employed by 
the Board of Education on April 24, 2007, and were assigned to Measure G projects as follows: 
 
Ordiz-Melby 
Architects  
BFGC 
Architecture1 
 
Flewelling & 
Moody  
Harley Ellis 
Devereaux  
Renfro & 
Cuningham, 
Inc  
Integrated 
Designs by 
SOMAM, Inc. 
New Elementary 
School 
 
Chipman 
Modernization 
 
 
Compton 
Modernization 
 
Miscellaneous 
Trailer 
Replacement 
 
Miscellaneous 
Trailer 
Replacement 
 
Miscellaneous 
Trailer 
Replacement 
 
Curran 
Modernization 
Eissler 
Modernization 
Evergreen 
Modernization 
 
Future Projects 
 
Future Projects 
 
Future Projects 
 
Voorhies 
Modernization 
Nichols 
Modernization 
 
Pauly 
Modernization 
 
   
Miscellaneous 
Trailer 
Replacement 
 
     
Future Projects 
 
     
 
1  BFGC Architecture had originally been hired to provide architectural services on Chipman, Eissler and Nichols 
modernization projects on January 1, 2002, but the projects were on hold due to a lack of funds. 
 
Commendation 
 
• The District is commended for keeping project and construction management costs at a 
reasonable level by having District staff manage most smaller-scale projects and by 
utilizing project/construction management services of an outside firm with a multi-prime 
approach for the new elementary school. 
 
Findings 
 
• There are no findings in this section. 
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DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION BUDGETS 
 
 
Process Utilized 
 
TSS conducted a series of interviews with members of the Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee, 
business and facilities personnel, the Superintendent, and members of the Board of Education. 
TSS also reviewed documents related to the management and control of District bond funds for 
content and thoroughness. 
 
Background Information 
 
Prior to the Board of Education’s approval to place Measure G on the November 2006 ballot, the 
District conducted an extensive assessment of the conditions of existing schools, along with a 
study to determine a need for new schools. The resulting report entitled, “2007-2014 Facilities 
Plan”, dated June 14, 2006, was used as the basis for the Measure G bond program budget. The 
original budget provided a detailed cost breakdown for: 1) construction of three new schools; 2) 
modernization of eight schools; 3) security improvements to thirty-two school sites; and 4) 
replacement of 216 non-DSA approved classroom buildings with DSA approved permanent 
modular classrooms. The original project budgets and the cash flow projections are presented in 
the attached table entitled, “Measure G Bond Project Budgets”.  For details on expenditures, 
schedules and project status, refer to the “Design and Construction Costs and Schedules” section 
of this report. 
 
To ensure that the District could complete all proposed projects included in the bond projects list, 
the following table entitled, “Measure G Bond Program Sources and Uses”, was extracted from 
the “2007-2014 Facilities Plan”. 
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 MEASURE G BOND PROGRAM SOURCES AND USES
 SOURCES AND USES As of 
June 14, 2006 1
Revised Budgets As of 
October 22, 2008 2
 Sources
 District Funds (Available Balances)
       Building Fund (21) $2,607,022 $5,011,477
       Capital Facilities Fund (25) 5,252,438 11,621,781
       School Facilities Fund (35) 4,334,058 3,114,656
Total $12,193,518 $19,747,914
 Developer Fees (5 Year Projection) 49,740,209 18,500,000
 State Match - New Construction 39,724,203 23,824,755
 State Match - Modernization 17,623,822 18,811,151
 Measure G Bond 100,000,000 100,000,000
Total Sources $219,281,752 $180,883,820
 Uses
 New Schools Construction $101,211,527 $100,032,539
 Modernization 82,848,080 36,602,625
 Security Improvements 6,741,000 7,249,376
 Modular Classroom Replacements 28,481,145 36,999,280
Total Uses $219,281,752 $180,883,820
Balance $0 $0
 1 Source: 2007 - 2014 Facilities Plan, June 14, 2006. Amounts presented may reflect rounding.
 2 Source:  District Facilities Cash Flow Analysis, updated October 22, 2008.
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MEASURE G BOND PROJECTS BUDGETS
PROJECTS Original Budget
June 14, 2006 1
Revised Budgets As 
of 
October 22, 2008 2
 New Schools Construction
 New Elementary School $23,502,783 $26,868,392
 New Middle School 35,862,675 40,675,824
New Elementary School (with Enhanced 
Special) 41,846,069 32,488,323
Total $101,211,527 $100,032,539
 Modernization 
 Chipman Junior High School $9,520,220 $4,454,385
 Compton Junior High School 9,789,501 6,753,169
 Curran Middle School 12,675,293 7,016,698
 Eissler Elementary School 6,451,330 2,354,223
 Evergreen Elementary School 7,995,876 4,076,356
 Nichols Elementary School 15,022,394 2,625,703
 Pauly Elementary School 11,401,088 4,215,240
 Voorhies Elelemntary School 9,992,378 5,106,851
Total $82,848,080 $36,602,625
 Security Improvements
 New fencing and gates, security system, 
 video surveillance and door hardware 
 upgrades to 42 school sites $6,741,000 $7,249,376
 Modular Classroom Replacements
 211 Modular classrooms to be 
 replaced at 31 school sites $28,481,145 $36,999,280
Total Projects Budget $219,281,752 $180,883,820
 1 Source: 2007 - 2014 Facilities Plan, June 14, 2006. Amounts presented may reflect rounding.
2  Source:  District Facilities Cash flow Analysis, updated October 22, 2008.  
 
Observations 
 
• In the review of the Board Agendas and Minutes for fiscal year 2007-08, a 
comprehensive report on the progress and status of the Measure G Bond Program was not 
included for presentation to the Board of Education for information and/or action. 
 
• The “Facilities Cash Flow Analysis” documents demonstrate annual adjustments to the 
total costs of projects. However, these adjustments are not characterized as budget 
adjustments, but are defined in the cash flow analysis.  
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Commendation 
 
• The District is commended for providing “Quarterly Expenditure Reports” and “Status of 
Modernization, DSA Buildings and Security Improvement Projects” reports to the 
Citizens Bond Oversight Committee (CBOC) during their regularly scheduled quarterly 
meetings. These reports provide committee members with the necessary information to 
keep track of the progress and status of the bond program.  
 
Findings 
 
• There are no findings in this section. 
 
Recommendation 
 
• It is recommended that District staff prepare a comprehensive report for the Board of 
Education regarding the progress and status of the Measure G Bond Program. Such a 
report should be prepared and submitted semi-annually, quarterly or as often as the Board 
desires. It is a good management practice to keep the Board informed of the current 
budget and expenditure history (i.e., to report budget savings, highlight the need for 
budget augmentation or additional funding sources) and the status of projects (i.e., 
planned, active and completed projects). 
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DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION COSTS AND SCHEDULES 
 
Process Utilized 
 
In this examination, TSS reviewed files and documents and conducted interviews with 
appropriate staff members. The following report documents actual project expenditures and 
schedules of projects in various stages of planning, design and construction.  
 
Background 
 
Fiscal year 2007-08 represents the second year of the Measure G bond program. The District 
developed and maintained a program schedule which provided timelines showing the school 
years in which the projects are scheduled for planning, design and construction. As of June 30, 
2008, these schedules have been maintained. 
 
Status of New School Construction Projects 
 
The first new school scheduled for construction is an elementary school in northeast Bakersfield. 
During the 2007-08 reporting period, the District continued the search for properties suitable for 
the construction of new schools. At least 14 properties were evaluated during the last two years. 
It is anticipated that a purchase contract for the first new elementary school site could be 
submitted to the Board for approval during the first half of 2008-09.  Ordiz-Melby Architects, 
Inc., is already under contract for architectural services for the new elementary school, while 
Lundgren Management is under contract to provide construction management services. The 
project timeline for the design and construction of this school will be redrawn as soon as the 
District confirms ownership of the proposed property. 
 
The two remaining new school construction projects to be built (a new elementary school with 
enhanced Special Education and a new middle school) and their estimated costs and schedule are 
shown in the attached table, “Costs and Schedules for Measure G Bond program”.  
 
Status of Modernization Projects 
 
Four of eight schools scheduled for modernization were bid and were under construction during 
the 2007-08 reporting period. Asbestos and lead abatement contracts which were bid and 
awarded separately preceded each modernization contract. These schools include Chipman 
Junior High School, Curran Middle School, Nichols Elementary School and Eissler Elementary 
School.  Four remaining schools; Compton Junior High School, Evergreen Elementary School, 
Pauly Elementary School and Voorhies Elementary School, are in the early planning stages and 
are scheduled to be completed in fiscal year 2009-10. The costs, schedules and status of 
modernization projects are shown in the table, “Costs and Schedules for Measure G Bond 
program” on page 37.   
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Status of Security Improvement Projects 
 
New security system improvements at 42 school sites are scheduled to be completed by the 
2008-09 fiscal year at an estimated cost of $7,249,376. During the 2007-08 reporting period, 
eight school security fencing installation projects were bid, awarded and constructed while 
contracts for three other schools are ready for bid. In addition, security hardware (campus access 
control) installation projects were completed in four schools. Security camera (video 
surveillance) systems installation projects were completed in four schools.    
  
Status of Modular Classroom Replacement Projects 
 
During the 2007-08 reporting period, plans for replacement of eleven Department of Housing 
(DOH) trailer type classrooms and one restroom at Pauly Elementary School was approved by 
DSA. Architects are preparing plans for the replacement of eighteen DOH trailer type classrooms 
with DSA approved units at Garza Elementary School. The replacement of all 211 DOH trailer 
type classrooms with DSA approved permanent modular classrooms at 31 existing schools were 
scheduled as follows, with a total budget of $36,999,280: 
 
Schools DOH 
Modulars 
Replacement 
Date 
3 – Hort, Garza, Wayside  30 2007-08
2 –Pauly, Evergreen 21 2008-09
3 – Casa Loma, Fremont, Sequoia 32 2009-10
3 – McKinley, Munsey, Voorhies 25 2010-11
4 – Frank West, Franklin, Hills, Owens Primary 25 2011-12
5 – Horace Mann, Longfellow, Roosevelt, Stiern, William Penn 11 2012-13
2 – College Heights, Pioneer 28 2013-14
4 – Emerson, Jefferson, Mount Vernon, Williams 25 2014-15
3 –Curran, Noble, Rafer Community Day 12 2015-16
2 – Eissler, Nichols   2 2016-17
31 School Sites      211 DOH Modulars 
 
Source: Revised Modular Replacement Schedule, October 22, 2008 
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COSTS AND SCHEDULES FOR MEASURE G BOND PROGRAM
MEASURE G BOND 
PROJECTS
Original Budget
June 14, 20061
Total 
Expenditures As 
of 
June 30, 20072
Total 
Expenditures As 
of 
June 30, 20082
Schedule
 of
Completion
Project 
Status 3
New Schools Construction
New Elementary School $23,502,783 $30,552 $33,900 T.B.D.
 Site Acquisition 
Planning
New Middle School 35,862,675 2012-13 Planning
New Elementary School (with 
Enhanced Special Education) 41,846,069 2016-17 Planning
Total $101,211,527 $30,552 $33,900
 Modernization 
Chipman Junior High $9,520,220 $93,751 $1,354,876 2008-09 48% Complete
Compton Junior High 9,789,501 5,000 2009-10
Curran Middle School 12,675,293 752,633 2008-09  50% Complete
Eissler Elem. School 6,451,330 58,812 893,254 2008-09 98% Complete
Evergreen Elem. School 7,995,876 3,600 2009-10
Nichols Elem. School 15,022,394 52,232 715,216 2008-09 97% Complete
Pauly Elem. School 11,401,088 3,480 2009-10
Voorhies Elem. School 9,992,378 2009-10
Total $82,848,080 $204,795 $3,728,059
Security Improvements
New fencing/gates and upgrades 
to security system, video 
surveillance and door hardware 
in 42 schools $6,741,000 $47,240 $1,212,518 2008-09
Completed projects: 
fencing (8), security 
door (4) and security 
cameras(4).
Modular Classroom Replacements
Replace 216 Modular 
classrooms with permanent 
classrooms $28,481,145 2007-2017
Plans / drawings 
prepared for 2 school 
sites
Garza Elem. School 17,841
Pauly Elem. School 13,798
Total $28,481,145  $31,639
General Expenses $40,148 $56,161
Total Projects Budget $219,281,752 $322,735 $5,062,277
 1 Source: 2007 - 2014 Facilities Plan, June 14, 2006. Amounts presented may reflect rounding.
 2 Source:  2007 Bond Series A Quarterly Expenditure Report, October 22, 2008.
 3 Source:  Status of Modernization, DSA Buildings and Security Projects,  July17, 2008.
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Observation 
 
• During the review of the Board Agenda and Minutes for the fiscal year 2007-08, TSS did 
not find a comprehensive report on the progress and status of the Measure G Bond 
Program presented to the Board of Education for information and/or action. 
 
Commendation 
 
• District should be commended for providing the “Quarterly Expenditure Reports” and the 
“Status of Modernization, DSA Buildings and Security Improvement Projects” reports to 
the Citizens Bond Oversight Committee (CBOC) during their regularly scheduled 
quarterly meetings. These reports provide committee members with the necessary 
information to keep track of the progress and status of the bond program.  
 
Findings 
 
• There are no findings in this section. 
 
Recommendation 
 
• It is recommended that District staff prepare a comprehensive report to the Board of 
Education regarding the progress and status of the Measure G Bond Program. Such report 
should be prepared and submitted semi-annually, quarterly or as often as the Board 
desires. It is good management practice to keep the Board informed on the current budget 
and expenditure situation (i.e., to report budget savings, highlight the need for budget 
augmentation or additional funding sources) and the status of projects (i.e., planned, 
active and completed projects). Through these reports, the Board can make appropriate 
decisions or directions to staff on issues relating to changes in priorities, budget 
adjustments and/or additions/deletions to the Measure G program project list.  
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MEASURE G EXPENDITURES REPORT 
 
MEASURE G 
 
To ensure a comprehensive performance audit, TSS reviewed all Measure G projects for 
the 2007-08 fiscal year. As of June 30, 2008, five percent of the total authorized Measure 
G bond funds had been expended. 
 
Measure G Bond Issuance and Expenditures as of June 30, 2008 
Total bond authorization  $100,000,000 
Total bond issues as of June 30, 2008 (Series A)  $  34,000,000 
Expenditures through June 30, 2008   $    5,062,277 
 (Five percent of total authorization) 
 
 Measure G Expenditures Report
 Projects As of June 30, 2008
 General Bond Expenses $56,161
 Security Improvements 1,212,518
 Modernization
         Chipman Junior High School 1,354,876
         Compton Junior High School 5,000
         Curran Middle School 752,633
         Eissler Elementary School 893,254
         Evergreen Elementary School 3,600
         Nichols Elementary School 715,216
         Pauly Elementary School 3,480
 Modular Classroom Replacements
        Garza Elementary School 17,841
        Pauly Elementary School 13,798
  New Schools Construction 33,900
 Total $5,062,277
Source: 2007 Bond Series A Quarterly Expenditure Report, October 22, 2008.  
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CHANGE ORDERS, CLAIM PROCEDURES, AND RESULTS 
 
Process Utilized 
 
In the process of this examination, TSS analyzed relevant documents and conducted 
interviews with staff. A tabulation of change orders was prepared to determine the cost of 
change orders for each construction project and to determine if any change order 
exceeded ten percent of the original contract amount.  Information provided from the 
2007-08 Board of Education meeting agendas and minutes, and facilities documents 
related to change orders were also used in preparing this analysis. 
 
Background 
 
The industry-wide percentage for change orders for modernization or facility 
improvement projects generally ranges from seven percent to eight percent of the original 
contract amount. (The change order standard for new construction tends to be three 
percent to four percent.) Typically, change orders for modernization cannot be avoided 
because of the age of the buildings, inaccuracy of as-built records, or other unknown 
conditions; all of which contribute to the need for authorizing change orders for 
additional work. 
 
Due to the urgent nature of school construction work, issues are sometimes resolved 
verbally at weekly construction meetings, where the architect, facilities project manager, 
inspector, and contractor’s job superintendent are present. Decisions are formalized in the 
meeting minutes and followed up with a change directive to authorize the work and 
eventual payment. The District is not liable for the cost of any extra work, substitutions, 
changes, additions, omissions, or deviations from the drawings and specifications unless 
it authorizes the work and the change, including costs. The change must be approved in 
writing through a change order or through a construction change directive. 
 
Most change orders are initiated by a Request for Information (RFI), which is a request 
for clarification in the drawings or specifications which is reviewed and responded to by 
the architect and/or project engineers. If it is determined that additional work or a 
reduction/deletion in work is necessary, the contractor submits a Proposed Change Order 
(PCO) for the additional cost, a reduction in cost, and/or time extension based on the 
determination. The facilities project manager reviews the proposal with the inspector, 
architect of record, and/or the District representative. If accepted, a change directive is 
issued. The increase or decrease in contract price may be determined at the District’s 
discretion through the acceptance of a PCO flat fee, through unit prices in the original 
bid, or through the use of a time-and-materials methodology as agreed upon by the 
District and the contractor. In some cases, this process may go through several cycles due 
to a disagreement over price.  
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When a contractor makes a claim for a contract price increase or time extension, the 
contractor notifies the District but continues to execute the work even if the adjustment 
has not been agreed upon. By having this language in the general conditions of the 
contract, the District is protected from work stoppage due to a disagreement over the 
price of a change order.  
 
The contractor is deemed to be in default if he or she fails to execute a change order when 
the District and the contractor negotiate and agree on the addition or deletion of work. To 
prevent contractors from filing frivolous RFIs, the contract language gives the District the 
right to deduct costs for providing information if the District has already provided said 
information to the contractor.  
 
During the fiscal year 2007-08, the District bid and awarded contracts for modernization 
and asbestos/lead abatement projects using the formal public bidding process. These 
school sites included Eissler Elementary, Nichols Elementary, Curran Middle and 
Chipman Junior High Schools. Change orders for these projects were initiated and 
approved through the Board approval process. A summary of the change orders are 
shown in the attached table, “Change Orders – Measure G Bond Projects”. 
 
Security improvement projects were bid and awarded utilizing the “informal” bidding 
process under the California Uniform Public Construction Cost Accounting Act 
(CUPCCAA). On May 28, 2002, the Board approved a resolution to adopt and become 
subject to the CUPCCAA which allowed the District to utilize “informal” bidding 
procedures for public works projects under $125,000. In addition, the Chief Business 
Official and/or such District staff as he/she may designate were each authorized to award 
informal contracts pursuant to the resolution. Change orders initiated for these projects 
are approved by the authorized District designees. 
 
Observations 
 
• As shown in the attached “Change Order Table – Measure G Projects”, all change 
orders approved by the Board of Education were within ten percent of the original 
contract price. This practice is in full compliance with Public Contract Code 
20118.4.a.1 and b.  
 
• The District utilizes the traditional change order approval process which includes 
field staff (Inspectors, Architects, CM’s and District) review and Board approval 
of individual change order items prior to execution. This process increases the 
turnaround time and could be detrimental to project construction schedules, 
especially on change orders that directly affect the “critical path” to completion of 
a project. In addition, the fact that the Board of Education meets only once a 
month to discuss these issues may increase the turnaround time. On new 
construction projects wherein the District will utilize Construction Managers 
(CM’s) and multiple prime contracts, the turnaround time for the approval of 
change orders is anticipated to be even longer due to the additional layer of CM 
review and the significant number of individual contractors involved in each 
project. 
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• On June 24, 2008, the Board of Education approved as deletion to Policies and 
Procedures, “Administrative Regulation 800.2 – New School Plants”, which was 
approved at the first reading on May 27, 2008.  
 
 
Commendations 
 
• The District is commended for adhering to the public contract code limitation on 
change order values. 
 
• The District is commended for resolving to become subject to the CUPCCAA and 
delegating authority to the District’s Chief Business Official and/or such District 
staff as he/she may designate to award informal contracts pursuant to the 
resolution. This facilitates the bidding and award process for projects below 
$125,000 and reduces the turnaround time for authorizing and approving change 
orders. 
 
• The District is commended for creating and maintaining well organized files for 
Measure G Construction Projects and all other facilities projects. Construction 
information and documents are easily retrieved for review and analysis.  
 
Finding 
 
• There are no findings for this section. 
 
Recommendation 
 
• The Board of Education may choose to delegate to the Chief Business Official, 
District field staff (Facilities Director, Assistant Director and Construction 
Planners) the authority to approve change orders and submit them to the Board of 
Education for ratification. The levels of authority of each designee must be 
defined in terms of scope and change order amounts. This system will further 
enhance District response time, increase field level control and management of 
changes and extra work in construction contracts.  
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Change Order Table - Measure G Projects
School Site Project Description/
Architect 
Contractor Contract 
Amount/
Award Date
Change 
Order No. / 
Date
Amount % of Original 
Contract 
Amount 
Adjusted 
Contract 
Amount
Eissler 
Elementary School
Modernization
BFGC Architecture Colombo Construction $1,780,000 1 $16,517 0.93% $1,796,517 
8/28/2007 2/26/2008
2 $56,149 3.15% $1,852,666 
6/24/2008
Eissler 
Elementary School
Asbestos Abatement and 
Lead Removal PARC Environmental $93,500 1 $10,940 11.70% $104,440 
7/24/2007 4/22/2008
2 ($2,160) -2.31% $102,280 
6/24/2008
Nichols 
Elementary School
Modernization
BFGC Architecture Omega Construction $2,035,000 1 $115,089 5.66% $2,150,089 
8/28/2007 3/25/2008
2 $63,593 3.12% $2,213,682 
5/27/2008
Nichols 
Elementary School
Asbestos Abatement and 
Lead Removal PARC Environmental $80,610 1 $8,745 10.85% $89,355 
7/24/2007 6/24/2008
Curran 
Middle School
Modernization
Ordiz-Melby Architects
Black-Hall 
Construction $3,775,754 1 $63,086 1.67% $3,838,840 
1/22/2008 5/27/2008
Curran 
Middle School
Asbestos Abatement and 
Lead Removal Janus Corporation $127,135 1 $3,675 2.89% $130,810 
12/11/2007 3/25/2008
Chipman 
Junior High School
Modernization
BFGC Architecture JTS Construction $2,923,000 1 $39,750 1.36% $2,962,750 
8/28/2007 6/24/2008
Chipman 
Junior High School
Asbestos Abatement and 
Lead Removal APC Contractors $270,000 0 $0 0.00% $270,000 
7/24/2007
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PAYMENT PROCEDURES 
 
Process Utilized 
 
In the process of this examination, numerous purchasing and payment documents pertaining to 
expenditures funded through Measure G were reviewed for compliance.  Interviews were held 
with the Chief Business Official, Assistant Director of Fiscal Services, Accounts Payable 
Accounting Technician III, Facilities Director and Facilities Accounting Technician III regarding 
payment procedures and processes.  
 
The review consisted of the following:   
 
• Verification that expenditures charged to the Measure G Bond were authorized as 
Measure G projects; 
• Compliance with the District’s Purchasing and Payment policies and procedures; 
• Verification that back up documentation, including authorized signatures, were 
present on  payment requests; and 
• Vendor payment timelines. 
 
Background 
 
When the Board of Education approves a construction contract, a requisition is initiated for the 
full contract amount and coded to the appropriate budget account by the Facilities Accounting 
Technician.  The requisition and contract are then routed to the purchasing department.  This 
process is used for larger projects and contracts (for smaller contracts, requisitions are usually 
initiated after the receipt of an invoice).  
 
The purchasing department assigns the purchase order number.  Adequate funds must be 
available for the purchase order to be released.  The funds are encumbered for the full amount of 
the purchase order and as payments are made, the encumbrance is reduced by the amount 
expended.  Copies of the purchase order are then routed to the Facilities Department and 
Accounts Payable. 
 
Construction payments (i.e. payment applications) are first reviewed and approved by the 
architect and inspector of record, who are responsible for certifying the percentage of work 
completed.   
 
Construction payments are then sent to the facilities office for processing. The facilities staff 
reviews the payment application for accuracy, including costs, change orders, appropriate backup 
documentation, and required authorized signatures.  
 
Payments are then forwarded to Accounts Payable for processing.  The Accounts Payable 
Accounting Technician reviews the purchase order and payment request ensuring that all 
required approvals are present and the payment amount is correct.  Accounts payable batches are 
processed daily and warrants are issued daily by the county office. The normal processing time 
for a warrant is approximately one week.  
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For the first payment on a payment application, the county office requires the District to submit a 
copy of the signed contract, proof of publication, payment bond, performance bond, and the 
Board minutes showing approval of the contract. The facilities department is responsible for 
providing the county office with the documents.  
 
Sample 
 
Forty-five invoices totaling $1,681,105, paid with Measure G funds, were reviewed in the course 
of this examination. The review consisted of verification that expenditures charged to the 
Measure G Bond were authorized as Measure G projects, of approvals (i.e., owner, architect and 
inspector); verification of the invoice amount; agreement of the invoice amount and the actual 
amount paid; and processing time to pay vendors or service providers.  
 
The sample of payments included the following Measure G projects: 
 
• Security improvements at Fremont Elementary, Jefferson Elementary, Wayside 
Elementary, Longfellow Elementary, Munsey Elementary,  Pauly Elementary, Penn 
Elementary, Wayside Elementary, Compton Junior High and Washington Middle; and 
• Modernization projects at Nichols Elementary, Eissler Elementary, Curran Middle and 
Chipman Junior High.  
 
Observations 
 
• In 2007-08, the District began issuing purchase orders for the full amount of the 
construction contract as soon as it was approved by the Board. 
 
• All of the invoices reviewed were authorized expenditures under Measure G. 
 
• All of the invoices included in the sample showed evidence of being appropriately 
reviewed and approved. 
 
• All of the invoices included in the review were paid timely and within thirty-days. 
 
Recommendation 
 
• As a best practice, purchase orders should be generated as soon as work, services or 
equipment is authorized.  Payments should be made from this single purchase order, 
which serves several purposes: (1) to provide budget detail that will accurately display 
the amount paid, the amount encumbered, and the amount still available; (2) the contract 
history of payments can be identified easily under one purchase order rather than locating 
payments through multiple purchase orders; and (3) approved change orders to a contract 
are incorporated on the original purchase order which provides full disclosure of full 
project costs. 
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BIDDING AND PROCUREMENT PROCEDURES 
 
Process Utilized 
 
In the process of this examination, interviews regarding bidding procedures and processes were 
held with the Director of Facilities, Assistant Director of Maintenance and Operations, 
Supervisor of School Planning/Construction and the Facilities Accounting Technician III. 
 
Background 
 
On May 28, 2002, the Board of Education elected by resolution to become subject to the 
California Uniform Public Construction Cost Accounting Act (CUPCCAA), promulgated by the 
California State Controller. Previously, on October 26, 2004, the Board elected by resolution to 
engage in the informal bidding procedures permitted under the Act. The resolution states that 
Public Contract Code 2200 permits school districts that adopt specified uniform cost accounting 
standards for construction work to increase the threshold for construction projects that may be 
performed by force account or without competitive bidding and to use certain informal 
procedures for letting contracts for public projects within a specified range outlined in a 
resolution dated August 22, 2006. Currently, public projects of $30,000 or less may be 
performed by force account, negotiated contract, or purchase order; public projects of $125,000 
($137,500 in special circumstances) or less may be performed by informal bidding procedures 
and public projects over $125,000 require formal bid procedures. 
 
Under CUPCCAA, the District is required to create and maintain a list of qualified contractors 
by category of work.  Each year the District is required to publicly invite licensed contractors to 
submit their name for inclusion on the list.   
  
The District may select a qualified contractor from this list for projects under $30,000 without 
going through any bid process.   
 
Informal Bidding: for public projects ranging from $30,000 to $124,999 the District must give 
notice to all listed contractors providing the type of services sought or provide notice through 
specified trade journals, or both. Mailing of these notices must be completed at least ten calendar 
days before bids are due.  
 
Formal Bidding: the rules for formal bidding under CUPCCAA are slightly different from 
standard bidding.  Notice must be published a minimum of once in a newspaper of general 
circulation at least fourteen calendar days before the bid due date and mailed to specific trade 
journals at least thirty calendar days before the bid due date.  For public projects over $125,000, 
there must be adherence to the formal bid process.   
 
The District bid boilerplate, expressly written for the District’s construction projects, has been 
approved by legal counsel. The architect may modify the boilerplate, as needed. The District’s 
bidding process, including advertisement, is conducted in compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations.  
  
Bids are received at the District office or address of the specified architectural firm. Once bids 
are opened, they are verified for compliance and completeness. Architects verify licenses, bonds, 
insurance, and fingerprinting before the facilities department prepares a recommendation for 
award. Bid results initially appear on the Board agenda as an informational item. At a subsequent 
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Board meeting, the recommendation of award is placed on the agenda for action. The Director of 
Facilities prepares the Board agenda information for the award of bid. The time period between 
the actual opening of bids and Board action is approximately five weeks.  
 
The Notice of Award is issued after the bid is approved by the Board of Education. The 
contractor has seven days to submit all the required documentation. The Board then approves the 
Notice to Proceed.  
 
SAMPLE OF BID PARTICIPATION AND RESULTS 
 
As of June 30, 2008, there were 269 contractors (various trades’) on the list of contractors 
qualified to perform construction work for the District.   
 
The last invitation to contractors to submit their name to BCSD for inclusion on the list of 
qualified bidders for the 2008 calendar year was November 20, 2007. 
 
The table below provides the bid results for all of the projects that were formally bid and 
contracts awarded during the 2007-08 fiscal year.      
 
Measure G Projects  
Bids/Contracts Awarded through Formal Bid Process 
 
The modernization project and the asbestos abatement and lead removal project at Curran 
Middle School were selected for the bidding and procurement review in this audit.  
Name of 
School 
Project 
Description 
Bid 
Opening 
No. of 
Bidders 
Base Bid 
(High) 
Base Bid 
(Low) 
Variances 
Between 
Bids 
BOE 
Approval 
of Award 
Contract 
Awarded 
Contract 
Amount 
Chipman  Modernization 7/26/2007 2 $3,131,000 $2,687,000 ($444,000) 8/28/2007 JTS Construction $2,923,000 
(includes 
alternate #1 
$236,000) 
Colonel 
Nichols 
Modernization 8/1/2007 2 $2,067,000 $2,035,000 ($32,000) 8/28/2007 Omega 
Construction 
$2,035,000 
Henry 
Eissler 
Modernization 8/9/2007 3 $2,065,500 $1,780,000 ($285,500) 8/28/2007 Colombo 
Construction 
$1,780,000 
Curran Asbestos 
Abatement & 
Lead Removal 
11/30/07 4 $256,000 $127,135 ($128,865) 12/11/2007 Janus 
Corporation 
$127,135 
Curran  Modernization 1/17/2008 5 $4,531,000 $3,775,754 ($755,246) 1/22/2008 Black Hall 
Construction 
$3,775,754 
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Asbestos Abatement and Lead Removal at Curran School 
The notice to bidders was advertised in The Bakersfield Californian on November 7 and 14, 
2007.  The original bid opening date was scheduled for November 28, 2007.  Two addendums 
were issued, addendum #1 dated November 15, 2007 included changes in scope and addendum 
#2 dated November 26, 2007 included changes in scope and a new bid due date of November 30, 
2007.  There were at least 14 days between the first bid publication and bid opening and at least 
48 hours from the date in which the addendum was issued and the bid opening date, as required 
by law.  A mandatory job walk occurred on November 15, 2007.  The bids were opened on 
November 30, 2007.  Four bids were received, as noted in the table below.   
 
Contractor Base Bid 
PARC  $174,700 
Janus Corporation $127,135 
Metalclad $141,000 
Specialized  $256,000 
  
The Board awarded the contract to Janus Corporation on December 11, 2007. The District 
received all required documentation and issued the Notice to Proceed on December 20, 2007.  
 
Modernization at Curran School 
The notice to bidders was sent to various trades journals/exchanges November 7, 2007 and 
advertised in The Bakersfield Californian on November 7 and 14, 2007.  The original bid 
opening date was scheduled for November 28, 2007.  Seven addendums and two bulletins were 
issued.   
 
Bulletin #1, dated November 28, 2007, notified plan holders of the bid opening date change to 
December 6, 2007.  The reason for the change was noted, “Refer to section 00, Bidding and 
Contract Requirements.  “Section 24, Contractors Qualifications Questionnaire.”  In order to 
adequately review all contractors qualifications and supply the District with an accurate 
recommendation to award contract; this section must be completed and submitted to Ordiz 
Melby Architects Inc. no later than Monday December 3, 2007.”   
 
Addendum #6, dated December 5, 2007, notified plan holders of a revised bid opening date of 
January 10, 2008. 
 
Bulletin #2, dated December 17, 2007, notified plan holders of a revised bid opening date of 
January 17, 2008. 
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There were at least 14 days between the first bid publication and bid opening, as required by law.  
A mandatory job walk occurred on November 15, 2007.  The bids were opened at January 17, 
2008.  Five bids were received, as noted in the table below.   
 
 
Contractor Bid  Amount 
Black Hall Construction $3,775,754 
Colombo Construction $3,780,000 
Davis Moreno Construction $4,446,714 
Don Kinzel Construction $4,342,994 
JTS Construction $4,531,000 
 
The Board awarded the contract to Black Hall Construction on January 22, 2008.  The District 
received all required documentation and issued the Notice to Proceed on February 6, 2008. 
 
The table below provides a sample of the bid results for projects that were informally bid and 
contracts awarded during the 2007-08 fiscal year.  The informal bidding for the projects 
reviewed in this examination were completed in accordance with CUPCCAA. 
 
Measure G Projects  
Bid/Contracts Awarded through Informal Bid Process  
 
Name of 
School 
Project 
Description 
Solicitation 
Date 
Bid 
Opening 
No. of 
Bidders 
Bid 
(High) 
Bid 
(Low) 
Variances 
Between 
Bids 
Contract 
Awarded 
Jefferson Decorative Iron 
Security 
Fencing 
7/3/2007 7/17/2007 2 $68,469 $48,728 ($19,741) ENP Ornamental 
Longfellow Decorative Iron 
Security 
Fencing 
7/3/2007 7/17/2007 2 $9,150 $8,694 ($456) Alley's Welding 
Penn Decorative Iron 
Security 
Fencing 
7/3/2007 7/17/2007 2 $45,494 $35,024 ($10,470) ENP Ornamental 
Wayside Fencing 5/16/2007 5/29/2007 3 $70,265 $51,229 ($19,036) Reliance Fence 
Fremont Iron Security 
Fencing 
1/25/2008 2/4/2008 2 $43,407 $41,358 ($2,049) ENP Ornamental 
Garza Iron Security 
Fencing 
1/25/2008 2/4/2008 2 $31,294 $23,445 ($7,849)   
ENP Ornamental 
Sierra Iron Security 
Fencing 
1/25/2008 2/4/2008 2 $66,599 $51,244 ($15,355)  
ENP Ornamental 
Harding Iron Security 
Fencing 
1/25/2008 2/4/2008 2 $8,980 $7,364 ($1,616)  
ENP Ornamental 
 
The apparent low bidder on the Iron Security Fencing projects at Fremont, Harding and Sierra 
Schools was considered to be non-responsive as the contractor did not submit the following 
required items:  completed “Request for Quotation”, bid bond, non-collusion affidavit and list of 
sub-contractors; the required items were specified on the Informational Notice to Bidders.  
Therefore, the contracts were awarded to ENP Ornamental. 
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Observations 
 
• The District purchased alarm and signaling systems through Sonitrol of Bakersfield for 
Compton, Sierra, Washington and Owens Schools in the amount of $118,978 without 
going through a formal bid process.  Public Contract Code 20111 requires District’s to 
competitively bid contracts over $74,200.  According to staff, since the District had 
already been using Sonitrol security systems for several years and is completely satisfied 
with the product, they did not believe that bidding would be a requirement since 1) 
Sonitrol is a “sole source vendor”, 2) each campus was considered a separate project 
(under $30,000) and 3) Public Contract Code 3400 identifies that the cost to a District to 
require bidding on a “sole source” product is an unnecessary expense to the District.  The 
District is using other security systems at various sites and does not have a resolution 
approving Sonitrol as a sole source vendor.  The State has specific procurement 
guidelines for purchasing and has developed programs which allow Districts the 
flexibility to purchase specific products through programs such as the California Multiple 
Awards System (CMAS) or Department of General Services (DGS) which was created to 
ensure public agencies receive fair pricing.  Sonitrol is a participant in the CMAS 
program.  However, the District did not procure the systems through CMAS. 
 
• In 2007-08 the District began the process of reviewing Board Polices and Administrative 
Regulations.  As of June 24, 2008, the Board reviewed and updated some of the 800 
Series Policies which are related to Facilities and Facilities Issues.  Currently, the District 
is reviewing other series and will be updating them accordingly.     
 
Commendations 
 
• District staff is commended for having a resolution confirming the threshold for the use 
of informal bidding procedures under the California Uniform Public Construction Cost 
Accounting Act (CUPCCAA). The Act’s benefits may include expediting the awards 
process, more flexibility in the execution of public works projects, and improved 
timeliness of project completion. 
 
• The District developed four separate internal check-off lists based upon the dollar value 
of the project and bidding requirements (no bid, informal and formal bidding) under 
CUPCCAA.  The check off lists are for projects ranging from $0 to $24,999; $24,999 to 
$29,999; $30,000 - $124,999; $125,000 and over.  The lists include the project location, 
description, budget account, amount, check of dates for scope, drawings, specifications, 
quotes, labor compliance (if applicable), contractor information, receipt of insurance 
certificates, endorsements, fingerprints, agreements, bonds, formal notices, change orders 
and final review.  For informal bidding, the check off list includes the 10-day notice, date 
of job walk, addendum, bid opening, letter to successful bidder and non-successful 
bidders and LCP (if applicable).  For formal bidding, the check off list includes the date 
in which the advertisement is placed in the Bakersfield Californian, Board Agenda 
submittal date and the Board meeting date. 
  Page 51
 
Findings 
 
• The electrical work at Chipman Junior High in the amount of $95,600 was not informally 
bid as required under CUPCCAA; informal bidding must occur for public works projects 
over $30,000 and all contractors specified on the “Contractors List” should have been 
invited to bid the project.   
 
• The Notice for the Curran Modernization Project was sent to the trades 
journals/exchanges on November 7, 2007.  The original planned bid opening date was 
scheduled for November 28, 2007.  CUPCCAA requires Notices to be mailed to specific 
trade journals at least thirty calendar days before the bid due date.  The Notices were 
submitted twenty-one days prior to the originally planned bid opening date. 
 
• The District did not submit the Notice of the Curran Asbestos Abatement and Lead 
Removal Project to the trade journals or building exchanges as required under 
CUPCCAA. 
 
Recommendations 
 
• Staff should ensure bidding requirements under Public Contract Code and CUPCCAA 
are followed for all public works projects.    
 
• The check-off list that is used for projects that require formal bidding should include the 
date in which the Notices are to be submitted to the various trade journals/exchanges, 
including the additional requirement under CUPCCAA to notify trades 
journals/exchanges thirty days prior to the bid opening date.   
 
• Staff may want to consider using the check-off list for all public works projects over 
$30,000, as doing so may help to alleviate missing any of the bid requirements under 
Public Contract Code and CUPCCAA.  
 
• It is recommended that the District update an existing policy and/or administrative 
regulation to reflect the change called for by the Resolution Confirming the Threshold for 
Use of Informal Bidding Procedures under the CUPCCAA.  
 
• It is recommended the District consider adopting a resolution for the use of sole source 
products such as Sonitrol or utilize the CMAS (or similar) program when procuring 
equipment over $72,400. 
 
District Response 
 
• The District has modified its check-off lists as recommended to ensure compliance with 
bidding requirements. The District is reviewing its facilities program policies and will 
implement recommended changes as needed. 
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EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PUBLIC OUTREACH PROGRAM AND 
COMMUNICATION CHANNELS AMONG ALL STAKEHOLDERS WITHIN THE 
BOND PROGRAM 
 
 
Process Utilized 
 
TSS interviewed the Superintendent, Board members, Citizen Bond Oversight Committee 
members, Director of Facilities, Chief Business Official, Architect, Construction Manager and 
the Public Information & Communications Manager.  TSS also reviewed the District’s website, 
the citizens’ oversight committee’s website, and the District’s newsletter. 
 
The purpose of the interviews and the review of the websites and published information was to 
examine the processes and systems used to convey information about the bond program to 
interested parties. These processes serve as a measurement of the effectiveness of disseminating 
information to parties involved and interested in the bond program and its operations. These 
processes and information also indicate the effectiveness of communicating to the school site 
communities and the community at large.  
 
Background 
 
Public outreach is a key component for any successful bond program.  It is vital to keep the 
community informed during each phase of the program.  Outreach to the community regarding 
the status of projects, including priorities, project timelines and updates are important for the 
district to undertake consistently in their ongoing efforts to manage information and expectations 
about the bond program. 
 
The District utilizes the following methods to convey information in regards to the Bond 
Program:  
 
The Direct Connection is a newsletter the District publishes quarterly.  The August publication is 
mailed to the homes of all BCSD students and the three other editions are sent home from school 
with students.  The publication is in both English and Spanish and provides information and 
updates regarding the District and updates on the Bond Program. 
 
The Community Connection is a quarterly newsletter that is emailed to over three hundred local 
businesses.  The newsletter provides updates on the Bond Program and District events and 
happenings.  
 
The homepage on the District’s website includes a Bond Update; this link will take you directly 
to the Citizen’s Bond Oversight Committee site.  The CBOC website includes community 
updates, pictures and descriptions of bond projects at various sites, committee member contact 
information, CBOC meeting minutes, bond expenditure reports, copies of the Bond Financial 
and Performance Audits for 2006-07, CBOC by-laws and the date, time and location of the next 
meeting. 
 
Bond updates and information are topics of discussion at the monthly Board Meetings. 
 
The school newsletters provide facilities project updates within the school community. 
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Billboards have been placed at schools being modernized to provide information to the school 
community. 
 
Commendations 
 
• The newsletters are excellent tools that are being used to communicate to both the school 
communities and local business communities on the status of the Bond Program. 
 
• The District is commended for keeping both the District and CBOC websites maintained 
and updated with current information.  During the 2007-08 school year TSS viewed the 
websites on numerous occasions and consistently found it to be updated with current 
information and pictorials. 
 
• The CBOC members expressed that staff are regularly in attendance at CBOC meetings 
and are very forthcoming with information. Information provided to the CBOC was 
current, staff is very responsive and overall it appears the community is content with the 
management of the program.  
 
• Board member comments included statements such as; “things are going well within the 
program”, and “projects are in compliance with the ballot language and communication is 
good”. 
 
Recommendation 
 
• The District may want to consider posting both the “Community Connection” and “Direct 
Connection” on their websites as one more way to keep the community informed about 
Measure G. The publication already exists, and it would be a relatively easy task to post it 
on their websites. 
 
Finding 
 
• There are no findings for this section. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
 
ACSA Association of California School Administrators 
 
AOR Architect of Record 
 
CASBO California Association of School Business Officials 
 
CBOC Citizens’ Bond Oversight Committee 
 
CDE California Department of Education 
 
CEQA California Environmental Quality Act 
 
CO Change Order 
 
CSBA California School Boards Association 
 
CUPCCAA California Uniform Public Construction Cost Accounting Act 
 
DSA Division of State Architect 
 
DTSC Department of Toxic Substances Control 
 
DVBE Disabled Veteran Business Enterprise 
 
EIR Environmental Impact Report 
 
GO Bond General Obligation Bond 
 
HVAC Heating, Ventilation, AirConditioning 
 
IOR Inspector of Record 
 
LCP Labor Compliance Program 
 
OPSC Office of Public School Construction 
 
PEA Preliminary Environmental Assessment 
 
RFI Request for Information 
 
SAB State Allocation Board 
 
SFP School Facility Program 
 
TBD To Be Determined 
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APPENDIX E: 
PUBLICATION #1 
CONSTRUCTION AUDIT - AN ESSENTIAL PROJECT CONTROLS FUNCTION 
 
This technical paper, first presented at the 2006 AACE International conference in Las 
Vegas, and subsequently reprinted in Cost Engineering journal in 2007, advocated for audit 
as a necessary part of oversight for any construction project. It provided some background on 
contractual audit requirements, and insight into audit timing and scope. Specifically, the 
technical paper illustrated the difference between financial audits and performance audits, 
and described in detail the procedural steps of conducting a performance audit, including the 
expenditure audit component often included in the performance audit scope. This process was 
seen to include: selecting the audit team, interaction with the client and those being audited, 
development of the document request (with examples of items requested), selection of items 
for testing, expenditure testing, interviews, workpaper creation, and reporting audit findings. 
Examples of audit findings, and risks associated with them, were provided. The technical 
paper then discussed the application of audit findings as continuous improvement tools, and 
types of positive organizational change that may be effected through resolution of audit 
issues. 
 
This publication contributed to capital project audit literature by increasing understanding of 
the audit process and introducing the concept of capital project audit as a mechanism for 
continuous improvement. 
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Using Simulation to Optimize Excavator Truck Selection 12
Dr. Eric Asa
The effective selection/matching and operation of the best excavator-truck systems are paramount to the suc-
cess of construction operations. In view of the uncertainty inherent in the excavator-truck system, huge front-
end costs involved, varying operating and maintenance costs, project managers cannot leave the equipment
matching process to chance. Computer simulation involves the use of complex mathematical modeling tech-
niques to duplicate the processes to be optimized. This approach facilitates system analysis, decision support
and serves as a cost-effective tool in sensitivity analysis (what-if scenarios) of construction excavation operations.
The use of simulation together with best practices approach can lead to the identification of system drivers and
aid in the optimization of the entire systems.
Construction Audit — 20
An Essential Project Controls Function
Alexia Nalewaik, CCE
Many construction projects, both publicly- and privately-funded, require that a project audit be performed by
an independent party. The audit not only tests the accuracy of invoices and other charges incurred against the
construction project, but may include a review of processes used in project management and project cost/
schedule controls, and a comparison of those processes to industry best practices. Thus, the audit function is
an essential project controls tool.
A Comparison Between the Non-Mixed and 28
Mixed Convention in CPM Scheduling
Dr. Gunnar Lucko
This article analyzes a basic difference between two methodological approaches that are in current use for crit-
ical path method (CPM) calculations, both in professional practice and in teaching CPM scheduling. Based
on a literature review and on a comprehensive discussion of this major issue, the article clarifies this inconsis-
tency, illustrates the correct use of either method with an example, and provides guidance on how to avoid any
confusion in CPM calculations by using the clarified definitions for periods and instances in time developed
herein. This article thus achieves a reconciliation of these two competing methods to benefit the entire sched-
uling community.
Departments
President’s Message ................................3
Women in Project Controls ..................6
Education Board News ..........................8
Legal Brief ............................................10
For the Bookshelf..................................18
Special Focus ........................................19
From the Cover ....................................26
Professional Services Directory ..............33
AACE International Bulletin ..............34
AACE International Bookstore ............41
Article Reprints and Permissions ..........43
Calendar of Events ..............................44
In This Issue
On the Cover: The Sunset Drive Office building in Olathe, Kansas is a LEED (Leadership in Energy and
Environmental Design) Gold certification structure under the Green Building rating system. See page 26 for article.
Board of Directors Contact List ........................1
Statement of Ownership ....................................4
Passport Reminder for Annual Meeting ..7
2007 Exam-On-Demand Schedule ................9
The 4h Quarter (4Q) Certification Exams ......9
How to Submit a Technical Manuscript ........11
Annual Meeting Abstract Deadline ............17
Index to Advertisers ......................................33
The AACE International Journal of
Cost Estimation, Cost/Schedule Control, and Project Management
ESTABLISHED 1958
Featured Articles
Policy concerning published columns, features, and articles -
Viewpoints expressed in columns, features, and articles published in Cost Engineering journal are solely those of the authors and do not represent an official position of AACE
International. AACE International is not endorsing or sponsoring the author’s work. All content is presented solely for informational purposes. Columns, features, and articles not
designated as Technical Articles are not subject to the peer-review process.
COST ENGINEERING
Vol. 49, No.10/October 2007
Managing Editor - Marvin Gelhausen - mgelhausen@aacei.org
Graphic Designer/Editor - Noah Kinderknecht - nkinderknecht@aacei.org
IT/IM/Graphics Specialist - Robin Donley - rdonley@aacei.org
AACE International Headquarters
209 Prairie Avenue, Suite 100
Morgantown, WV 26501
ph: 800.858.COST    
fax: 304.291.5728  
AACE International
Board of Directors
President   
William E. (Bill) Kraus, PE CCE
International Aviation Consult., GA
615-828-2037
e-mail: president@aacei.org
President-Elect   
Stephen P. Warhoe, PE CCE CFCC
WSDOT, WA
206-770-3591
e-mail: preselect@aacei.org
Past President   
James G. Zack Jr., CFCC
Fluor Corporation, CA
949-349-7905/fax: 949-349-7919
e-mail: pastpres@aacei.org
Vice President-Administration  
Kerri J. Hunsaker Stannard
BWXT Y-12, LLC, TN
865-241-3262
e-mail: vpadmin@aacei.org
Vice President-Finance   
Marlene M. Hyde, CCE
PARSONS, FL
407-702-6857
e-mail: vpfinance@aacei.org
Vice President-TEC   
Vera A. Lovejoy, CCE PSP
Parsons Transportation Group, HI
626-440-6241
e-mail: vptec@aacei.org
Vice President-Regions   
Mark G. Grotefend, CCC
CH2M Hill Inc., WA
206-988-5503
e-mail: vpregions@aacei.org
Director-Region 1   
Stephen O. Revay, CCC CFCC
Revay & Associates, Ltd. Calgary, Canada
403-777-4900
e-mail: dirregion1@aacei.org
Director-Region 2   
Michael A. Withers
M.A. + Associates, Inc., MD
301-961-1578
e-mail: dirregion2@aacei.org
Director-Region 3   
Michael B. Pritchett, CCE
Faithful+Gould, GA
770-957-8070
e-mail: dirregion3@aacei.org
Director-Region 4   
Robert D. Bakewell, CCC
Cummins & Barnard, Inc., MI
517-522-4621
e-mail: dirregion4@aacei.org
Director-Region 5   
Andy Padilla, CCC
PNM Resources, NM
505-241-0553
e-mail: dirregion5@aacei.org
Director-Region 6   
Alexia A. Nalewaik, CCE MRICS
Moss Adams LLP, CA
213-399-1373
e-mail: dirregion6@aacei.org
Executive Director  
James R. Baxter
304.296.8444
e-mail: jbaxter@aacei.org
M any construction projects, bothpublicly and privately funded,require that a project audit be
performed by an independent party. The
audit not only tests the accuracy of invoices
and other charges incurred against the
construction project, but may include a
review of processes used in project
management and project cost/schedule
controls, and a comparison of those
processes to industry best practices. Thus,
the audit function is an essential project
controls tool. 
The Right to Audit
The Public Company Accounting
Reform and Investor Protection Act of
2002, also known as the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, was a US federal act created to
protect shareholders and public interest.
In addition to other requirements,
certain sections of the act require all
regulated companies to establish an audit
committee, to document internal controls
and evaluate their effectiveness, and to
certify that financial statements fairly
reflect the company’s financial situation
and operations for the period presented.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has had an
impact on construction projects because
capital expenditures for new construction,
renovations, and expansion represent a
substantial investment, usually shown on
the balance sheet as “assets.” Such items as
capital assets, construction in progress,
bond issuances, leases, depreciation and
capitalized interest may be reflected in
several places in the financial statement,
including the aforementioned balance
sheet, income statement, cash flow
statements, and notes to the financial
statement.
With capital expenditures given such
high visibility on the financial statement,
and with increasing corporate awareness of
accountability and expenditure controls, it
is the rare construction contract that does
not contain a “right to audit” clause.
The clause is commonly found in
government contracts, and is increasingly
being included in private-sector contracts.
The language varies from contract to
contract, but the clause typically provides
the owner with a restricted or unrestricted
right to audit operations, contracts,
projects, programs, and expenses.
The owner may choose to audit
continuously, at intervals, or at closeout.
The clause allows the owner the right of
access to all of the contractor’s files during
the contract term, and often for a specified
period following final payment on the
contract. Audits are becoming an integral
and unavoidable part of any construction
project.
Audit Scope
When the owner exercises their right
to audit, the objective may be a financial
audit, a performance audit, or some
combination of the two. The scope of the
audit is determined by the owner, who may
elect to audit a construction contract, a
specific supplier, a construction project, or
the entire construction program. Audits of
publicly funded construction may be
required by law, whereas private sector
audits are typically requested by internal
corporate governance, as a representation
of accountability to shareholders and
stakeholders.
Financial audits include financial
statement and finance-related audits. A
financial statement audit is an examination
of a company’s financial statements and
records, in order to provide reasonable
assurance that the data is accurate and
complete, and is presented according to
generally accepted accounting principles
(GAAP). There are several kinds of
finance-related audits, but the best known
is a direct result of Sarbanes-Oxley section
404—an audit of the entity’s internal
control structure for financial reporting
and safeguarding assets.
In contrast, a performance audit
provides an independent assessment of
performance, with the purpose of
determining how well established goals
and objectives are being achieved, and
with the additional objective of identifying
opportunities for improvement.
Performance audits may include
functional audits for economy and
efficiency, evaluating the planning process,
space use, staffing, and established
procedures. A performance audit for a
construction program will typically
combine an in-depth review of
expenditures with an analysis of
compliance with applicable laws and
funding requirements, and may also
include an examination of the program
management plan and its effectiveness as
practiced.
In this capacity, the auditor for a
performance audit is acting in an advisory
role, where the performance audit results
in findings, conclusions, and
recommendations presented for the
purpose of client decision-making.
Some broad audit scopes may include
a review of installed materials and
equipment to ensure that the contract
specifications have been satisfied and the
quantities billed match those installed.
Audit work of this type requires the use of
technical auditors who have an
engineering background and experience
with specifications compliance.
Conducting the Audit
Once the owner determines to
perform an audit, whether through an
outside consultant or through their own
internal audit department, an audit team
will be assembled. Typically, this blended
team will consist of the auditors, and
representatives from the owner and the
contractor. Owner team members may
include staff from internal audit, finance,
and project management. Contractor team
members may include the project
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TECHNICAL ARTICLE
Construction Audit—An Essential
Project Controls Function
ABSTRACT: Many construction projects, both publicly- and privately-funded, require that a proj-
ect audit be performed by an independent party. The audit not only tests the accuracy of invoic-
es and other charges incurred against the construction project, but may include a review of
processes used in project management and project cost/ schedule controls, and a comparison of
those processes to industry best practices. Thus, the audit function is an essential project con-
trols tool.
KEY WORDS: Audit, construction, cost, project and schedule controls,  and management
Alexia Nalewaik, CCE
executive and staff from project
management, project controls, and
corporate finance.
At the kickoff meeting attended by the
audit team, the audit scope will be
reviewed and the work plan will be
discussed. The audit may be conducted in
phases by one team, or smaller teams may
be assigned to specific portions of the audit.
The owner may provide the auditors
with a list of specific issues to investigate.
The auditors will require work space at
both the owner’s and the contractor’s
offices, either at corporate headquarters or
in the construction trailer. A spirit of
cooperation will need to be emphasized,
because the contractor (and sometimes the
owner’s staff) tend to view the audit as an
intrusion.
During or immediately prior to the
kickoff meeting, a document request will
be provided to both the owner and the
contractor, so that the necessary
documentation may be made available to
the auditor in a timely fashion. 
For construction projects, the owner
will typically require the contractor to keep
records of all labor, materials, and other
items furnished during construction or the
performance of services. These records
may be requested for review during the
audit, including the following. 
• employee timesheets;
• daily logs;
• payroll records;
• subcontract and vendor files with bid
documentation;
• contracts, change orders, purchase
orders, invoices and canceled checks;
• owned and leased equipment records;
• master budget and project cost reports;
• detailed accounting reports, including
direct and indirect costs;
• master schedule and variance reports;
• relevant financial records and
transaction support, such as the
general ledger;
• list of individuals approved to sign
contracts or approve invoices;
• lien releases;
• proof of insurance;
• performance or payment bonds;
• project management plan;
• organization chart and staffing plan;
• closeout documentation, including
warranties, as-built drawings, and
operation manuals; and
• monthly narrative status reports.
The audit will also require
participation on the owner’s side, with
requests for such documentation as the
following.
• executive- or board-level authorization
for capital project;
• cash flow analysis;
• corporate request for and approval of
funding;
• list of individuals approved to issue
contracts or approve payment
applications;
• correspondence;
• purchasing files;
• presentations and reporting to
stakeholders, including annual reports;
and
• policies and procedures.
The auditors need to quickly become
acquainted with the history of the project,
the roles and responsibilities of the project
team, and project risks. This is most easily
accomplished by reviewing the monthly
narrative status reports for the project, and
conducting interviews with members of the
owner and contractor project team.
Key project team members, such as
the project executive, project manager,
project controls, purchasing, contracting,
and finance, can expect to answer
questions about existing policies and
procedures, gaps and challenges, project
cost and schedule status, lessons learned,
successes and failures.
Audit testing represents the bulk of the
audit work plan. A sampling will be taken
of timesheets, purchase orders, contracts
and subcontracts, general ledger charges,
payment applications and invoices, and
supporting documentation for these items. 
“Testing” is a term used to describe the
practice of evaluating a discrete set of data
by selecting (“sampling”) and reviewing
only a percentage of that data. There are a
number of sampling methods available, but
in construction project audits the sampling
is often performed on a judgmental,
random, or a stratified dollar-unit statistical
basis.
The methods are chosen based on the
desired objective. Judgmental sampling
may be used to determine whether or not
policies, procedures and controls are being
used—however, this method may lead to
biased results. The errors found in dollar-
unit sampling can be used to project an
estimate of reliability. True random
sampling is the most frequently used
method of selection because it is easy to
apply and its arbitrary nature guarantees
impartiality—it is typically used for large
populations of data.
The tested sample will be used to
ensure that the contractor’s payment
applications agree with the terms of the
contract, verify that items billed on the
payment application have been incurred
by the contractor, identify non-
reimbursable items and duplicate
payments, and ensure that project
reporting includes all costs incurred by
both the contractor and the owner. Labor
and material charges will typically be
traced back to their origin, such as
timesheets, payroll records, subcontractor
invoices, and bill of materials.
Failure to provide information, or
delays in responsiveness, will prolong the
audit and will increase the cost of the audit.
However, a dedicated audit team will not
allow an uncooperative contractor to affect
their scope of work—in fact, upon
encountering opposition from those being
audited, an audit team will often be
motivated to investigate further. When a
document cannot be provided promptly,
the auditor may assume that the document
does not exist and (if there is substantial
delay) may further suspect that the
document has been created specifically in
response to the audit request.
Field observations also contribute to
the audit. The auditor may request a tour of
the construction site, and will also record
their impressions while visiting the
construction trailer and offices. Notes on
the cohesiveness of the project team,
adequacy of document controls,
inefficiencies, communication
effectiveness, safety issues, and more can
be used to develop audit findings and
recommendations.
The auditors may also coordinate with
and report to various groups, such as the
owner’s audit committee, facilities
planning committee, citizens’ oversight
committee, or board of trustees. 
Audit Findings
When the field work has concluded,
the audit findings will be summarized in a
report and presented to the client. Some
audits will conclude with a closeout
meeting, at which the findings and
remedies will be discussed and both the
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owner and contractor management’s
responses to the findings can be recorded.
Overcharges and questioned costs will
typically be reported as the focus of the
findings, along with any additional audit
observations about controls and
management. However, the auditor may
elect not to report some findings if they are
determined to be immaterial.
Materiality is a measurement of the
impact (or value) of the findings.
Information is considered to be material if
it has the potential to influence decision-
making, or if its omission or misstatement
will have an impact on the project cost
report or financial report. Clearly,
materiality varies directly with the scale of
the construction project or program. 
The quality and quantity of audit
findings is also directly proportional to the
level of sophistication of the owner and the
contractor. While the focus of the audit
may be on overcharges, the auditor often
has the construction experience to make
suggestions related to project controls and
industry best practices.
For example, the owner may lack
experience with construction and may
have undertaken the building of new
facilities in response to current or future
business needs. Because the owner may be
unfamiliar with project management
methods and complicated construction
payment applications, and they may lack
the staff to adequately support the project
and review invoices, they may be
completely reliant on the contractor for
project management and project controls. 
Conversely, the contractor is focused
on maximizing profit and using the terms
of the contract to their benefit. The owner,
therefore, has a high risk of overpayment to
the contractor, and scope/cost/schedule
overruns due to their dependency on
external technical and professional
expertise.
The owner may have accepted a
contract that was drafted by the contractor;
the auditor can help to protect the owner
by including in their findings a draft of
stronger and clearer language for future
contracts, which anticipates and addresses
potential problems. The auditor can also
help the owner by making
recommendations to strengthen controls,
and by identifying unallowable or
duplicate charges, overcharges, and math
errors.
Similarly, if the contractor is providing
services for a project which is larger than
any that they have previously completed,
they run the risk of failing to perform. They
may lack strength in scheduling, may be
overcommitted and thus unable to deliver,
or they may lack sophistication in project
management and controls. The auditor can
review the contractor’s policies and
procedures and, as part of their findings,
suggest improvements which will increase
controls for expenditures, cost and
schedule. An analysis of the contractor’s
organization chart may identify skills gaps
which need to be filled. The auditor may
offer advice for improvements in monthly
reporting, which will enable the owner to
have better visibility in areas of cost,
schedule and contingency risk.
If the auditor is an independent third
party, they will have the ability to speak out
about owner and contractor issues.
Whereas a project team member’s
suggestion may be overlooked or ignored,
or certain concerns might never be voiced
for fear of alienation or repercussions, the
auditor’s findings are designed to be highly
and unavoidably visible at the executive
level.
A skilled auditor will use interviews
and field observations to identify topics of
concern, and will weigh the observations to
determine whether the issue is widespread
or is that of one isolated individual or
department. The auditor will then consider
the public or corporate impact of their
findings. If the topic is highly political or
explosive, the auditor may briefly mention
the issue as a finding in the report, and
then write a separate and confidential
“management letter” to provide
clarification and detail.
The audit findings will typically be
ranked according to their potential impact
or financial exposure, as follows:
• Very High—Finding is material to
accomplishing project or company
objectives, and is serious enough to
severely impair the project or cause
business disruption if not resolved. 
• High—Finding deserves attention by
management within a specified time
period, and is material to
accomplishing project or company
objectives. While not as urgent as a
finding ranked “very high,” this finding
could disrupt certain business
processes.
• Moderate—Finding may be material
to accomplishing project or company
objectives. Corrective action is
required, and could result in project
cost or schedule impact if left
unresolved. 
• Low—Finding represents a minor risk,
and is immaterial to accomplishing
project or company objectives but may
result in inefficient operations.
Resolution of this finding is suggested. 
Table 1 provides a list of typical audit
findings.
In the report, the auditor will list the
findings, and will recommend
corresponding corrective actions. Periodic
follow-up should be delegated to a
responsible party and must be performed to
ensure that audit issues have been resolved
or that recovery of overcharges has taken
place. The follow-up may occur at periodic
intervals after the audit has concluded, or
may take place immediately prior to the
next year’s audit.
The Aftermath of the Audit
The effects of the audit will begin to be
discernable soon after the report and
findings have been submitted and
discussed. A ripple of change will typically
start at the epicenter of the project, led by
management or the project executive. 
The findings which represent the
greatest risk and impact will often be
addressed immediately, with a focus on the
recovery of overcharges and negotiation of
potential cost reductions. Other findings
will typically be resolved in direct
proportion to the level of risk and amount
of effort required.
Ultimately, the audit will have some
detectable positive effect and measurable
outcome on the “system,” whether that
system can be defined as the project, the
owner/contractor relationship, or the
values and methodologies of the
organization. As the findings are resolved
and recommendations are implemented,
the following results can typically be seen.
• Better enforcement of compliance
with existing policies and procedures.
• Revision of policies and procedures to
incorporate the owner’s values and
current (actual) practices by the
project team.
• Changes to the project management
structure.
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Audit Issue
Construction program was started before budget
and schedule were finalized.
Construction program scope clearly exceeds the
available funds.
Funding for construction program was obtained
from several different sources.
Owner’s purchasing department procures some
construction program FF&E and services.
Failure to review payment applications and invoic-
es against contract provisions.
Change orders are calculated using unit rates high-
er than those included in the contract.
Failure to require justification for contingency and
allowance expenditures.
Failure to require justification for reimbursable
expenditures.
General requirements are included in the schedule
of values as direct costs, upon which general condi-
tions and fee are added.
Retention is not held consistently on subcontracts.
Program manager time is allocated between proj-
ects on a percentage basis, not on actual time
incurred.
Monthly equipment charge over the course of the
project exceeds the Fair Market Value for the
equipment.
Equipment is charged to several projects, instead of
being allocated on a percentage basis.
Fiscal operations has recently implemented a new
accounting system.
Risk
Lack of expenditure controls at the start of the 
project.
Accountability to voters or funding source, possible
legal implications, facilities needs not met.
Failure to accurately track expenditures against
funding source, difficulty in identifying key sched-
ule milestones for funding requests.
Project controls does not capture owner’s expendi-
tures, resulting in understatement of project
progress and incorrect cash flow reporting.
Potential overpayment with respect to hourly rates,
quantities, reimbursable expenses, scope, and
schedule.
Potential overpayment with respect to hourly rates,
quantities, reimbursable expenses, scope, and
schedule.
Hidden profit.
Hidden increase to the contractor’s fee.
Potential overpayment of general conditions items,
and hidden increase to the contractor’s fee.
No financial recourse available for subcontractor
nonperformance.
Understatement / overstatement of actual project
costs, lack of an appropriate time reporting system.
Potential overpayment for equipment.
Potential overpayment for equipment.
Lack of policies and procedures for the new system,
possible failure to capture expenditures, incorrect
cost reporting.
Table 1 — Typical Audit Findings
• Tighter internal controls.
• Strengthening of project controls.
• A reduction in errors and overcharges.
• Improved communication between
the owner, contractor, and project
team.
• An increase in focus on prevention
and early detection of risk.
• Greater visibility of change and trends.
And,
• Evolution by the owner, contractor,
and project team toward a culture of
continuous improvement
While it can be said that the auditor is
often the least welcome person in any
organization, a distinct change in attitude
does occur when the project team
perceives and accepts that the previously
“unwelcome intrusion” by the auditor has
resulted in positive change.
Subsequent audits are often performed
more quickly and with measurably less
resistance from the project team, which is
a result of both greater acceptance by those
being audited and the auditor’s level of
familiarity with the organization. Team
members who have seen positive change
occur following an audit are more likely to
recommend that audits be conducted on
other projects.
Construction projects represent
considerable financial risk for both the
owner and the contractor. Any reduction of
that risk represents cost savings. While a
construction project audit may generate
measurable cost reductions for the owner
through the recovery of overcharges and
the discovery of errors, the monetary value
of improvements in internal and project
controls cannot easily be quantified, if they
can be calculated at all.
The primary benefit from audit work is
in the effective resolution of the audit
findings and implementation of the audit
recommendations. Strengthened controls
and continuous improvement generate
increases in efficiency and profitability
over the lifetime of the project and the
organization. Because the role of project
controls involves educating the project
team, managing project cost and schedule,
addressing risk and change, and accurately
reporting project status, the audit function
is an essential part of project controls. ◆
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The procurement process is shortchanged by limit-
ed advertisement, a succinct supplier list, or a short
turnaround time.
Owner does not have a restricted list of individuals
who are authorized to sign invoices or contracts.
Labor burden is calculated incorrectly.
Duplicated charges and math errors.
Billing for late fees, failure to give credit for early
payment savings.
Billing for materials purchased but not installed.
Failure to give credit for deductive change orders.
Not enough bids to create competition.
Lack of expenditure controls.
Potential overpayment of fringe benefits.
Potential overpayment for labor, materials, equip-
ment, reimbursables. Hidden profit.
Potential overpayment. Contractor absolved of
responsibility for lateness. Possibility of contractor
cash flow issues.
Potential overpayment for materials. Hidden profit.
Hidden increase to the total contract value.
Audit Issue Risk
Table 1 — Typical Audit Findings (Continued)
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The 2008 Editorial Calendar:
The monthly themes of each issue of the Cost Engineering
journal will be the following. However, monthly themes are
subject to change without notice based upon production
needs.
January: Academic/Education;
February: Building Information Modeling;
March: Claims and Dispute Resolution;
April: Cost Estimating and Analysis;
May: Management Issues (i.e., focus on facilities
management/materials management);
June: Annual Meeting Issue;
July: Government Public Works;
August: High Tech Research (focus on the aerospace
industry);
September: Annual Meeting follow up issue;
October: Planning and Scheduling;
November: Project Cost Control (i.e., focus on the
transportation industry); and
December: Value Improving Practices (oil, 
gas, and chemical industries)
A US coalition will under take the goal
to educate the public, industry, and elected
officials about the critical role officials play
in improving the level of safety in the built
environment.
The “Raise the Profile” Coalition,
committed to creating awareness about the
important role code officials play in making
everyday life safer, is made up of building
safety professionals, trade associations, man-
ufacturers, consumers, and other stakehold-
ers committed to improving public safety
by raising awareness of code officials’ roles. 
Throughout the US and round the
world, people have sustained injuries,
death, and economic loss because of unsafe
buildings and systems. These losses are suc-
cessfully minimized through the applica-
tion and ongoing enhancements to codes
and standards (building, electrical, fire,
HVAC, plumbing, property maintenance,
zoning, environmental, etc) and a regulato-
ry system to administer them. ◆
Coalition to Promote 
Role Code Officials 
Play in Public Safety
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APPENDIX F: 
PUBLICATION #2  
SYSTEMIC AUDIT AND SUBSTANTIVE EVALUATION IN THE  
BUILT ENVIRONMENT 
 
This technical paper summarized literature review on the evolution of the practice of audit, 
providing in-depth information on the history of audit, beginning with financial audit, and 
explained how laws and global concerns about fraud, waste and abuse forced the 
development and evolution of performance auditing, performance measurement, and program 
evaluation. Definitions were provided for the performance audit concepts of economy, 
efficiency, and effectiveness. It described (United States) government compliance auditing 
standards, their application in the framework of the audit engagement, and their limitations, 
while at the same time noting that there existed no comprehensive standards for performance 
auditing. 
 
The paper also defined several types of construction audit, including traditional performance 
audits, performance audits as defined by Proposition 39 (The Office of the Secretary of State 
of California, 2000), expenditure audits, contract audits, project audits, technical and forensic 
audits, and discussed their scopes and limitations. Specifically, there was discussion about the 
relevance of statistical sampling in an industry where there is a demonstrated and 
unavoidable history and relationship between expenditures from period to period. Included in 
the paper was this list of high-dollar-value errors that (in the author’s experience) might not 
surface during traditional expenditure testing, due to the challenges and limitations inherent 
in statistical sampling.  
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There was also discussion about the misnomer of ‘performance audit’ as  typically applied for 
Proposition 39. Still focusing on Proposition 39, the paper described State of California and 
local city and county investigations, public outcry, and stakeholder objections to the audit 
scope and methods applied by accounting firms when conducting Proposition 39 performance 
audits. 
 
This technical paper was granted the Jan Korevaar Award at the 2010 ICEC / PAQS 
conference in Singapore, for having received the highest delegate evaluations of all 
presentations at the congress, and was subsequently reprinted in both ICEC’s International 
Cost Management journal and AACE International’s magazine The Source. This publication 
contributed to capital project audit literature by highlighting some of the concerns about the 
use of government auditing standards (GAGAS), limitations of expenditure testing, and 
controversy surrounding performance audits conducted in the State of California. By 
adopting a rare perspective on audit research, namely the viewpoint from that of project 
auditing and performance auditing, the study began to address the risk concerns of internal 
and external project stakeholders and represented a previously unaddressed contribution to 
existing research. In addition, the publication equipped auditors with an understanding of the 
circumstances surrounding the evolution of audit, and how and why standards and 
methodologies continued to change. 
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ABSTRACT 
 
The disciplines and functions of performance auditing and program evaluation have evolved 
over the past half-century as part of an ongoing global evolution. Traditional audit functions 
are systems-based, focused on financial accountability and fiscal regularity. More recently, 
concerns about fraud and waste have raised questions about efficiency, economy, and 
effectiveness of organizations, integrity of systems, and accountability. Auditors began to 
take a legalistic inspection approach, stopping poor or illegal practices, and reviewing 
operations in terms of whether rules were observed and enforced. These adaptations resulted 
in various efforts at performance measurement and improvement, including: benchmarking, 
balanced scorecards, output measurement, and total quality management. Organizational 
paralysis was often the result, with middle managers focusing on high marks on the 
performance scorecard instead of the success of the business.  
 
In response to these challenges, the “new” performance audit philosophy is based on the 
concept of business entities as adaptive organisms. While there remains a focus on control 
and accountability, there is renewed global movement toward performance evaluation. The 
accountability sphere has been broadened to include procedural (internal control), compliance 
(contractual and statutory), professional (peer), and political (stakeholder) accountability. The 
systemic audit component continues to provide assurance through data validation, while the 
substantive evaluation component assesses how well the program is working and applies best 
practices to improve operations. 
 
This technical paper advocates for performance auditing in the construction project 
management environment, where traditional control-based systems are less effective because 
the built environment continuously evolves. 
 
Keywords: construction audit, performance assessment, expenditure review, contract audit, 
project controls best practices 
 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
Capital expenditures characteristically receive high visibility on financial statements. In 
today’s era of cost-consciousness, the industry is experiencing an increase in corporate 
awareness of expenditures, and calls for greater accountability and expenditure controls. 
  
The capital expenditure arena is contentious from the start. “The nature of the typical 
construction project is such that the parties to various contracts progress from project 
inception to completion while at the same time endeavoring to satisfy their own (often 
competing) objectives. The result is an industry and situation characterized by high potential 
for conflict; history indicates that only the most rare of projects is completed without changes 
or claims.” (Nalewaik, 2010) Even if a project is complete on time and on budget, and 
achieves quality expectations, measuring the success or failure of a construction project is a 
complex process, largely because the definition of success varies from stakeholder to 
stakeholder.  
 
In such an inherently risky environment, audits should be an integral part of every 
construction project, enabled by “right to audit” contract language that can provide restricted 
or unrestricted rights to review operations, contracts, projects, programs, and expenditures 
during the time period of the contract and beyond. However, just as no two construction 
projects or snowflakes are exactly alike, the scope and objective of construction audits vary 
considerably by entity and situation. In the built environment, a systemic audit component 
can provide expenditure assurance through data validation, while a substantive evaluation 
component can assess how well the program is working and apply best practices to 
underperforming activities. Different approaches to construction audit, and their benefits, are 
discussed herein. 
 
HISTORY 
 
Traditionally, public sector audit has been systems-based, focused on financial accountability 
and fiscal regularity. The need for accurate accounting of Federal expenditures in the United 
States was institutionalized by the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950, which required 
internal audit functions to be established in Federal agencies. The accounting was considered 
to be satisfactory if it demonstrated that transactions were legal, formally authorized, and 
reported accurately. “Financial audits include financial statement and finance-related audits. 
A financial statement audit is an examination of a company’s financial statements and 
records, in order to provide reasonable assurance that the data is accurate and complete, and 
is presented according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP).” (Nalewaik, 
2007) Indeed, the financial audit component remains an important factor in the review of 
capital expenditures, applying fixed standards and methodologies and involving attestation of 
financial statements and reviews of financial controls.  
 
To further complicate matters, some fifty years later the Federal Public Company Accounting 
Reform and Investor Protection Act of 2002 (the Sarbanes-Oxley Act) was enacted to protect 
shareholders and public interest. “In addition to other requirements, certain sections of the act 
require all regulated companies to establish an audit committee, to document internal controls 
and evaluate their effectiveness, and to certify that financial statements fairly reflect the 
company’s financial situation and operations for the period presented.” (Nalewaik, 2007) 
Because capital expenditures represent substantial investment, often appear on the balance 
sheet as “assets”, and represent potential control risks, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act has pushed 
 some responsibility for expenditure control downward from the financial and internal audit 
departments, to construction project management and project controls. “Capital assets, 
construction in progress, bond issuances, leases, depreciation and capitalized interest may be 
reflected in several places in the financial statement, including the aforementioned balance 
sheet, income statement, cash flow statements, and notes to the financial statement.” 
(Nalewaik, 2007) Although originally written for regulated companies, this act has had a 
trickle-over effect to the public sector. 
 
Outside the realm of pure financial auditing, the past thirty years illustrate an ongoing global 
shift in government administrative culture away from pure reviews of revenues, expenditures, 
and controls, toward a post-positivist, quality-oriented stance, in which the disciplines and 
functions of performance auditing and program evaluation developed to supplement the 
financial audit. “The moves by the United States General Accounting Office (GAO, now 
known as the Government Accountability Office) into programme evaluation or efficiency 
auditing in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s reflected the view of the Comptroller-General as 
to what information the legislature needed to exercise appropriate oversight. … In general, 
this extension of the audit  mandate reflects a view that full accountability to the legislature 
requires more than just financial and compliance accountability.” (Shand & Anand, 1996) A 
few years later, the Inspector-General Act of 1978 was yet another response to widespread 
public concerns about fraud, waste, and abuse, intended to promote the assessment of 
efficiency, economy, effectiveness, and integrity. Government entities began to establish 
strict and detailed policies and procedures for performing day-to-day activities, and the role 
of the external auditor evolved to focus on compliance. “The presumption was that adherence 
to these procedures would produce the desired level of performance. … Audits often resulted 
in recommendations for more controls to ensure compliance with established guidelines.” 
(Trodden, 1996) The tide continued to shift and, while entities sustained the practice of 
auditing for financial accountability, there grew ever-greater focus on accountability to the 
public. Continuing the evolution, in the United States during the Reagan and Bush 
administrations of the 1980’s and 1990’s, auditors focused on the legalistic inspection 
approach of stopping poor or illegal practices, and reviewed operations in terms of whether 
rules were observed and enforced.  
 
However, the never-ending flood of controls, policies and procedures did not yield the 
expected improvement in performance. “For a century, public administration has built rules 
and regulations of increasing complexity and formalism, presumably to assure equity and to 
avoid corruption. Unfortunately experience, at least at all levels of government in the United 
States, has demonstrated that corruption can adapt to complex rules and procedures but 
competence cannot.” (Walsh, 1996) Clearly, a new solution was needed. 
 
The Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), passed in 1993, endeavored to link 
budget inputs with performance outcomes. Additional philosophical shifts during the 1990’s 
resulted in a number of efforts at performance measurement1, including (among others): 
benchmarking, balanced scorecards, output measurement, statistical process control, spiral 
analysis, total quality management (TQM), and six sigma. Although what was measured was 
likely to be acted upon, organizational paralysis was more often the result, with middle 
managers focusing on the narrow objectives and specific measures of success that would 
yield some personal or departmental benefit (such as bonuses, raises, promotions, or the 
                                                 
1 Countless studies have been conducted and technical papers published, regarding appropriate “critical success 
factors” to be used in establishing performance criteria for construction projects. 
 longevity of their particular sector) instead of the broader performance of the program. This 
likely occurred because performance measurement quantified results against pre-established 
goals, but did not necessarily provide a means by which improvement could be effected.  
 
This is the realm of performance assessment, which creates a vehicle for continuous 
improvement. In this early 21st century, new approaches to organizational performance 
assessment are based on the concept of public sector entities as adaptive organisms. While for 
statutory reasons there remains a component of focus on control and accountability, there is a 
renewal of the common global movement toward performance evaluation. Whereas efforts at 
establishing accountability focus on the use and abuse of resources and authority within a 
well-defined statutory box, questions about performance focus on progress, continuous 
improvement, and evolution. Where the traditional accountant asks, “Were things done the 
right way?” and verifies the data and reporting, those focusing on performance ask, “Was the 
right thing done in this specific situation?” and question whether the rules serve their 
intended purpose, determining whether the rules are appropriate, inadequate, or superfluous. 
The accountability sphere in the public sector has also been broadened to include procedural 
(internal control), compliance (contractual and statutory), professional (peer best practices), 
and political (stakeholder) accountability.  
 
GUIDANCE AND STANDARDS 
 
When conducting an audit, the auditor’s role is to ensure that the findings are factual and 
accurate; in a financial statement audit, as mentioned above, that the data is fairly presented 
and the statements prepared in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles. 
“Most state legislative audit staffs follow the general guidelines set down in the GAO’s 
[Government Accountability Office] 1972 ‘Yellow Book’, Standards for Audit of 
Governmental Organizations, Programs, Activities, and Functions. The Yellow Book covers 
standards for audit work such as staff qualifications, planning, supervision, evidence, 
reporting, and review.” (Craft & Brown, 1980) In addition, these generally accepted 
government auditing standards (GAGAS), provide a framework for conducting audits and 
attestation engagements with an assumed level of professional competence, ethics and 
integrity, objectivity, quality control, and independence. “Laws, regulations, contracts, grant 
agreements, or policies frequently require audits in accordance with GAGAS.  For attestation 
engagements, GAGAS incorporate the AICPA [American Institute of CPAs] general standard 
on criteria, and the field work and reporting standards and the related Statements on 
Standards for Attestation Engagements (SSAE) unless specifically excluded or modified by 
GAGAS.” (GAO, July 2007) Public organisations turn naturally to the internal audit group to 
write the request for qualifications (RFQ) or request for proposal (RFP) when advertising the 
audit opportunity and seeking auditors. Because it is assumed that they know the standards, a 
Certified Public Accountant (CPA) is often an audit team prerequisite. Because single-audit2 
or “Yellow Book” is the language best-understood and most familiar in the audit universe, 
and due to the GAGAS requirements, many public RFQs and RFPs also specify these as 
requirements, regardless of their appropriateness.  
 
                                                 
2 The Single Audit Act of 1984 and the United States (Federal) Office of Management & Budget (OMB) 
Circular A-133 ("Audits of State, Local Governments, and Non-Profit Organizations") provide details of 
financial audit requirements for ensuring that Federal funds are properly expended. The term “single audit” 
refers to the option for the audited entity to conduct one broadly-based annual audit in lieu of a collection of 
audits of individual programs. 
 Consulting standards may be applied instead of attestation standards, depending on the 
engagement. The AICPA acknowledges the differences between attestation engagements and 
consulting services, stating that “…consulting services differ fundamentally from the CPA's 
function of attesting to the assertions of other parties. In an attest service, the practitioner 
expresses a conclusion about the reliability of a written assertion that is the responsibility of 
another party, the asserter. In a consulting service, the practitioner develops the findings, 
conclusions, and recommendations presented. The nature and scope of work is determined 
solely by the agreement between the practitioner and the client. Generally, the work is 
performed only for the use and benefit of the client.” (Auditing Standards Board, 2004) In 
general, the expected standards of care remain the same as for attestation, and the consulting 
standards are applied where the auditor is providing advisory services. 
 
 “There are still no comprehensive standards for performance reporting and auditing” 
(Holmquist & Barklund-Larsson, 1996), comparable to those used for compliance auditing 
(the “Yellow Book”). Here, the concept of ‘comprehensive’ is key. GAGAS does include 
performance audit standards, but they do not differ substantially from the rest of GAGAS, 
containing guidance on such audit elements as:  significance & risk, field work, planning & 
scoping, supervision, and documentation. This gap has been noted by the industry; the GAO 
allows auditors conducting performance audits to use other professional standards, such as 
the International Standards for the Professional Practice of Internal Auditing (published by 
the Institute of Internal Auditors); Guiding Principles for Evaluators (published by the 
American Evaluation Association); Program Evaluation Standards (published by the Joint 
Committee on Standards for Education Evaluation); and Standards for Educational and 
Psychological Testing (published by the American Psychological Association). (GAO, July 
2007) However, even the GAO’s concession to the use of alternate standards requires the 
auditors to use those in conjunction with GAGAS, and proffers the opinion that performance 
audits conducted without applying GAGAS are not performance audits but non-audit 
services. This has led to additional concerns; “…some of the controversy surrounding the 
revision and adoption of GAGAS has largely concerned evaluation researchers’ fears that 
these standards are too closely related to financial auditing practice and are, therefore, 
inapplicable to many program evaluation situations.” (Davis, 1990) Until a comprehensive 
and appropriate standard is developed, the realm of performance auditing will likely remain 
trapped in a mire of insufficient guidelines, and both auditor and auditee will need to work 
together to determine the appropriate scope and methodologies for each engagement. 
 
TYPES OF CONSTRUCTION AUDIT 
 
Traditional control-based systems can be effective in situations where tasks are repetitive and 
the processes are predictable. However, the construction environment is considerably less 
stable than the typical project-based environment or governmental organization, such that it is 
not feasible to create detailed procedures and controls to cover all possible eventualities. The 
majority of construction audits involve the ex post process of collecting data at a single point 
in time, yet performance is not a discrete event and the built environment continuously 
evolves throughout its lifecycle, which results in audit findings becoming outdated almost as 
soon as (and sometimes before) they are issued. Without a real-time evaluative / audit role, 
opportunities for improvement would otherwise have to wait for the next annual audit cycle 
rather than effecting change in real time, and improvements achieved would not be visible 
until the issuance of the next audit report. Although many audits are conducted on a periodic 
(often annual) basis, the entity may see a benefit from continuous auditing. 
 
 The quality and quantity of audit findings will most often be directly proportional to the level 
of sophistication of the construction program; as controls and management practices are 
refined over time, the auditor may report fewer findings. Indeed, as subsequent audits result 
in fewer best-practice improvement opportunities, the entity may decide to reduce the scope 
of assessment and expenditure testing, perhaps focusing solely on areas of concern. 
 
Predictably, costs questioned during an audit can be easily measurable and quantified, 
whereas other findings may be more qualitative in nature. The financial consequences of the 
evaluative (qualitative) findings are difficult to assess but nonetheless of value. The Owner or 
project culture that is most likely to see significance in qualitative findings will 
characteristically have strong executive support, desire to challenge the status quo and be 
identified as a change agent, demonstrate willingness to address and be held accountable for 
tough problems, and promote an environment that places a premium on continuous 
improvement. In these environments, a blend of traditional systemic and continuous 
substantive evaluation is necessary. 
 
Performance Audit  
 
The substantive evaluation component (the performance audit) provides an independent 
assessment of performance, with the purpose of determining how well pre-defined goals and 
objectives are being achieved. “Performance auditing is a systematic, objective assessment of 
the accomplishments or processes of a government program or activity for the purpose of 
determining its effectiveness, economy, or efficiency.” (Waring & Morgan, 2007) This type 
of operational auditing is also known as management-oriented auditing, in which the external 
auditor is a valuable part of a team charged with assisting an organization achieve its 
objectives.  
 
The “three e’s” associated with performance auditing sound similar, but are distinctly 
different.  
 A typical definition of “economy” (Little, Fowler, & Coulson, 1973) may emphasize 
the element of economic conservation or thriftiness, but in a performance audit the 
auditor’s attention is devoted to demonstrating prudence in the use of funds. One 
representative activity in construction is value engineering. 
 The standard definition of “efficiency”, however, is in this instance quite accurate, 
focusing on producing a result while minimizing waste, and using all available 
resources (not just funds, but also technology, staffing, and more) productively. 
 The concept of “effectiveness” can be difficult to define without reference to the other 
two, but there is a subtle distinction. Even with the application of economy and 
efficiency, results may be ineffective. The emphasis here is on whether or not the 
desired result was achieved; however, as mentioned previously, the “success” of any 
construction program is a highly subjective topic, and definitions will vary diversely 
depending on which stakeholder is polled. 
 
A performance audit for a publicly-funded construction program will typically combine 1) a 
compliance [systemic] review of a statistically significant sampling of expenditures, and 2) 
an [substantive] examination of the effectiveness of program management as practiced, with 
3) a financial audit conducted separately. In addition, as with traditional performance audits 
of organizations, “…there are cross-cutting performance aspects that apply … such as ethics, 
integrity, and equity; and continuous improvement.” (Waring & Morgan, 2007) Thus, the 
audit may include some form of expenditure review (limited or broad in scope), and also 
 evaluate other aspects of the program including planning and management processes, contract 
compliance, and adherence to laws and funding requirements. Again, the list of subject areas 
addressed when reviewing management functions can be exhaustive, and may include any 
department or function within the organization. 
 
Clearly, the performance audit methodology can be complex and situational. “Performance 
audits deal with a multitude of topics and perspectives covering the entire government sector, 
and it would not be possible to develop detailed standards and procedures that work equally 
well in all these situations…they operate from a quite different knowledge base to that of 
traditional auditing. It is not a checklist-based form of auditing.” (INTOSAI, 2004) Indeed, 
the successful and valuable performance audit should combine traditional auditing skill-sets 
(such as review of expenditures, and testing of preventive and detective controls) with in-
depth industry knowledge and social sciences techniques (including interviewing, 
investigative efforts, and evaluation research methods). However, not all auditors are trained 
in the softer techniques of data gathering that are well established in the fields of qualitative 
evaluation. 
 
In situations where it is not feasible to test the entire population of expenditures, the auditor 
may instead select and test a sample (a smaller population). Sampling theory holds that the 
findings discovered in testing the few can be assumed to hold true for the whole - “…a 
demonstrated quality of a representative sample can be extrapolated to the population” 
(Sawyer, Dittenhofer, & Scheiner, 2003) - and that the same results would have been 
achieved had one hundred percent of the expenditures been tested. This technique has been 
proven over many decades of financial accountancy. However, in order for the findings to be 
relevant, the sample itself needs to be well understood in the context of the circumstances and 
program. Outliers need to be explained, and findings evaluated for materiality (significance, 
relevance and value of impact)3. Sampling methodologies vary from audit to audit, and can 
be divided into two main categories –random (statistical) sampling, and judgmental (non-
statistical) sampling. In general, it is accepted practice that a larger sample will more 
accurately represent (be representative of) the broader controls environment, providing 
greater confidence and reduce audit risk in the results. The sample could be large either in 
terms of quantity of items (such as payment applications) sampled, or sum total of the 
expenditures sampled as a percentage of the total expended to date.  
 
It is valid here to question whether statistical sampling is truly effective in the realm of 
performance auditing, especially for very large programs whose scope include multiple 
projects and many design, engineering, consultant, and construction contracts. True, the 
technique of statistical sampling will likely surface routine procedural and controls issues, 
such as: duplicate payments; whether or not an invoice was reviewed appropriately and 
approved for payment; rates were charged in accordance with the contract; math was correct; 
or the expenditure was captured in both the project management software and in the financial 
system.  
 
                                                 
3 An extreme example of an immaterial finding would be a rounding error of two cents on an invoice of several 
thousand dollars. 
 However, in the world of construction, there is a history and relationship from period to 
period that is reflected in the contractor’s payment applications. The schedule of values 
(SOV) and related reporting evolve on a monthly basis in response to project conditions, 
including both expenditures and change orders, and those SOV changes will be invisible to 
the auditor if the expenditures are selected and tested singly, out of context, and out of 
sequence. Thus, the traditional method of testing may actually prevent the auditor from 
appropriately questioning expenditures, in effect reducing the number of questioned costs and 
thus the effectiveness of the entire audit.  
 
Examples of high-dollar-value errors that might not surface in random testing of expenditures 
across a capital mega-program include (but are not limited to): 
 Missing deductive (negative) change orders 
 Unreasonable inflated charges, especially in change orders 
 Excessive hours spent for design, engineering, or installation 
 Unexplained variations in the schedule of values 
 Charges for materials or equipment purchased but not used 
 Differences between material quantities installed and quantities invoiced 
 Expenditure totals for rented equipment that exceed the purchase price of the item 
 Equipment or personnel hours charged to two projects at the same time 
 Owner-purchased or donated equipment not captured in the project reporting 
 Issues with information systems used to manage the project 
 
Proposition 39 Performance Audits 
 
Traditional auditors might be lacking even more than just the evaluation skills noted above; 
many lack the appropriate industry expertise, and some may even have made a grave error in 
determining which audit procedures to apply. In a very specific instance in the State of 
California affecting K-12 school districts and community colleges using public funds 
(General Obligation Bonds) for construction, Proposition 39 requires that the public entity 
must conduct both an annual independent financial audit and an annual independent 
performance audit of the bond fund usage. Specifically, the audit should be conducted “…to 
ensure…voters will be given a list of specific projects their bond money will be used for; to 
require an annual, independent financial audit of the proceeds from the sale of the school 
facilities bonds until all of the proceeds have been expended for the specified school facilities 
projects; and to ensure that the proceeds from the sale of school facilities bonds are used for 
specified school facilities projects only, and not for teacher and administrator salaries and 
other school operating expenses, by requiring an annual, independent performance audit to 
ensure that the funds have been expended on specific projects only.” (The Office of the 
Secretary of State of California, 2000) 
 
Reading the language of the proposition, at first glance this looks like the ideal situation for 
an agreed-upon procedures4 engagement, limiting the scope of the audit to only a comparison 
of bond fund expenditures against the project list specified in the bond. Indeed, this was the 
approach taken by many a school district and community college district, and their chosen 
audit firms. Yet, reading even more closely, the proposition language clearly expects that a 
performance audit will be conducted. Herein lies the contradiction and the ambiguity, which 
                                                 
4 In an agreed-upon procedures (AUP) engagement, the objective is to conduct clearly delineated audit 
procedures on a limited subject matter. The auditor does not perform an examination or a review, and merely 
describes the procedures and reports the results without expressing any opinion about the findings. 
 leads one to question how a limited-scope agreed-upon procedures audit can adequately 
assess the effectiveness, economy, or efficiency of an entire bond-funded construction 
program. 
 
Within the past year, the stakeholder and taxpaying community has focused intensely on this, 
along with the State of California Controller’s Office and the Little Hoover Commission 
(LHC)5. In a letter issued to the California Board of Accountancy in November 2009, the 
California League of Bond Oversight Committees (CALBOC) challenged the status quo, 
stating that “…[the] AICPA expects a performance audit to offer much more than a review of 
the agreed upon procedures. Most, if not all, licensees of the board, engaged in the practice of 
public accountancy, lack the staff and expertise to measure the efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy of a facilities program. A typical CPA firm does not have experience and expertise 
in managing a school facilities program. We contend that one cannot judge and evaluate the 
performance of processes and systems in which one is not experienced. The California State 
Controller’s Office has concluded that an “agreed upon procedures review” does not 
constitute a performance audit. (CALBOC, 2009) It can be foreseen that Districts currently 
conducting an “agreed upon procedure” review will soon find that the tide has turned, as the 
State Controller’s Office and LHC consider their audits to be insufficient as required by the 
State constitution. Quoting the LHC’s findings, CALBOC has taken the stance that “… these 
inadequate “audits” are causing the school districts to lose opportunities to save millions in 
taxpayers’ money. A number of licensees of the Board of Accountancy, therefore, are 
complicit in violating Proposition 39 by continuing to offer “agreed upon procedures” and 
presenting them and/or allowing them to be presented as performance audits.” (CALBOC, 
2009) The State Controller’s Office has recommended that the State more clearly define the 
purpose and objectives of required audits, (Little Hoover Commission, June 2009) and the 
State Governor has issued an executive order demanding accountability and transparency 
from agencies administering publicly-funded programs, proclaiming “Accountability consists 
both of ensuring that bond expenditures contribute to long-lasting, meaningful improvements 
to critical infrastructure, and providing the public with readily accessible information about 
how the bonds they approved and are paying for are being spent.” (Schwarzenegger, 2007) 
Assuming a particularly aggressive stance, CALBOC has also demanded that firms 
conducting agreed-upon procedures be investigated for unethical and unprofessional conduct 
and subject to appropriate sanctions and penalties, and that the California Board of 
Accountancy be advised of current issues. Although it appears to be an extreme reaction, this 
may in actuality be very appropriate, considering that a firm may be in violation of GAGAS 
if they conduct a performance audit of a construction program and do not have team members 
who have specialized knowledge and demonstrated expertise in the technical subject matter. 
 
                                                 
5 “The Little Hoover Commission, formally known as the Milton Marks "Little Hoover" Commission on 
California State Government Organization and Economy, is an independent state oversight agency that was 
created in 1962. The Commission's mission is to investigate state government operations and – through reports, 
recommendations and legislative proposals – promote efficiency, economy and improved service. … Unlike 
fiscal or performance audits, the Commission's studies look beyond whether programs comply with existing 
requirements, instead exploring how programs could and should function in today's world. The Commission 
produces in-depth, well-documented reports that serve as a factual basis for crafting effective reform legislation. 
Based on its reports, the Commission follows through with legislation to implement its recommendations, 
building coalitions, testifying at hearings and providing technical support to policy makers.” (The Little Hoover 
Commission, 2010) 
 Expenditure Audit 
 
The systemic audit component is typically effected through expenditure audit, which can take 
many forms including contract audit, review of expenditures on projects or programs, and 
specialty audits of such items as change orders, overtime charges, payment applications, 
labor burden, reimbursable expenses, and more. The objective of the audit may be to satisfy 
external or internal audit requirements, or the investigation may be prompted by events, 
rumors, or allegations. 
 
Expenditures may be reviewed in their entirety, or in part (by testing a statistically relevant 
portion). Here, as discussed earlier, the same statistical testing issues apply. However, by 
reviewing a greater population of expenditures in context and possibly in sequence or 
batches, it is more likely that in conducting a detailed expenditure audit the auditor will gain 
a greater understanding of the history and relationship from period to period that is reflected 
in the invoices or payment applications. This may in effect increase the number of questioned 
costs and thus the overall effectiveness of the audit. 
 
Contract Audit 
 
The most detailed of the expenditure audits may well be the contract audit, because the 
construction contract is the single most powerful and legally binding document of the project. 
“Among other things, it defines the key parties to the contract, delineates their rights and 
obligations, establishes the methodology for contract administration, sets the payment terms, 
and clarifies allowable/unallowable expenditures.” (Nalewaik, 2010) In addition, the contract 
and addenda establish project expectations by providing detail about the means and methods 
of the project itself, explaining “…how work will be accomplished, the roles and 
responsibilities of the parties, the methods to handle change, and how to resolve disputes.” 
(Krebs, 2000) The language within the contract can be used to determine the viability of 
applications for payment, potential change orders, and claims. 
 
In a contract audit, the auditor will typically validate that approvals were received prior to 
expenditure, review the use of allowances and contingency, ensure that supporting 
documentation was provided to justify expenditures, and review cost charges against both 
funding source requirements and contract language. The level of review and type of findings 
will vary according to the type of contract (such as guaranteed maximum price, time & 
materials, lump sum, etc). For certain types of contract, the scope of the audit can be 
seemingly without limit, as every dollar spent can be traced to many levels and sub-levels of 
supporting documentation. 
 
Interestingly, one study has demonstrated that capital project owners and auditors have not 
utilized this important tool to maximum effect and contract audits are, surprisingly, a less 
than common occurrence in the construction industry, despite overwhelming evidence of 
their value.  
 
Of 61 study participants, only 63 percent conducted audits of their capital programs, those 
who did conduct contract audits reviewed fewer than half of their construction contracts, and 
only one respondent included audit-trained engineers as part of the audit team. “The auditors 
participating in the study reported finding significant overcharges during their audits. 
Twenty-eight percent found significant overcharges on I-24 percent of their audits; 38 percent 
did so on 25-49 percent of audits; and 17 percent did on 50-99 percent of audits. Only seven 
 percent indicated finding significant overcharges on all of their audits. Interestingly, all of the 
auditors who reported finding overcharges on every audit included an audit of the contractor's 
own records in their audit scope.” (Cashell, Aldhizer, & Eichmann, 1999) As discussed 
above, it is natural for organisations to turn to their internal audit group to scope the 
engagement and specify the standards. Although some large public megaprograms have 
included contract audit in rigorous continuous review of expenditures, some owners new to 
capital construction (whose core business is not construction and who are for the first time in 
a long while adding, retrofitting, or expanding facilities) might not be fully aware of the 
benefits of contract audit. 
 
Other audits 
 
Many other types of audit can be conducted in the built environment. In fact, in the categories 
discussed above, one may find when observing the actual activities of public sector agencies 
that the majority of construction audits are hybrids. Some technical audit scopes may focus 
less on expenditures and more on issues encountered during the project or contract 
(sometimes known as a project audit). This may include forensic assessment and review of 
installed materials and equipment to ensure that the project was delivered in accordance with 
expectations, closeout achieved (both occupancy and formal closeout), the contract 
specifications were met, and/or the quantities invoiced matched those installed. These may or 
may not include expenditure testing.  
 
Investigations of this type require the use of team members who have an engineering 
background and very specific skillsets. The AICPA has provided for this eventuality, through 
Pronouncement SAS 73 (Using the Work of a Specialist), a less commonly used section of 
the generally accepted auditing standards that allows auditors to seek the assistance of third 
party experts. “The auditor's education and experience enable him or her to be knowledgeable 
about business matters in general, but the auditor is not expected to have the expertise of a 
person trained for or qualified to engage in the practice of another profession or occupation.” 
(Auditing Standards Board, 1994) Indeed, by invoking SAS 73 and teaming with specialists 
who have experience in both audit and construction, a number of CPA firms could generate a 
more relevant workproduct, and identify more findings of value to the client. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Because capital expenditures are highly visible on financial statements and today’s economic 
environment is inspiring an era of extreme cost-consciousness, there is a renewed global 
focus on corporate awareness of expenditures, and calls for greater accountability and 
expenditure controls. Audits of capital programs fill this need. However, the scope and 
objective of construction audits vary considerably by entity and situation. 
 
An independent assessment of performance can be commissioned to determine how well pre-
defined goals and objectives are being achieved, with a focus on the effectiveness, economy, 
or efficiency of the construction program or project. This type of engagement may combine 
traditional auditing skill-sets (such as review of expenditures, and testing of preventive and 
detective controls) with in-depth industry knowledge and social sciences techniques 
(including interviewing, investigative efforts, and evaluation research methods).  
 
 Expenditure audits typically review incurred costs in greater detail, and may have a specific 
focus such as the construction contract, consultant contracts, change orders, overtime 
charges, payment applications, labor burden, reimbursable expenses, and more.  
 
Many other types of audit can be accomplished in the built environment. Some technical 
audit scopes may focus less on expenditures and more on issues encountered during the 
project or contract. These may or may not include expenditure testing. 
 
By embracing a combination of systemic audit and substantive evaluation, and making a 
commitment to using the audit recommendations to effect change, an entity can adopt an 
action-oriented philosophy. Not just reactively adapting to change in the environment, these 
entities are leading their peers by becoming learning organizations, discarding poor-
performing management practices and anticipating the future. These owners are at the 
forefront of a global wave of public entities and Fortune 500 companies that are using 
performance assessment and expenditure audits in new ways to affect progress, continuous 
improvement, and evolution. 
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APPENDIX G: 
PUBLICATION #3  
THE NEED FOR ASSURANCE IN PROJECT MANAGEMENT 
 
Presented at the 2011 International Project Management Association (IPMA) Expert Seminar 
in Zurich, this research paper summarized literature review on the topic of accountability. 
Beginning with a definition of accountability, it considered the application of the definition in 
developing appropriate audit scope for large programs, and discussed limitations, especially 
in the evaluation of economy, optimization, and value for monies spent. It discussed 
accountability in project and program management, the role played by controls in the form of 
policies and procedures, and the specific challenges faced by large and complex programs. 
The paper acknowledged the existing application of audit skills and methods in many project 
and program quality assurance mechanisms. 
 
The first batch of research results was presented, demonstrating that different types of 
findings were generated for different audit scopes. The author observed that most audit 
findings focused on routine procedural, accounting, and controls errors, and neither the 
expenditure audits nor the performance audits addressed questions about economy, 
effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of expenditures. The concept of a risk-based 
assurance approach to audit was introduced, in the context of its application on three mega-
programs, as a new audit scope and methodology in the auditor’s toolkit wherein any 
resource consumed could conceivably be audited. 
 
  
222 
This publication contributed to capital program  audit literature by discerning that audit scope 
affected audit findings, and that the true value of the audit resided in its usability by 
stakeholders. The description of the impact of audit scope on audit findings, as presented in 
this study, provided new insights and means for the appropriate scoping of audits. The key 
message was that audits must be carefully crafted to suit their intended purpose, and auditors 
must be aware of how scope and methodology impact audit results. 
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The Need for Assurance in Project Management 
 
Abstract 
 
Complex projects and mega-programs tend to experience great volatility, resulting 
in overspending and significant delays in completion. The need is greater than ever 
for careful oversight of these endeavors, especially those using public funds. 
Although audit, with accounting and reporting, is the most frequently used 
mechanism for such oversight, performance audit standards and traditional 
techniques are insufficient, providing a mere illusion of adequate administration. 
The question becomes one of how changes in management techniques  can be put in 
place to effect confidence in the control and delivery of these projects, while 
satisfying stakeholders’ needs for supervision, expenditure visibility, and risk 
management.  
 
This paper focuses on the characteristics of complex projects, including obstacles to 
audit and control, and advocates for a new management philosophy. A vision of the 
path forward involves adopting an assurance mentality, by focusing on 
accountability and facilitating oversight. This is achieved by merging risk 
assessment and more sophisticated audit methodologies, to identify and target 
specific areas of concern. 
 
The approach is grounded in experience, supplemented by empirical research of 
audit findings from over 600 projects, and is being realized in practical application. 
Elements of the methodology are currently being used on three highly visible 
construction mega-programs. The Owners leading the way to the future of project 
management are: 
 
 Los Angeles Community College District, Bond-funded construction 
program, $5.73 billion 
 MGM Resorts International-Dubai World, CityCenter Las Vegas complex,  
$8.50 billion 
 Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Third Set of Locks project, $5.25 billion 
 
This paper uses as exemplars three capital projects, but the same tools can be 
applied to any projects, programmes and portfolios in any industry worldwide. 
 
Key words 
 
Project audit, project performance, complex projects, accountability, assurance 
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1. Introduction 
 
In today’s age of economic austerity, complex projects tend to experience great 
volatility, resulting in overspending and significant delays in completion. The need 
is greater than ever for careful oversight of these endeavors, especially those using 
public funds, such that the maximum possible can be achieved with available 
resources. Ultimately, the project management team and governing body are held 
jointly accountable for the performance of the project. As the project manager, 
providing the minimum professional standard of care is not enough. 
 
Existing mechanisms for project assessment are insufficient, and do not provide 
adequate oversight of project status. Traditional audit methods and scorecards have 
been shown to fail on large and complex projects; periodic reporting may be 
inaccurate or deficient. It is clear that additional innovative methods are needed to 
satisfy stakeholders’ expectations for appropriate governance, expenditure visibility, 
and risk management. Project assurance fills that need.  
 
This paper uses capital projects to illustrate the method and benefits. However, the 
same tools can be applied to any projects, programmes and portfolios in any industry 
worldwide.  
 
2. Defining Accountability 
 
When a project does not perform as expected or promised, both project executive 
management and stakeholders seek to understand who was responsible. They ask 
that someone be held accountable for (as example) budget busts, delayed 
completion, failure, errors, injuries, and deaths. That accountable someone is 
expected somehow to remedy the situation, or make it right through a form of 
compensation. In a typical project scenario, there is a hierarchy of accountability. As 
a simplified example: the project team reports to project management, who may be 
accountable to a governing board, who are in turn responsible to a broader group of 
stakeholders. 
 
The concept of accountability implies responsibility and liability … and, often, 
punishment. (Behn, 2002) “To be accountable is to have to answer for one's actions 
or inaction, and to be responsible for their consequences.” (Roberts, 2002) With 
respect to projects, the definition of accountability can be broadened to include not 
only satisfactory achievement of results but also the means, policies and procedures, 
and controls by which results are achieved and resources managed, (Roth, 1996) 
because those means impact the project as a whole.  
 
In broadening the scope of accountability, the concept departs from a traditional 
view of satisfactory accounting of resources expended. From this new accountability 
perspective, “accounting is satisfactory if it demonstrates that … authority and 
money have been used efficiently and effectively. By contrast, the traditional 
specification of satisfactory accounting requires a demonstration that transactions 
have been formally authorised.” (Barzelay, 1996) This broader approach recognizes 
that transactions may be formally authorized but still be wilfully and knowingly 
unnecessary or excessive; critical questioning of expenditures and project controls 
IPMA Expert Seminar 2011 Alexia Nalewaik, FRICS CCE MSc 
- 3 - 
 
becomes a necessary part of being responsive and responsible to stakeholders. 
Economy and optimization of the project become the focus, and stewardship in the 
use of resources, such that more can be achieved with the available means while 
achieving the same expectations and quality. (International Congress of Supreme 
Audit Institutions, 2004) In order to achieve this level of accountability, traditional 
project accounting and project controls must be supplemented with additional 
governance mechanisms. 
 
3. The Project Manager’s Role 
 
A project necessitates the creation of a temporary organization designed to 
achieving completion of a specific goal. (John, Wardle, & Fairhurst, 2008) Within 
that organization, there are various entities who work together to deliver and govern 
the project. Two of those groups, project management and stakeholders, play 
specific and important roles in the sphere of accountability. 
 
Project management is given the authority to implement and complete the project; 
thus, individuals ultimately are held accountable and responsible (IPMA, 2006) for 
the success or failure of the project. Although project management is given some 
autonomy to flexibly direct and deliver the completed project in accordance with 
cost, schedule, quality and performance expectations, they are usually expected to 
provide periodic status reports to stakeholders as a mechanism of accountability; this 
occurs with varyinig degrees of success and accuracy (Nalewaik & Witt, 2009). 
Where the project or program has multiple stakeholders, perhaps internal and 
external stakeholders with interdependencies, the accountability relationship 
becomes even more dynamic (Nalewaik A. , 2010) and ‘success’ and ‘value’ 
become harder to define (Klakegg, 2009), especially where the project is subject to 
direct and indirect influence by stakeholders. 
 
There is no shortage of literature purporting to provide methods to ensure successful 
project execution. Yet, despite both academic research and practitioner lessons 
learned, projects often fail. (Mian, 2005) Perhaps this is because traditional project 
controls are based on an assumption that success can be achieved and risks avoided 
by following detailed procedures. (Roth, 1996) In reality, project team members 
have a tendency to do the minimum required by established policies and procedures; 
‘check-box management’ is the norm. Not every team member is motivated to 
perform at a level exceeding expectations, at all times, to serve the client & 
stakeholders. Elements of behavioral competence (IPMA, 2006) are critical on 
complex projects, yet are often absent. Indeed, in many instances, the roles and 
responsibilities of project team members have become so narrowly defined and task-
oriented that innovation and superior performance is discouraged or hindered. 
Traditional control systems and detailed policies and procedures may be effective in 
reducing risk in a predictable environment, but on a complex project it is impossible 
to detail a course of action for every possible situation. Innovation, leadership, 
responsiveness, competence and flexibility are required, in order to deliver the 
complex project. 
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Stakeholders expect and demand due professional care, which includes the 
competence and judgment of the project team, coupled with ethics, values, and 
commitment, (Roth, 1996) for successful completion of the project. At the project 
organization level, governance requires a level of effort beyond basic management 
responsibilities. Management by rote, with established prescriptive controls, is not 
enough to satisfy this expectation.  
 
4. The Challenges of Complex Projects 
 
Project success is due to a combination of situation and performance. “We all know 
of cases where poor results followed a heroic performance because of bad 
circumstances. Similarly, we know of situations where the results were good even 
though the performance was mediocre, often because the circumstances were right.” 
(Roth, 1996) A well-managed project can fail, and a poorly managed project can 
succeed. But, on very large projects or complex projects, the margin for error is 
quite narrow and mistakes are easily amplified. 
 
Large, complex projects require considerable investment in time, money, and other 
resources. These projects necessitate multifaceted and geographically diverse teams, 
often exceeding the limits of available resources at all levels and requiring that 
additional means be brought from wherever available. Classic well-respected 
generic project excellence models provide solid principles for management, but 
require customization and adaptation in order to facilitate effective project 
administration. This customization results in an amalgam of project management 
tools, because the sheer size and volatility of the complex project pushes the limits 
of boxed solutions. Every effective project management solution is susceptible to 
implementation failure, even more so on complex projects where bespoke tools 
require ‘bridge’ programming and workarounds. International projects experience 
even more challenges, with differences in languages, units of measurement, laws 
and cultures. The result is a project that may experience “…profound differences 
between organizational policies as formally adopted and actual organizational 
practices.” (March & Sutton, 1997) Although policies and procedures may be 
implemented, they may be cumbersome, insufficient, or inappropriate to the 
situation, and the project team must be open to updating controls as circumstances 
and stakeholders change.  
 
When projects go awry, especially very large projects on which significant funds 
have been expended, it often becomes difficult for the project manager or 
stakeholder to admit defeat and exert authority to cancel the project, due to the 
‘punishment’ aspect of accountability. “When cost overrun becomes visible, 
termination becomes unacceptable - and even though continuation will not prove to 
be economical, the logical decision will still be to proceed forward to completion.” 
(Butts & Linton, 2009) As a result, many projects limp forward, struggling to 
overcome obstacles caused by ineffective implementation of controls, policies and 
procedures, and seeking additional funding in order to produce a marginally 
acceptable product. Fortunately for project managers, history eventually erases the 
label of failure, and a measure of success can be identified, even for projects that 
miss cost, schedule, and performance goals. 
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5. Evaluating and Controlling Complex Project Performance 
 
Over the past 20 years, a number of efforts have been made at standardizing 
accountability reporting in the form of project performance measurement, including 
benchmarking, balanced scorecards, project health checks, and output measurement. 
“Measurement of performance has been the focus of tens of thousands of pages of 
careful thought.” (Walsh, 1996) Over time it has become evident that project 
performance measures were promising but ineffective (Poister & Streib, 1999), and 
may even have negatively affected project quality. (Bowman, 1994) What was 
measured was likely to be acted upon, resulting in project management focus on 
narrow objectives as defined by the scorecard metrics, instead of concentrating on 
improving the broader performance of the program. (Nalewaik A. , 2010)  
 
For large, complex projects, “simple metrics might not be fully and effectively 
describing the state of the project,” (Williams, 2003) as it is quite difficult to reduce 
a complex project to just a few measurable components. Scorecard metrics provide 
only a snapshot in time of progress in the specific areas measured, and do not 
effectively report the dynamics, risks, and reality of the project status. Numerous 
research studies have identified key performance indicators and critical success 
factors for projects, yet an aggregate, proven list for use in performance metrics is 
unavailable because the variety of conclusions is so vast. This proves the failure of 
the performance measurement mechanism for reporting the status of complex and 
unique projects. 
 
Another traditional accountability mechanism is audit. “Audits and reviews to check 
the project processes and results are the most common methods for quality assurance 
in projects and programs.” (Huemann, 2004) Many well-respected project 
management tools include an audit component, such as TQM, PRINCE2, stage gate 
reviews, and ISO certification. Audit supports two other accountability mechanisms, 
cost accounting and reporting. (Rasche & Esser, 2006) Traditional audit methods, 
evolved from financial audit techniques, focus on systems and the effectiveness of 
controls, analyzing a sampling of data that is expected to be representative of the 
project as a whole but might not do so. 
 
A recent study illustrated the sizeable gap between the types of findings that resulted 
from existing performance and expenditure audit methodologies and scope, 
(Nalewaik A. , 2011) and the accountability expectations of stakeholders. The study 
of over 600 capital project audit reports covered publicly-funded capital projects 
totaling $37 billion. The study results showed that, on average, expenditure audits 
questioned only 2.65% of expenditures, and performance audits questioned only 
0.03% of expenditures. Most of the questioned costs were due to such issues as 
contract compliance, mathematical errors, and lack of documentation; the audit 
scope and type affected the findings as shown below.  
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Table 1: Effect of Audit Type on Audit Findings 
 
Most of these findings focus on routine procedural, accounting, and controls errors; 
neither the expenditure audits nor the performance audits addressed questions about 
economy, effectiveness, efficiency and appropriateness of expenditures. The 
extremely low percentage of questioned costs and lack of usefulness of audit 
qualitative findings was astounding; given the history of overspending and 
mismanagement on construction megaprojects, it is unlikely that all of the 600+ 
projects were perfectly executed. And, yet, perhaps the results were not at all 
surprising, given that the typical team of auditors knows the basics of expenditure 
and procurement controls, but lack field experience in and thus comprehension of 
industry-particular exposures and expenditure context. The study results indicated a 
failure of the audit mechanism for these large construction programs, with the audit 
requirement satisfied but not necessarily the stakeholder intent. 
 
What is missing from both the traditional audit and performance management 
methodologies is an understanding of risks unique to the project. Risk management 
is an expected, minimum standard of professional care in project management, yet it 
is conspicuously missing from these time-honored project evaluation techniques. In 
order to satisfy stakeholders’ expectations of accountability and responsibility, the 
project assessment mechanism needs to “undertake forward-looking evaluation, 
[which represents] a move away from traditional auditing.” (Newcomer, 1994). This 
is achieved by incorporating in the performance assessment the specific concerns of 
stakeholders, any risks unique to that project, and risks known to be common to 
large, complex projects. 
 
It is important to note that none of these evaluation methods can be implemented by 
the project management office, due to conflict of interest and self-evaluation bias. 
Most often, these tools are conducted by an internal audit group, or by an 
independent third-party consulting firm. There is a necessary tension between 
project management and evaluation, because the evaluators seek to improve both the 
project and the organization while satisfying stakeholders’ needs for in-depth 
objective review. 
  
Audit Findings
Expenditure 
Audit
Performance 
Audit
Contract compliance violation 32.01% 1.67%
Excessive or unallowable charges 27.25% 3.75%
Lack of expenditure support 23.28% 0.42%
Incorrect rates charged 16.67% 2.08%
Inadequate controls or accounting 7.41% 10.42%
Incorrect math 1.32% 0.42%
Duplicated scope of work or payment 0.26% 0.83%
Recommendations for program 
management improvements 0.00% 30.00%
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6. The Assurance Approach 
 
Those wishing to provide stakeholders with reasonable assurance must supplement 
expenditure and compliance reviews with critical questioning (Flyvbjerg, December 
2005), and use the results from risk assessment to prioritize and direct the audit plan. 
This approach pushes the boundaries of audit well beyond project cost and financial 
accounting.  
 
By assessing the risks associated with the megaproject, and identifying the concerns 
of key stakeholders, “…the resources of the audit team can be focused on those 
functions of the organization which are of most concern, which are critical to future 
performance, or which are likely to yield the best returns for the audit expense.” 
(Lane, 1983) Audits tend to be limited by constraints of cost and time; incorporating 
the element of risk provides reassurance that the most pressing issues will be 
considered, and other areas audited as resources allow. Such issues may be 
prioritized based on the level of perceived risk, expenditure magnitude, and 
vulnerability to fraud, waste and abuse. The risk assessment helps the audit team to 
“identify the precise ways in which an existing programme is liable to break down in 
the future” (Barzelay, 1996), evaluate the situation, and warn management and 
stakeholders as appropriate.  
 
The assurance mechanism involves challenging the traditional perception of what 
can be assessed, expanding the horizon beyond policies and procedures, internal 
controls and expenditures. This is not “check-box auditing”. Every activity that 
consumes project resources, and every internal or external material risk, can be 
‘audited’. In this sense, assurance borrows methodologies from such established 
business and project best practices as peer review, threat assessment, and value 
engineering. The critical questioning aspect of assurance involves evaluating why 
things are done a certain way, with a view to reducing risk and increasing value to 
stakeholders. This means questioning “…whether the introduction of proposed new 
technology, construction techniques, or design approaches is absolutely essential to 
the mission of the project” (Merrow, 1988), and reviewing the program management 
plan for best practices. Technical and industry experts augment the audit team, such 
that the audits are conducted in as much depth as possible, with every confidence 
that the team has the skills and experience necessary to recognize potential problems 
and make suitable recommendations for improvement.  
 
The focus is on continuous improvement, emphasizing “…cooperation with program 
management rather than the adversarial approach … identifying the barriers to good 
programs, including dysfunctional rules that are in need of change”. (Goldenberg, 
1983) The assurance approach is not highly prescriptive; it is flexible and responsive 
to the uniqueness of each project. 
 
7. The Assurance Approach in Practice 
 
The flexibility of the assurance methodology is illustrated by the approaches taken 
by three Owners in the public and private sectors, each with multi-billion-dollar 
complex capital programs, as follows: 
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 The Autoridad del Canal de Panama is currently implementing the risk-based 
assurance technique on the $5.25 billion Panama Canal expansion program, 
which anticipates completion in 2014. The Office of the Inspector General 
has conducted continuous auditing since 2007, and commissioned a 
comprehensive risk analysis of the construction program, which identified a 
number of subject areas to be investigated as part of a scalable five-year 
audit plan.  
 The Los Angeles Community College District’s $5.725 billion publicly-
funded construction program began in 2001 and completion is anticipated in 
2015. Public legislation requires annual financial and performance audits, 
which the District has voluntarily supplemented over the years with over a 
dozen targeted audits and technical reviews, following risk-based 
identification by District leadership and the Inspector General’s office.  
 MGM Mirage applied the assurance methodology throughout design and 
construction of the privately-owned $8.5 billion CityCenter complex in Las 
Vegas. Over 50 audits were conducted between 2004 and 2010 by the 
Internal Audit division, based in part on a risk analysis. 
 
The areas that can be covered by the risk-based review are seemingly endless. 
Examples of areas audited by the three agencies listed above include:  
 
 Asset management systems 
 Bid process 
 Contractor financial exposure 
 Design process 
 Labor resources 
 LEED certification program 
 Project controls systems 
 Project governance 
 Program viability 
 Soft and hard costs 
 Technical plan compliance  
 Turnover of key personnel 
 
As could be expected from the breadth of the risk-based review, the results 
generated by in-depth targeted audits by industry experts cover a broad spectrum. 
Examples of results generated by the assurance method as applied by the three 
agencies listed above include:  
 
 Avoided $1.5 million by renegotiating contracts 
 $2 million recovered due to lack of supporting documentation 
 $5 million recovered due to bid fraud 
 $24 million recovered from a missing change order 
 Avoided $91 million in insurance costs 
 Strengthened policies and procedures, reporting, accounting, and controls 
 Developed a detailed, realistic schedule 
 Developed a contingency plan for resource failure 
 Restructured the project management organization 
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Although each of the abovementioned programs is unique, the assurance 
methodology is flexible and able to accommodate the varied program management 
plans, systems, organizational structures, and stakeholder dynamics. The results 
generated typically have a higher dollar value than the routine controls errors 
surfaced by traditional audit. The mechanism does not relieve the organization of 
responsibilities for competent project management and / or required audits. Instead, 
it provides deep evaluation in high-risk areas and enables action to be taken as 
appropriate. 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
As capital investments increase worldwide, stakeholders are demanding 
accountability and transparency in expenditures by project management 
organizations. Traditional performance assessment, reporting, and audit fail 
specifically on complex projects, and a new mechanism is needed for independent 
oversight.  
 
The risk-based assurance process has been implemented successfully on a number of 
capital mega-programs, and is becoming a necessary part of project governance. The 
approach is flexible and responsive to the dynamics and risks experienced by 
complex projects. The depth of review by industry experts provides stakeholders 
with increased confidence, specifically in the reduction of risk and accountability for 
expenditures. 
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APPENDIX H: 
PUBLICATION #4  
GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC CAPITAL PROJECTS 
 
Presented at the 2011 European Academy of Management (EURAM) conference in Tallinn, 
this research paper began by identifying the need for accountability on construction 
programs, in the context of United States and global infrastructure capital expenditure 
forecasts. Touching on examples of construction programs that experienced significant cost 
overruns, it summarized literature review of certain characteristics of complex capital 
programs and governance mechanisms, specifically those issues that act as obstacles to audit, 
risk management, project control, and evaluation. 
 
Reporting briefly on research results, it was stated in the paper that (on average) “contract 
expenditure audits questioned only 2.65% of expenditures, and performance audits of large 
complex programs questioned only 0.03% of expenditures. The majority of the performance 
audits reviewed yielded no findings or questioned costs whatsoever.” (Nalewaik A. , 
Governance of Public Capital Projects, 2011) The discussion then provided some insight into 
the nature of the different types of audits, and available tools & techniques identified in 
literature review that could be applied to supplement the audits and enable them to be used as 
mechanisms of continuous improvement. 
 
Acknowledging that constraints of cost and time could prevent the widespread application of 
the technique, the risk-based assurance approach to audit was described in detail as an 
amalgam of the aforementioned tools. Examples from industry were provided, to further 
describe the risk-based assurance approach. 
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This publication contributed to capital program audit literature by identifying potential 
obstacles and solutions to successful program auditing, in the context of economic and 
political conditions. The propositions concerning audit effectiveness provided a basis for 
further considerations on the application of audit as a continuous improvement mechanism, in 
addition to its existing usage in determining accountability and the effectiveness of 
governance. 
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GOVERNANCE OF PUBLIC CAPITAL PROJECTS
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Abstract
With an aging global infrastructure and increasing population, it is forecasted that more 
capital mega-programs will be undertaken in the immediate future. Complex projects, mega-
programs, and capital upgrades tend to experience substantial change and great volatility, 
resulting in overspending and delays in completion. In today’s era of economic austerity, the 
need is evident for careful management of public sector capital programs.
A recent study of construction programs indicated a failure of the traditional audit 
mechanism. Innovative methods can be adopted to effect better control and delivery of these 
projects, while satisfying stakeholders’ need for transparency, tangible value, and efficient use of 
public funds. This paper presents an analysis of the characteristics of complex projects, including 
obstacles to management and audit, advocating for the adoption of an assurance mentality, 
focusing on accountability, and facilitating oversight by incorporating risk assessment, strategic 
management and quality control traditions as part of the governance system.
Keywords: construction audit, complex projects, accountability, assurance
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Introduction: The Need for Accountability
Demand for capital investment continues to increase worldwide due to a combination of 
aging infrastructure, ever-increasing population growth1, economic growth, urbanization, and 
changing demographics. In the United States alone, over $2.2 trillion is needed over the next five 
years to improve infrastructure, including aviation, transportation, schools, water and 
wastewater, roads, and energy. (American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009) Global
infrastructure spending over the next 25 years is estimated at $35 trillion (Gerritsen, 2009) to $40 
trillion (Daltorio, 2010); this includes both improvements to existing infrastructure, and new 
construction (Airoldi, Biscarini, & Saracino, 2010). Many of these infrastructure efforts can be 
categorized as large projects and mega-programs. For these, their sheer size, volatility, and 
complexity guarantee maximum visibility and / or notoriety, especially where public funds are 
expended.
Project management is not a new profession; it seems at times there is nothing new to 
learn, and no shortage of guidance purporting to ensure successful project execution. Yet, despite 
both academic research and practitioner lessons learned, projects continue to fail to achieve their 
goals. (Mian, 2005) Megaprojects require additional planning and skill (National Research 
Council, 2000); complex projects and mega-programs tend to experience substantial change and 
great volatility, resulting in overspending and significant delays in completion. Indeed, history
reveals that megaprojects have long trended more towards failure than success, with many
examples of "multiyear, multibillion-dollar overruns.” (McKenna, Wilczynski, & VanderSchee, 
                                                          
1
 The United Nations estimates that the world population will increase by 1 billion over the next 10 years. (Stanford 
University, 2008) 
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2006) For the purposes of this discussion, a ‘megaproject’ is defined as a major project “that 
costs more than US$1 billion, or...attracts a high level of public attention or political interest.”
(Bhaumik, 2010) Research on the topic indicates that cost overages of 50 percent, 100 percent, 
and more than 100 per cent are typical (Flyvbjerg, 2005), with large and complex projects 
experiencing greater cost impact (Butts & Linton, 2009) and schedule slippage. (Merrow, 1988)
Globally, fiscal caution is the current trend. Internal and external stakeholders, including 
governing boards and audit committees, are demanding accountability and value for money
throughout the project lifecycle; they are no longer content with arms-length monthly status
reports or dashboards to provide a measure of confidence (Nalewaik, 2011). With complex 
projects exhibiting a norm of cost and schedule deviations, the need is clear for strong project 
management to be supplemented by audits and ever vigiliant monitoring; if projects experienced 
less risk and change, performance audit would be irrelevant (Hepworth, 1996) except as 
validation. However, traditional performance assessment and audit methods have been shown to 
be insufficient (Nalewaik, 2011), and need to be supplemented with techniques from other 
disciplines, specifically risk management. “In surveys of board and audit committee members, 
corporate risk and risk governance consistently top the list of concerns.” (Chapman, 2003) A
vision of the path forward involves a focus on accountability, avoiding the pitfalls of traditional 
audit and facilitating a more appropriate depth of governance by incorporating risk assessment, 
strategic management and quality control traditions into the continuous audit effort.
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This paper builds upon a previous study of performance audit and expenditure audit 
findings, and continues the process of trying to understand the challenges of construction audit
by approaching the problem from various perspectives. Previously, the author reviewed the 
history of audit and performance assessment techniques, considered definitions of accountability, 
and studied the accountability obligations of project management. Here, the author analyzes
certain characteristics of complex megaprojects, including those that pose obstacles to audit, risk 
management, governance and evaluation.
How Complex Projects Fail
The problems of complex projects often begin when the megaproject is a glimmer of 
hope on the horizon, as returns on investment are calculated and budgets developed. “It is not the 
best projects that get implemented, but the projects that look best on paper…the projects with the 
largest cost underestimates and benefit overestimates.” (Flyvbjerg, December 2005) Complex 
projects may well be doomed from the start, with cost overruns and budget busts inevitable, due 
to the politics of project approval and gap between capital needs and available funding.
Once approved, the project needs to be delivered. All projects create a temporary 
organization dedicated to a specific deliverable (John, Wardle, & Fairhurst, 2008), a construct
that is responsible to a broad group of internal and external interdependent stakeholders.
Complex capital projects tend to create especially multifaceted and geographically diverse teams. 
More so than small projects in a specific region or industry, where the designers, project 
management firm, general contractor, and subcontractors may be well known to each other, large 
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projects often tap the limits of resources at all levels and bring in help and suppliers from 
wherever available. A potpourri of engineering and design firms may contribute to the project 
concept. A consortium of contractors may be required, or one contractor per phase or location of 
construction, instead of one large general contractor. Multiple subcontractors may be needed per 
trade, where no one subcontractor can provide the necessary labor. For a large program
encompassing many projects at multiple locations, responsibility for administration may be split 
between multiple project management firms. The number of variations on these scenarios may be 
infinite.
Unlike mechanized production in quantity by a manufacturer, where processes can be 
continually refined, best practices and lessons learned have less of an impact on the one-time-
only megaproject team because the team gets only one chance to achieve success, and the team 
members and various companies scatter to new projects as soon as the current project is 
completed. Continuous improvement may occur during the lifecycle of the project, and certain 
Total Quality Management (TQM) process benefits realized in the field and captured for future 
use by the contractor and subcontractors, but members of the management team bring only select 
pieces of the best-practices puzzle to the next project. Classic well-respected project excellence 
models (best practices such as Total Cost Management [TCM], PMBOK, and PRINCE2) are 
generic and intended to be applicable to any type of project. (Huemann, 2004) Each brings value, 
but the complex project requires additional customization in order to facilitate effective 
management and administration, mandating solutions that expand above and beyond the solid 
principles and foundation established by basic project management building blocks.
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The circumstances of complex projects effectively create a situation that results in a 
veritable soup of project management tools, incorporating divergent opinions and techniques. 
These projects are more likely than traditional projects to use a ‘kitchen sink’ of project 
management tools and philosophies, cobbled together from the experience of the diverse team
members because the management demands of the megaproject push the limits of boxed 
solutions. The project manager may bring a pre-written set of policies and procedures, used on a 
recent project, which require some adaptation. Any good project management solution can be 
rendered marginally effective due to implementation failure, even more so on complex projects. 
An effort will usually be made to integrate written policies and procedures with scheduling, 
project management, risk management, document management, project controls, collaboration,
accounting / enterprise resource planning (ERP) and other software programs, often requiring 
customized ‘bridge’ programming, duplicate manual entry, much reconciliation, and still more 
workarounds to make the overall bespoke system work effectively. Still more tools and traditions 
(cost and schedule risk models, shared governance, value engineering, peer review, and others)
may be added to the program management plan if budget permits, and attempts made to enforce 
conformity team-wide. For international projects, the variety of management philosophies,
languages, units of measurement, laws and cultures is even greater. The result is often project 
management failure, with the project experiencing “…profound differences between 
organizational policies as formally adopted and actual organizational practices.” (March & 
Sutton, 1997) Elsewhere, the team may be successful in achieving compliance with policies and 
procedures, but the mechanisms themselves may be cumbersome, insufficient, or inappropriate 
to the situation and are subject to reinvention as circumstances and stakeholders change, and the 
project progresses through its lifecycle.
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In this environment, one finds within the team differing levels of commitment and 
accountability compounded by divergent traditions, objectives, loyalties, and opinions, making it 
difficult for a diverse project team to move continually forward as one entity along the same 
path. Because large complex project schedules span multiple years, the likelihood is slim that 
key team members will remain with the project from inception to completion. New team 
members bring their own experiences and methods to the project, sometimes effecting drastic 
changes in the course and progress of the project.
As the level of project complexity and concurrent activities increases, project 
management techniques must adapt. Unlike other types of projects, the nature of construction is 
such that every project can be viewed as a one-time manufacturing effort yielding a unique
(never to be exactly duplicated) product. Due to the inimitability of each project and many 
unknowns (no bid package is perfect, not all site and underground conditions immediately 
apparent), “there are very few industries that have the risks of the construction industry.” (Guo, 
2004) Risk in construction is dynamic, not static, with new risks and secondary risks developing 
over time. In this environment, written policies and procedures are not enough. “Traditional 
control systems can work effectively when the environment is stable and the tasks repetitive and 
predictable. The trouble is …that we cannot develop detailed rules and controls to cover all 
eventualities.” (Roth, 1996) Risk and change are inevitable, and the management team find 
themselves chasing the project instead of leading the way. “Highly volatile projects are simply 
not compatible with traditional project management. In most cases, the plan is obsolete as soon 
as it is printed.” (DeCarlo, 2004) In such a dynamic environment, reliance on internal controls,
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rigid policies and procedures, and good judgment are insufficient governance and are thus not 
conducive to best possible project delivery.
The construction industry itself contributes to project failure. “The nature of the typical 
construction project is such that the parties to various contracts progress from project inception 
to completion while at the same time endeavoring to satisfy their own (often competing) 
objectives.” (Nalewaik, 2010) In a low-bid public-sector environment, with contractors and 
subcontractors reviewing the contract language, specifications, and field conditions in extreme 
detail in the hope of identifying change order and cost recovery opportunities, it is the most rare
of projects that is completed without changes and claims. Gaps between contractual 
responsibilities and scopes of work create errors and accidental oversights. The sheer magnitude 
of the project can be overwhelming, and there may be a tendency on the part of the individual 
project managers, engineers and designers bound by budget restrictions to conduct less than 
detailed review in the interest of time, instead managing by exception or assuming that another 
team member will pick up the slack. This compounds the opportunity for change orders, 
ultimately capitalized upon by the contractor team.
Project management optimism (or aversion to criticism) is another contributor to project 
decline, especially in high-visibility projects that draw negative judgment more often than 
support. “Once a contract is 15 percent complete, if it is over budget, it is highly unlikely to 
realign itself with original cost/schedule projections, and the final percent overrun will be greater 
than the percent overrun to date.” (Butts & Linton, 2009) Yet the project team may delay 
reporting problems and endeavor to rebound from cost and schedule overruns, ultimately 
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reporting the variances too late in the project to implement effective recovery measures or 
resulting in an unnecessarily expensive remedy. The magnitude of funds already expended on 
very large projects compound the problem, such that “…when cost overrun becomes visible, 
termination becomes unacceptable - and even though continuation will not prove to be 
economical, the logical decision will still be to proceed forward to completion.” (Butts & Linton, 
2009) Very few large infrastructure projects are halted mid-construction and left unfinished.
These are just a few of the reasons why complex projects and mega-programs are 
difficult to manage. While project managers are held accountable for the performance of their 
projects, appropriate and accurate measurement of that performance is also a concern.
Performance Measurement Malfunction
Over the past several decades, many efforts have been made in the government sector to 
assess and control performance of projects, departments, and organizations. Performance 
measurement is a longstanding tradition in public management. “Measurement of performance 
has been the focus of tens of thousands of pages of careful thought. Many have proven useful; 
none have proven definitive in varying situations.” (Walsh, 1996) The mechanism has not 
translated well to industry, as it is quite difficult to reduce a complex project to just a few 
measurable components. “The considerations about the behaviour of large projects suggest that 
simple metrics might not be fully and effectively describing the state of the project.” (Williams, 
2003) Performance metrics are insufficient for complex capital projects, providing only a 
snapshot in time of progress in specific areas measured by particular quantifiable statistics, 
failing to capture the broader reality and risks of the dynamic situation.
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The action of performance measurement has erred in many situations, from government 
entities to the private sector. Ultimately, what was measured was likely to be acted upon. What 
was assessed was too often narrow in scope and vision, and the reward for a high score in each 
category was some individual or departmental benefit (such as bonuses and budget increases).
The effort did not improve the performance of the program as a whole. To use an analogy from 
everyday life: the hamburger was delivered to the customer within the allowable time, but was 
completely inedible. Quality and service delivery suffered.
A construction megaproject is, essentially, a gargantuan exercise in contract 
administration, where the contracts outline the roles, responsibilities, scope and expectations for 
the contractors constructing the project, and the project management team is responsible for 
knowing the intimate details of the contract and effecting compliance with its various
requirements. Yet “few generally accepted standards or performance measures exist for 
determining the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of…organizations responsible for awarding 
and administering contracts.” (Kestenbaum & Straight, 1995) Numerous research studies have 
identified long lists of key performance indicators and critical success factors for both typical 
construction projects and complex megaprojects, yet there is very little similarity between the 
various research conclusions and thus an aggregate industry-wide proven approach to
performance metrics is unavailable. The variety of conclusions serves only to prove the 
complexity and uniqueness of projects undertaken in the construction industry, and failure of the 
performance measurement mechanism.
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If performance measures cannot provide enough information to facilitate objective 
evaluation of complex projects, then it is clear that another approach is necessary.
Construction Audit Ineffectiveness
Another commonly used project oversight and accountability tool, frequently requested 
by governing boards or the chief financial officer, is audit. The auditor is charged with 
evaluating the systems, mechanisms and controls that comprise project and organizational 
governance. Indeed, “…audits and reviews to check the project processes and results are the 
most common methods for quality assurance in projects and programs.” (Huemann, 2004) Many 
major project control and project management initiatives include an audit component, such as 
TQM, PRINCE2, stage gate reviews, and ISO certification. Traditional performance and 
expenditure audit methods, borne from financial audit techniques, are applied periodically or 
continuously to check on the effectiveness of these controls, and tend to be systems-based,
selecting and analyzing a sample of data in the expectation that it is representative of the broader 
picture.
However, the audit mechanism itself tends to be ineffective, satisfying the requirement 
for audit but not necessarily the intent. A recent study of over 600 construction audit reports
(Nalewaik, 2011) covering $37 billion in publicly-funded capital projects indicated that, on 
average, contract expenditure audits questioned only 2.65% of expenditures, and performance 
audits of large complex programs questioned only 0.03% of expenditures. The majority of the 
performance audits reviewed yielded no findings or questioned costs whatsoever. The extremely 
low percentage of questioned costs was astounding, given the history of overspending and 
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mismanagement on construction projects, and the study results indicated a failure of the audit 
mechanism for these large construction programs.
The study revealed that the quantity and quality of audit findings were affected by various
factors, including but not limited to:
 Scope and objectives of the audit
 RFP/RFQ language used to solicit 
the work
 Skill-set and composition of the 
audit team
 Independence and objectivity of the 
audit team
 Maturity of the construction program
 Level of sophistication of the 
stakeholders
 Audit methodology specified
 Size and complexity of the 
construction program
 Type of sampling method used
 Depth of testing performed
 Audit constraints of cost and time
 Project delivery method
 Project or program lifecycle phase
 Timing of the audit
 Level of resistance from those being 
audited
 Project contract type and language
One factor mentioned above, the type of sampling method used for audit testing, can have 
quite a significant effect on audit results. One reason for auditors’ use of the sample testing 
approach is that the typical audit is limited by constraints of cost and time; it is assumed that the 
sample will be representative of the whole.  But, on complex megaprojects that involve multiple 
contracts, entities, and projects, a traditional sampling methodology fails to uncover problems,
“…with testing [serving to] identify primarily routine procedural and controls issues and often 
failing to…look in-depth for inappropriate and unreasonable expenditures.” (Nalewaik, 2011)
Any cost history and expenditure relationships from period to period, including changes to the 
schedule of values (SOV), will be invisible to the auditor when a sampling of expenditures are 
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selected and tested out of context and out of sequence. “Reviewing expenditures against a 
checklist of requirements, the typical CPA [Certified Public Accountant]…may not have enough 
detailed information to properly question costs and change.” (Nalewaik, 2011) Indeed, the 
majority of the audit findings in the study sample were related to contract compliance and 
accounting controls, with few questions raised about the appropriateness of the expenditures. For 
a profession (audit) that has slowly evolved from pure reviews of financial accounting to 
management consulting (Nalewaik, 2010) with little industry-specific training, these results were 
not surprising. “Little research has focused on internal controls specifically in the context of risk 
management and business processes,” (Rikhardsson, Best, Green, & Rosemann, 2006) and 
auditor training rarely considers risk management and business practices in the specific industry 
being audited (such as construction, manufacturing or information technology). What results is a 
team of auditors who know the basics of proper controls over typical expenditures and 
procurement (in terms of requiring a contract / payment application, segregation of duties, and 
signature approvals), but who lack detailed understanding and field experience with industry-
particular exposures and expenditure context.
In the study, a higher percentage of expenditures were questioned on contract audits 
(compared to program-wide audits). The expenditure testing percentage was higher, often 100%
of a single contract; by testing the entire population of expenditures, cost relationships and trends 
over time became visible to the auditor and surfaced not just questioned costs but possible 
improvements to the expenditure controls. Here, contract audit was demonstrably superior to 
performance audit, but both types of audits were still subject to technical failures on the part of 
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the auditor. The quality and quantity of audit findings were directly proportional to the scope and 
breadth of the audit, and the level of sophistication of the audit participants.
Another drawback to traditional auditing is that the data is collected at a single point in time. 
“While this approach is often a practical necessity, it treats performance as if it were a discrete 
event. Real-world task performance is probably more accurately described as a continuous 
process which ebbs and flows through its own natural cycle.” (Steel & Van Scotter, 2003)
Indeed, this problem exists not just in audit but in any periodic assessments of project 
performance. What is lacking in all of the audit and evaluation traditions is recognition of the 
changing nature of risk, and ongoing evolution of the project. Indeed, some projects evolve so 
quickly as to render audit findings obsolete (Nalewaik, 2011) or irrelevant at the time of audit 
report publication.
Better results may be yielded by a reinvention of audit and innovation in the techniques and 
methods used.
The New Assurance Perspective
Having recognized the shortcomings of traditional performance assessment and audit
techniques, those seeking to provide stakeholders with reasonable assurance may be able to
supplement their existing tools with techniques already established and respected in the 
construction industry, government, and business.
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These could include:
 The role of the program evaluator in identifying barriers to program performance
(Goldenberg, 1983), prompting action to reduce or overcome those barriers and thus 
improve program performance;
 Scenario planning exercises that recognize future actionable issues or drivers of change
(John, Wardle, & Fairhurst, 2008), by identifying and reviewing potential scenarios and
then pre-planning so as to reduce the negative effects of change and capitalize on 
opportunities;
 Performance audit review of controls ineffectiveness (Barzelay, 1996) and vulnerability
(Waring & Morgan, 2007), which when resolved contribute to the improvement of the 
program and increase the likelihood of successful project completion;
 Government audit reports that state existing facts or confirm suspicions about problems 
that “nobody cares to acknowledge” or for which no one will assume responsibility
(Danon, 1996), both confirming the existence of issues and prompting ownership /
responsibility for action and thus effecting a solution;
 The broader time horizon of operational audits, which consider not only the present but 
also the medium-term future (Lane, 1983), enabling not just a retrospective assessment 
but forward planning and strategic management;
 TQM concepts of continuous improvement (Kaizen), where “even if the processes are 
operating without problems, they are objects for quality improvement” (Huemann, 2004),
ensuring that no aspect of the project is immune from evaluation and evolution;
17 
 
 Peer reviews and value engineering which question whether the “proposed technology, 
construction techniques, or design approaches are absolutely essential to the mission of 
the project” (Merrow, 1988), enabling a reduction of both cost and risk. By reducing risk 
and identifying savings, those funds recovered can be used to finance additional capital 
projects.
Each of these tools have merit but not all are customarily applied in a very rigorous fashion 
in complex capital project settings, largely due to constraints of cost and time. When elements of 
these tools are combined, the building blocks complement each other and have the potential to be 
quite powerful and instrumental in effecting project success. Adopting an assurance mentality
and integrating proven techniques from other management traditions will help evolve
expenditure audit, performance audit and evaluation methods, sharpening the focus on
accountability and incorporating risk mitigation.
The first step in project assurance is to identify the risks faced by the complex project. This 
can be achieved by gathering a small group of key stakeholders and team leaders for open 
discourse about the definition of project success and obstacles to satisfactory completion of the 
capital program. This differs somewhat from the traditional project risk management approach, 
which encourages detailed input from a broad set of team members and end users. The charrette 
focus is intended to be at the macro- level instead of a micro- level, including external, 
organizational and operational risks, with the intent of engaging stakeholders and addressing the 
specific concerns of internal and external entities. By assessing and prioritizing the risks 
associated with the megaproject, and identifying the controls, policies and procedures, and 
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departments responsible for managing those risks, audit efforts can be directed to the most 
relevant issues and “…the resources of the audit team can be focused on those functions of the 
organization which are of most concern, which are critical to future performance, or which are 
likely to yield the best returns for the audit expense.” (Lane, 1983) Thus begins the Deming 
PDCA (Plan-Do-Check-Assess) cycle of identifying those risks and their impacts, with periodic 
re-evaluation.
In-depth review of each of the risks is then added to a comprehensive audit plan, which 
should already include traditional contract compliance review and expenditure testing (payment 
applications, change orders and claims), thus pushing the boundaries of audit well beyond 
project cost and financial accounting (Nalewaik, 2011) while including some micro-level review.
Not just continuous improvement of project management and production processes (as with 
TQM) or check-box validation that existing policies and procedures are being followed (e.g. 
ISO), the assurance mechanism involves broadening the very perception of what can be assessed. 
The focus is no longer purely on project management, construction management, internal 
controls or expenditures. The certified public accountant (CPA) is included as a valuable team 
member who has an understanding of audit standards and financial accounting, but is no longer 
the driving force of the audit. In selecting specific high-risk aspects of the program to review,
and using the skill-sets of a hybrid team that includes industry specialists (such as engineers, 
systems analysts, quantity surveyors, financial analysts, fraud experts, and more), any and every 
activity that consumes project resources or represents a material risk has the potential to be 
evaluated.
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The approach does not come with a highly prescriptive template; it is flexible and responsive 
to the dynamics and risks experienced by the capital program. The focus is on continuous 
improvement, facilitating evolution so both the project team and owner can become learning 
organizations. The audit methodologies are fine-tuned to meet the specific needs of the complex 
capital program, and audit resources directed to areas that can benefit the most. The deep review 
provides internal and external stakeholders with increased confidence in the forward progress 
and positive achievements (success) of their capital program. This is assurance.
The Assurance Perspective in Practice
The flexibility of the assurance methodology is illustrated by the approaches taken by 
three Owners in the public and private sectors, each with multi-billion-dollar complex capital 
programs. Preliminary results from audits conducted by these Owners using the assurance 
methodology indicate a far higher percentage of questioned costs and more success in risk 
management. The following paragraphs provide a brief introduction to the Owners.
The Los Angeles Community College District’s (the District) $5.725 billion Proposition 
A/AA/J Bond Construction Program began in 2001 and is expected to continue through 2015.
State of California legislation requires annual financial and performance audits of publicly-
funded bond program expenditures, which the District has voluntarily supplemented over the 
years with targeted audits and technical reviews. Over a dozen special audits have been 
conducted since the inception of the bond program, with auditors reporting directly to the 
District Board of Trustees. The District’s audit results closely follow the pattern identified in the 
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abovementioned study, with performance audit findings changing over time in response to the 
maturity and lifecycle phase of the construction program. Special audits have been judgmentally 
selected in accordance with perceived risks, and project audits, contract audits, and technical 
reviews have yielded significantly more questioned costs and qualitative findings than the 
performance audits; this, too, is in accordance with the expectations established by the study.
The clearly defined and directed scope of these reviews has enabled in-depth analysis of issues, 
incorporating document examination with interviews to capture both verifiable facts and oral
history. The targeted audits have had a measurable impact and effected beneficial change in
policies and procedures, operations, and systems, contributing to a practical evolution of the 
bond construction program management approach and improvements in controls. Recently, the 
District has established an independent Office of the Inspector General (OIG), which will both 
conduct and provide centralized administration of the risk-based adjunct audits. In establishing 
an annual audit plan, the OIG will increase the number of special audits conducted each year; the 
first audits as planned clearly reflect current concerns of public and internal stakeholders. The
District sees value in the assurance approach to capital program oversight, and intends to 
continue using the methodology.
MGM Mirage also applied the assurance methodology during the construction of the 
privately-financed and privately-owned $8.5 billion CityCenter complex in Las Vegas. Over 50 
audits were conducted between 2004 and 2010 by the Internal Audit division, reporting to the 
audit committee of the Board of Directors of MGM Resorts International. Areas to be audited 
were judgmentally selected, in part based on a program-wide risk assessment. The targeted 
audits included projects, contracts, processes, and special technical areas of review, yielding over 
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$165 million in retroactive audit savings realized as questioned costs, unsupported costs, and 
avoided expenditures. Key to effective audit was an understanding of the players and processes 
in construction, which was achieved through the skillset and composition of the audit team.
MGM blended corporate internal auditors, internal auditors with construction experience, and 
third-party external auditors with specialized expertise. The MGM approach had two unique 
innovations. First was a mandate that, if any audit yielded over $100,000 in savings, the cost of 
the audit would be backcharged to the contractor. Second, any questioned and unsupported 
expenditures were recovered immediately from contractors at contract closeout through the use 
of credit memos. Now that the CityCenter complex is open to the public, the role of the auditors 
has changed to support the claims function.
The Autoridad del Canal de Panama (ACP) is implementing the risk-based assurance
technique on the current $5.25 billion Panama Canal expansion program (PCEP), on which 
completion is anticipated in 2014. The internal OIG has conducted continuous auditing of the 
Program Management Team (PMT) since 2007. Recently, the OIG commissioned a 
comprehensive risk analysis of the construction program, which identified a number of subject 
areas to be investigated as part of a scalable five-year audit plan. The objective of the risk 
analysis was to identify risks that pose the greatest threat to the program, and assure that the 
PCEP cost, schedule, quality, and transparency objectives are met. Key to the ACP assurance 
process is the Deming cycle of continuous risk assessment, and a prioritized audit plan that is 
flexible, expandable, and responsive to the changing nature of risk during the lifecycle of the 
program. A unique aspect of the ACP approach is that the audit plan incorporates both internal 
and external auditors. This enables both organizational learning on the part of the ACP to 
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supplement the existing construction-industry and project-specific knowledge of the ACP audit 
team, and short-term use of very specific skill-sets brought by the external auditors.
Although each of these Owners’ capital programs is unique, the assurance methodology 
has thus far been flexible enough to incorporate the various program management plans, 
systems, organizational structures, stakeholder dynamics, and risks encountered.
Conclusion
With demand for capital investment continuing to increase worldwide, the focus on able 
project management and third-party oversight is intense. Internal and external stakeholders are 
demanding accountability and transparency in expenditures. However, traditional performance 
assessment and audit methods are often insufficient, and fail specifically in the construction 
industry due to the nature of capital projects and constraints of both audit cost and time. 
The implications of performance audit and expenditure audit results indicate that the 
audit mechanism itself needs to be improved in order to provide adequate oversight of complex 
capital programs. Because risk tops the list of stakeholder concerns, a vision of the path forward 
involves adopting an assurance mentality that focuses on risk and accountability. Assurance is
not expected to replace skilled project management, nor would the organization be relieved of its 
responsibility to conduct a financial audit and / or other required audits.
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The risk-based assurance method has begun to be implemented in full or in part on 
several capital mega-programs, and is on the verge of becoming a necessary part of project 
oversight. The assurance approach has thus far been proven to be flexible and responsive to the 
dynamics and risks experienced by the capital program. The deep review aspect of this new audit 
method has provided stakeholders with increased confidence in the forward progress and positive 
achievements of their capital program. It is expected that further study of stakeholders and their
expectations, combined with quantitative results from the assurance-based audits conducted by 
the three featured Owners (as they become available), will prove the power of the assurance 
methodology.
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APPENDIX I: 
PUBLICATION #5  
THE INADEQUACY OF PUBLICLY-FUNDED CONSTRUCTION  
PROGRAM AUDITS 
 
The most comprehensive summary of the author’s research conducted at that point in time, 
this research paper was presented at the 2011 AACE International conference in Anaheim. 
Building on the table of results presented in Zurich and the statistical results presented in 
Tallinn, it discussed the data and the results in the context of Proposition 39 in the State of 
California. Several types of recurring findings for both expenditure audits and performance 
audits were identified, as shown below. 
 
For expenditure audits, frequently occurring findings in the sample were found to be often 
quantitative or related to contract compliance. It was discerned that many of the recurring 
expenditure audit findings were clustered in the sphere of knowledge of the typical CPA 
(certified public accountant), and it was also apparent that many of the expenditure audits 
included an element of contract compliance review.  
 
Because the performance audits included some expenditure audit scope, recurring findings in 
the sample for the performance audits included some of the above, and (in addition) also 
included a number of qualitative findings. Again, many of the recurring performance audit 
findings indicated that the audit process featured an element of compliance review, such as 
adherence to policies and procedures, regulatory requirements, and the contract. Also again, 
certain recurring expenditure audit findings were clustered in the sphere of knowledge of the 
typical accountant. It was observed that a higher percentage of expenditures was tested in the 
264 
population of expenditure audits (59%), compared to performance audits (24%), and that the 
expenditure audits typically contained no qualitative findings related to project / program 
management improvements. 
 
The paper went on to discuss certain perceived failings in the performance audit reports, such 
as missing information on the expenditure testing sample, total expended to date, funds 
remaining, resolution of past audit findings, and audit methodology applied. The paper also 
distinguished between limited-scope performance audits and broad-scope performance audits. 
Specifically, it was reported that an extremely high percentage (81%) of the “performance 
audits” instead applied a very limited set of agreed-upon-procedures (AUP). This revelation 
was stunning and unexpected; it was known that some performance audits had a limited 
scope, but the prevalence of the practice was a surprise. An example of an AUP audit is 
shown in Appendix C. Comparing the audit attached as Appendix C to the audit attached in 
Appendix D, it was astounding that the two audits were accepted as satisfactory for the same 
performance assessment purpose. 
 
Defining ‘assurance’, the author presented the concept that audit need not focus solely on 
policies and procedures, contract compliance, and expenditures. Indeed, “any endeavor that 
consumes project resources (staff, equipment, materials, labor, etc.) can be evaluated using a 
methodology similar to peer review or quality assurance / quality control.” (Nalewaik A. , 
The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction Audits, 2011) The paper concluded by 
identifying solutions to the audit report and audit process issues described in both this paper 
and earlier published papers, such as considering risk, focusing on stakeholder needs, using 
appropriate audit methods, and including industry experts on the audit team. 
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This publication contributed to capital program audit literature by presenting the research 
results, discovering the prevalence of agreed-upon-procedures “performance audits” (which 
had significant legal implications), recommending remedies to audit process issues, and 
introducing the concept that any element of the project could be audited. The empirically-
generated findings of factors influencing audit findings verified and lent support to the 
published observations of Davis (1980), Davis (1990), Glynn (1996), Ledman (2000), Lane 
(1983), Holmquist & Barklund-Larsson (1996) and Kestenbaum & Straight (1996) in the 
field of audit practice and research, by providing much-needed evidence on audit results.
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The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction 
Program Audits 
 
Alexia A. Nalewaik, FRICS CCE 
 
ABSTRACT— Traditional audit methods and scope are systems-based, and focused on financial 
accountability and controls. In response to concerns about fraud and waste, audits are becoming an 
integral part of every construction project where stakeholders demand expenditure accountability.  
 
Herein is the challenge: control-based testing can be effective where tasks are repetitive and processes 
predictable, but the nature of construction is considerably more complex, tasks are not typically 
repetitive, and processes continuously evolve in response to circumstances and experience. Standard 
audit techniques applied in these situations may actually reduce questioned costs and audit 
effectiveness.  
 
This paper presents the results from audits of projects and contracts using public funding for school 
and university construction. It advocates for a new audit philosophy, and begins to build a case for the 
cost engineer/quantity surveyor to assume responsibility for audit, and for academia to include audit 
techniques in the construction curriculum.  
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Introduction 
 
In today’s era of cost-consciousness and financial crisis, awareness of capital investment is increasing 
and desire for greater accountability for expenditures and increased transparency have resulted in 
more audits of construction projects and contracts. Construction inherently represents considerable 
financial risk, which anecdotal evidence suggests increases exponentially (not linearly) with the 
magnitude and complexity of the capital program. These risks can be mitigated and managed through 
unrelenting oversight. Audits, both continuous and periodic, represent one such form of guardianship. 
 
The scope of construction audits performed in the public and private sectors vary considerably and are 
dependent on a number of factors, including the type of construction program, stakeholder risk 
tolerance, objective of the audit, and level of sophistication of the capital program team. However, the 
type of audit selected might not always be appropriate to the situation, and the methods of testing 
utilized and skill-set of the auditors are often inadequate, resulting in fewer findings, reduced audit 
effectiveness, and stunted program improvements.  
 
This paper presents the results from a study of more than 600 annual audits of projects and contracts 
using public funds for school and community college construction, in which the percentage of 
questioned costs and types of audit findings were reviewed in detail. The implications of these results 
for future audit scope and team composition are discussed herein, and a glimpse of a new assurance 
philosophy presented. 
 
 
Background 
 
In practice, the scope of a construction audit may involve the construction contract or portion of the 
contract (such as change orders), a project, the entire capital program, or any quantitative and 
qualitative combinations thereof. The scope is often driven by the objective of the audit, which may be 
to satisfy audit requirements, or could be prompted by specific circumstances or stakeholder concerns.  
 
The quality and quantity of audit findings are directly proportional to the scope of the audit, the 
maturity of the construction program, and the level of sophistication of the participants. Audit findings 
may be quantitative (in the form of questioned expenditures) or qualitative (such as project 
management process or controls improvements). “While a construction project audit may generate 
measurable cost reductions for the owner through the recovery of overcharges and the discovery of 
errors, the monetary value of improvements in internal and project controls cannot easily be 
quantified. … Strengthened controls and continuous improvement generate increases in efficiency and 
profitability over the lifetime of the project and the organization [1].” It is entirely possible that 
qualitative findings provide greater audit value than quantitative findings (questioned and recovered 
costs), because of the resulting changes in project controls and management. 
 
One specific type of audit, the performance audit, “…involves the examination of the performance of a 
public organization or program on behalf of a client - ultimately citizens - by an independent auditor” 
[2]. The audit may combine a compliance [systemic] review of a statistically significant sampling of 
expenditures and an [substantive] examination of the construction program, or may be considerably 
more limited in scope. “Performance auditing works with the same performance management 
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concepts used by program managers and their principals to plan, monitor, and evaluate how public 
resources are used to achieve public policy ends [2].” When conducting a performance audit, various 
areas of the organization (such as program management, project controls, and accounting) may be 
evaluated against their peers and industry best practices. 
 
Traditionally, performance audits have been throughout history intended to “… provide objective 
analysis so management and those charged with governance and oversight can use the information to 
improve program performance and operations, reduce costs, facilitate decision making by parties with 
responsibility to oversee or initiate corrective action, and contribute to public accountability [3].” 
Almost always associated with the performance audit concept is the demonstration of accountability 
by assessing economy (prudent use of funds), efficiency (minimizing waste and using resources 
productively), and effectiveness (achieving the desired results).  
 
In the US, projects using public funds for construction are often subject to an audit requirement, and 
sometimes specifically a performance audit requirement. In the State of California, school districts and 
community colleges using general obligation bonds for construction are required by Proposition 39 to 
conduct both an annual independent financial audit and a separate annual independent ‘performance 
audit’ of the bond fund usage. According to California law, the audit should be conducted “…to ensure 
voters will be given a list of specific projects their bond money will be used for; to require an annual, 
independent financial audit of the proceeds from the sale of the school facilities bonds until all of the 
proceeds have been expended for the specified school facilities projects; and to ensure that the 
proceeds from the sale of school facilities bonds are used for specified school facilities projects only, 
and not for teacher and administrator salaries and other school operating expenses, by requiring an 
annual, independent performance audit to ensure that the funds have been expended on specific 
projects only [4].” 
  
Many school and community college districts had interpreted this quite literally, and severely limited 
the scope of their audits to only a comparison of bond fund expenditure coding against the list of 
projects specified in the bond language (an agreed-upon procedures engagement). Some districts 
combined the financial and performance aspects of the audit into one engagement, instead of 
producing two reports as required by Proposition 39. Still other districts endeavored to include in the 
audit scope assurances that oversight was provided through ongoing bond program review and public 
reporting by an appropriately comprised Citizens Oversight Committee, as required by Assembly Bill 
1908 (AB1908, contained in the State of California Education Code, Sections 15278 et seq.), which 
provides additional specific legal requirements related to Proposition 39.  
 
However, Proposition 39 itself specifies one of its purposes is to “…ensure accountability so that funds 
are spent prudently [4],” where ‘prudence’ is a synonym for ‘economy.’ Further, by specifically 
requesting an ‘performance’ audit, the proposition language implies a desired deeper investigation of 
program accountability. “Herein lies the contradiction and the ambiguity, which leads one to question 
how a limited-scope agreed-upon procedures audit can adequately assess the effectiveness, economy, 
or efficiency of an entire bond-funded construction program [5],” or provide any assurances regarding 
the prudent use of public funds.  
 
That is the question to be answered by this study. 
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It is worth noting here that, in addition to bond funds, many of these public entities also have received 
State matching monies and additional funds from other sources such as grants, interest income, cash 
(general fund), and donations. These additional funds substantially supplement and increase the total 
capital program funding, further justifying the need for adequate oversight and controls. 
 
 
The Data and Analysis  
 
Qualitative and quantitative results were gathered from 618 audit reports of publicly funded projects 
for school and community college construction in 73 districts between the years of 2002 and 2010. The 
documents were received from State agencies subject to the California Public Records Act (CA 
Government Code Section 6250 - 6270) and the Ralph M. Brown Act (CA Government Code 54950 - 
54960.5), made available through the websites of the school and community college districts or their 
construction programs. 
 
The bond programs ranged in size from $4 million to $14 billion, with occupation of the facilities 
expected in as short as two years and as many as 15 years or more. 
 
Some of the audit reports were for the same construction programs, but with the audit work 
conducted in different years, testing a different population of expenditures, and with the testing 
sometimes performed by different audit firms or a different composition of team members.  
 
A. Expenditure Audit Results 
 
Of the reports in the current population of data, 378 were from expenditure audits. Of those, 358 were 
contract audits, and 20 were audits of change orders to particular contracts. 
 
Total Public Bonds Issued $13,605,000,000  
Funds Expended  $2,473,080,114 18.18% 
Expenditures Tested $1,796,547,168 72.64% 
Questioned Expenditures $65,657,743 2.65% 
 
Table 1 – Expenditure Audit Testing 
 
The testing amounts shown are in US dollars. 
 
The population of data included both construction and non-construction (services and consulting) 
contracts. 
 
Expenditures were questioned for a number of reasons, and the audits often included observations 
about the adequacy of controls and accounting, as follows: 
 
Finding Occurrence 
A - No issues 128 
B - Contract compliance violation 121 
C - Excessive or unallowable charges 103 
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D - Lack of expenditure support 88 
E - Incorrect rates charged 63 
F - Inadequate controls or accounting 28 
G - Incorrect math 5 
H - Duplicated scope of work or payment 1 
 
Table 2 – Expenditure Audit Findings 
 
With the exception of a ‘no issues’ finding, the findings were nonexclusive (meaning more than one 
category of issue may have been identified during the audit).  
 
The high occurrence of contract compliance violations, excessive/unallowable charges, lack of 
expenditure support, and questioned unit rates was partly explainable because certain contracts 
appeared to have been judgmentally (not randomly) selected by the districts for expenditure audit 
because of concerns about the propriety of expenditures (including change orders) or contract 
performance.  
 
What emerges from the judgmentally selected population of contracts “…is not a picture of auditors 
and evaluators with startling new information, overpowering everyone with their skills and facts, and 
thus leading all others to change. The picture, instead, is one of the auditors and evaluators revealing 
to legislative and executive officials what they suspected but did not know for certain, or what they 
already knew but could not document [6].” Rather, this was the purpose and intent when these 
contracts were selected for review. 
 
More details about the audit findings reveal these recurring issues: 
 Costs exceeded contract value (B) 
 Missing payroll records (D) 
 Disallowed reimbursable expenses or overhead (C) 
 Excessive indirect rates, labor burden, and/or profit (C) 
 Disallowed staff time (jury duty, holiday, vacation, overtime, wrong project) (C) 
 Markup duplicated or unallowable (C) 
 Missing insurance and/or OCIP documentation (B) 
 Missing certified payroll (D) 
 Timesheets not signed (F) 
 Charges incurred before or without authorization (F) 
 Missing credit adjustment, shared savings, or discounts (C) 
 Expenditures not incurred (C) 
 Prevailing wage not paid (E) 
 Materials not installed or services not provided (D) 
 Billing was not in accordance with contract terms (B) 
 Costs incurred outside the period of performance (B) 
 Accidental overpayment (C) 
 Apprentice ratio or small business (SBE) participation too low (B) 
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 Subcontractor safety prequalification missing (B) 
 Schedule of values not provided or budget not well documented (B) 
 Fingerprinting, Department of Justice (DOJ) clearance check, tuberculosis testing, drug testing, 
or felony background check not conducted (B) 
 Disallowed interest charges, commissions, service fees, markups, or taxes (C) 
 Unapproved contingency use or missing credits (C) 
 Unit pricing fluctuated (E) 
 Missing change order (B) 
 Expenditure coding incorrect (F) 
 Billed lump sum task orders as T&M (B) 
Note there were no findings in the expenditure audits related to project/program management 
improvements. This was largely because of the scope of the audit, and the type of documentation 
available to the auditors. Simply put, evaluation of performance was not part of the scope for most of 
these audits, thus the review and findings were heavily focused on contract compliance and controls. 
 
There was no consistency in the timing of the expenditure audits. Some of the audits were conducted 
as part of a comprehensive audit plan, other contracts were selected at contract completion, and still 
others were judgmentally selected at the time of concern, as discussed above. 
 
The audits were conducted by 13 different small-business, local, regional and national accounting and 
management consulting firms. Some of the audits were conducted by the districts’ internal audit staff, 
with facilities staff included on the team when the scope was broadened to include technical issues. 
 
B. Performance Audit Results 
 
The remaining 240 reports were from performance audits, with the population tested representing 
nearly half (by value) of all bond programs in the State of California (which totaled $76 billion from 
2001 to 2008).  
 
The testing amounts shown are in US dollars. 
 
Total Public Bonds Issued $36,582,989,278  
Funds Expended $7,861,545,014 21.49% 
Expenditures Tested $1,892,350,768 24.07% 
Questioned Expenditures $7,017,915 0.09% 
 
Table 3 – Performance Audit Testing 
 
One challenge with this performance audit data was that the amount of bond funds expended (to date 
in total, within the past year, or both) was not stated in 48 (20%) of the audit reports, and similarly the 
expenditures tested were not described in 128 (53%) of the audit reports. Thus, the total reported 
funds expended and expenditures tested may have been severely understated, and the total 
questioned costs may in contrast have been overstated (as a percentage of the funds expended or 
tested).  
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The percentage of questioned expenditures for these performance audits was further overstated 
because a solitary audit report represented $5,149,409.89 of the expenditures questioned. Removing 
this outlier from the population of data, the audited expenditures questioned dropped to 0.02% of the 
expenditures tested. 
 
The majority of these performance audits (195, or 81%) stated in the report they were agreed-upon 
procedures audits, and were designed solely to meet the requirements of Proposition 39 and AB1908. 
The procedures for the audit often involved validating funds were expended for approved projects, 
with no detailed review of expenditures. Thus, 164 (68%) of the audits reported no exceptions were 
found with Proposition 39 compliance. A recurring minor finding involved the Citizens’ Oversight 
Committee’s failure to publish annual reports, committee composition issues, or lack of a website, all 
of which were requirements of AB1908. 
 
The types of findings could be summarized as follows: 
 
Finding Occurrence 
a - No issues 164 
b - Recommendations for program management improvements 72 
c - Inadequate controls or accounting 25 
d - Excessive or unallowable charges 9 
e - Incorrect rates charged 5 
f - Contract compliance violation 4 
g - Duplicated scope of work or payment 2 
h - Incorrect math 1 
i - Lack of expenditure support 1 
 
Table 4 – Performance Audit Findings 
 
With the exception of a ‘no issues’ finding, the findings were nonexclusive (meaning more than one 
category of issue may have been identified during the audit). 
 
One of the audits was conducted by the California State Controller, in response to concerns about the 
bond program at that particular community college district. Another reported on an investigation 
commissioned by a County Grand Jury, for a similar reason. 
 
The performance audits were conducted by 28 different small business, local, regional and national 
accounting and management consulting firms. At least seven of these firms were management 
consulting firms with a specialization in construction, or accounting firms known to have included 
construction experts (people with hands-on experience in the management and delivery of capital 
programs) on their audit teams. 
 
Where expenditures were questioned, the scope of the audit had often been broadened to include a 
review of expenditures for contract compliance and a review of specific functions of project 
management. Of the performance audits, 44 (18%) had such a broad scope. These audits also tended 
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to include numerous observations about the adequacy of project management, controls and 
accounting.  
 
Several districts conducted broad-scope annual or semi-annual performance audits at the outset of 
their bond program, and then reduced the scope of the audit to an annual agreed-upon procedures 
review as the program matured, with a corresponding reduction in the number of findings (and, one 
might assume, audit fees). 
 
With few exceptions, the performance audits were conducted on an annual basis, containing data 
through the most recent fiscal yearend for the districts (30 June of that year). 
 
More details about the findings yield these recurring issues: 
 Missing or out of date policies and procedures (b) 
 Bid process inconsistencies (b) 
 Incorrect, inadequate, or infrequent reporting (b) 
 Late approval of change orders (b) 
 Missing master schedule or unapproved baseline (f) 
 Website out of date (b) 
 COC compliance with AB1908 (b) 
 Outdated cash flow projections (b) 
 Work commenced prior to authorization (f) 
 Accounts do not reconcile (c) 
 Recommended changes to contract language (b) 
 Change orders exceed 10% (f) 
 Inadequate expenditure controls and cost monitoring (c) 
 Missing facilities master plan (b) 
 Excessive soft costs (d) 
 Missing EIR (b) 
 Missing facilities condition assessment (b) 
 Missing ADA transition plans (b) 
 Performance metrics missing (b) 
 Conflict of interest (b) 
 Irregular journal entries (c) 
 Cost allocation irregularities (c) 
 
Implications of the Results 
 
It is recognized that “…most audit engagements are undertaken in situations where constraints of cost 
as well as time limit the amount of testing done [7].” Because performance audits often audit large 
projects or programs that involve multiple projects, few performance audits test 100% of the capital 
outflow, except where the number of payments are few (such as at the very beginning of a 
construction program, when only design and consulting fees have been incurred). A higher tested 
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expenditure percentage can typically be seen on contract audits (and indeed that higher percentage is 
seen in this audit population), because the size and scope of the audit is by its very nature limited to 
disbursements against a single contract.  
 
However, it is inconceivable that any public agency would accept a report in which the auditor failed to 
provide an accounting of the capital program spending to date and the audit testing conducted. In the 
population of data reviewed for this study, where a majority of the auditors did not provide adequate 
details about the expenditure testing and audit methods used, the audit reports are unacceptable. 
These omissions call into question the validity of the audits in their entirety, and should prompt further 
investigation by the districts’ citizens’ oversight committees and boards of trustees. 
 
The quantitative results of these audits were  disappointing, especially the percentage of questioned 
costs. Audit firms routinely promise a certain high percentage of expenditure recovery or a return on 
investment in multiples of the fees charged. Most often this is a verbal claim, but some put it in writing 
in proposals and presentations. The data in this study, with questioned costs of only 0.03% to 2.65% of 
expenditures tested and even lower recovered dollars, prove auditors’ salesmanship belies their ability 
to generate  questioned cost results. 
 
It is possible, in the population of data for both the expenditure audits and performance audits, the 
questioned costs were low because most of the audits were conducted by accounting firms with only 
certified public accountant (CPA) staff. “Industry-specialist auditors are likely to better recognize the 
audit risks associated with an engagement when they face a client in that industry as opposed to 
another industry [8].” That more questioned costs and qualitative findings were generated by 
construction consulting firms and audit teams that included construction experts would seem to 
support the notion “…advanced skills in accounting and financial auditing are not always needed in 
performance auditing or program evaluation [9],” and specialized industry knowledge should be a 
team requirement. Performance audits of construction programs, by their very nature, demand an 
audit team of experts with deep knowledge and hands-on experience in the construction process and 
project delivery, who can evaluate the capital program against current industry best practices and its 
peers. 
 
Performance audits “… operate from a quite different knowledge base to that of traditional auditing. It 
is not a checklist-based form of auditing [9],” whereas an agreed-upon procedures review essentially is 
a roadmap or checklist to be followed. This issue already surfaced on California Proposition 39 bond 
programs; in a letter issued to the California Board of Accountancy in November 2009, and based on 
reports by the State Controller and Little Hoover Commission, the California League of Bond Oversight 
Committees (CALBOC) complained of fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in the professional practice 
by certain licensees of the California Board of Accountancy, stating “…*the+ AICPA expects a 
performance audit to offer much more than a review of the agreed upon procedures. Most, if not all, 
licensees of the board, engaged in the practice of public accountancy, lack the staff and expertise to 
measure the efficiency, effectiveness and economy of a facilities program. A typical CPA firm does not 
have experience and expertise in managing a school facilities program. We contend that one cannot 
judge and evaluate the performance of processes and systems in which one is not experienced. The 
California State Controller’s Office has concluded that an ‘agreed upon procedures review’ does not 
constitute a performance audit [10].” The complaint does not appear to have been very widely 
publicized. 
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More granular review of the questioned costs showed, when audits were conducted in subsequent 
years, the amount of questioned expenditures and number of qualitative findings tended to decline, or 
the type of findings changed significantly. This may have been because of improved controls 
(resolution of past audit findings) and an increase in project team sophistication (lessons learned). It 
may be derived from this that program progress has an effect on the type of findings – as the project 
moves from design to procurement to construction to closeout, different kinds of issues surface and 
become significant, and others are resolved or become immaterial. Different audit scopes and 
approaches also become applicable as the need for audit evolves. 
 
It can be questioned whether statistical sampling is effective for very large capital programs whose 
scope often include multiple projects and many design, engineering, consultant, procurement, 
services, and construction contracts. “The technique of statistical sampling will likely surface routine 
procedural and controls issues, such as: duplicate payments; whether or not an invoice was reviewed 
appropriately and approved for payment; rates were charged in accordance with the contract; math 
was correct; or the expenditure was captured in both the project management software and in the 
financial system [5].” The data results supported this theory, especially the non-quantitative contract 
compliance and administrative findings such as missing insurance and/or OCIP documentation, missing 
certified payroll, apprentice ratio or small business (SBE) participation too low, subcontractor safety 
prequalification missing, fingerprinting/DOJ clearance/tuberculosis testing/felony background check 
not conducted, or incorrect expenditure coding. These were all, simply, contract compliance and 
accounting controls findings. There were no questions raised about the appropriateness or context of 
the expenditures. 
 
Note the client was likely partially at fault for reduced effectiveness of audit findings, by intentionally 
or unintentionally overly limiting the scope and timing of the audit. This may have occurred in an effort 
to satisfy stakeholder expectations or regulatory audit requirements at the lowest possible cost, but 
could also have been the result of ignorance, lack of experience with construction audit, or a lemming 
effect. It might not have been immediately obvious (to those requesting the audit) that the audit type 
would have a significant effect on the type of questioned costs and findings, as illustrated by the 
differences in the frequency and type of findings shown in the expenditure and performance audit 
tables above. “Public organisations turn naturally to the internal audit group to write the request for  
qualifications (RFQ) or request for proposal (RFP) when advertising the audit opportunity and seeking 
auditors [5],” who then use the language and scope with which they are most familiar, regardless of 
their appropriateness. The language used when advertising the opportunity also attracts a different 
composition and caliber of firms proposing to conduct the work. 
 
The high incidence of “no issues” findings was a cause for concern, and begged the question of 
whether more findings would have resulted from a broader audit scope, different audit methodology, 
or different audit team skillset. Those questions could not be answered in this study, because of the 
type of data provided, but it seemed highly unlikely that in a population of 618 audits, 292 (47%) of 
construction program reviews would yield no errors or inconsistencies in expenditure and program 
administration. Such perfection is elusive, especially in an industry such as construction which is 
complex and rife with conflict, change, and claims. 
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It was likely the audit timing had an effect on the audit findings, especially in the instances of the 
performance audits. Whereas a contract audit can be conducted within a relatively short period of 
time, a detailed performance audit may require months of interviews, document requests and review, 
and investigation of the status (resolution) of past audit findings. With the current population of audit 
results, the performance audits were conducted once per year and the data received by the auditors 
was limited to expenditures and findings from prior to that fiscal yearend. With a fiscal yearend of 30 
June, audit records were typically unavailable until September of the same year, and final reports were 
presented in November/December of that same year (or sometimes early in the next calendar year).  
 
The timing and duration of the audit may have yielded the following challenges: 
 
1. Findings regarding expenditures and procedures became outdated during report production, 
because the program management team began reacting to the findings as soon as they were 
identified. 
2. Findings surfaced for expenditures incurred after 30 June but identified during the performance 
of the audit would have had to be framed in a theoretical perspective only or current year 
documentation located for the same or similar issue, with the post-30 June documentation held 
until the subsequent year for audit, by which time the issues likely had been resolved. The audit 
timing was at the expense of the audit findings. 
3. The audit team decided whether qualitative findings (such as observations about policies or 
procedures, or ways to streamline program management) should reflect only the time period 
through yearend or included current activities through the time of report finalization. The latter 
choice would have resulted in a truer representation of program oversight at the time of report 
issuance, and would have relieved the audit team of the need to retroactively or forensically 
audit the condition and evolution of policies and procedures over time. 
4. The decision to conduct only an annual audit effectively delayed observation and resolution of 
issues by failing to provide an intermediate mechanism for reporting potential improvement 
opportunities. 
5. The program management team failed to report the resolution of past audit findings in the 
interim between annual audit reports, preventing visibility of continuous improvement even 
though progress was made. 
 
It should be noted, of the 618 audits, merely eight of the expenditure audits (and none of the 
performance audits) reported pursuing a remedy from the contractor and recovering any of the 
questioned expenditures ($1,007,871 in total, or 1.54%). Only 35 audit reports included review of the 
status of past audit findings. Failure to follow up on audit findings, report the results, and endeavor to 
recover questioned costs were oversight and possible negligence on the part of the auditor, the 
Owner, and the Citizens’ Oversight Committee. 
 
The qualitative results from reviews of policies and procedures were significant, because “…much of 
performance auditing to date has been aimed at ensuring that adequate systems and practices were in 
place to control the inputs and processes. That approach assumed that adequate systems and 
practices would produce good results. We now know from experience that this is not necessarily the 
case [11],” because controls can be circumvented. Indeed, a number of policies and procedures related 
recommendations involved conforming actual practices to existing written procedures, or (where new 
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practices represented a controls improvement) modifying existing procedures to reflect new 
methodologies or industry best practices. 
 
The traditional audit approach can be broadly assumed to fail because, lacking an understanding of 
both the industry and the project, the typical accountant-auditor will select and test expenditures 
singly, out of context, and out of sequence. Reviewing expenditures against a checklist of 
requirements, the typical CPA lacks visibility of the expenditure history and relationship from period to 
period, and may not have enough detailed information to properly question costs and change.  
 
The data appears to confirm this theory. Certain types of potentially high-dollar-value errors were not 
identified in the current population of expenditures, which were unrelated to assurances of adequate 
controls and reporting but could be very relevant in the management and oversight of capital projects.  
 
Examples of these include but are not limited to: 
 Missing negative change orders 
 Unnecessary change orders 
 Unreasonable or inflated charges 
 Excessive hours spent for design and engineering 
 Low productivity in material and equipment installation 
 Unexplained variations in the SOV 
 Inappropriate use of journal entries 
 Inappropriate or unauthorized use of allowances and contingency 
 Materials or equipment purchased but not installed 
 Lost, damaged, or stolen materials and equipment 
 Contract deliverables not provided 
 Differences between material quantities installed and purchased 
 Rental equipment or small tools expenditures that exceed the purchase price or blue book 
value of the item 
 Equipment or personnel hours charged to two projects at the same time 
This bulleted list of potential findings illustrates the sizeable gap between the types of findings that 
resulted from existing performance and expenditure audit methodologies and scope, and the potential 
results that could be reaped from a reinvention of the audit process. 
 
 
The Path Forward 
 
Errors and overspending are magnified on large construction programs because of program size and 
complexity. “Research reveals that construction projects do not succeed as initially planned because of 
the volatility and complexity of projects and its delivery mechanism. Generally, past industry 
experiences show that, medium to large size projects appear as the frequent victims because project 
complexity fluctuates proportionately with the increase in project size [12].” With an aging global 
infrastructure and population increasing worldwide, it is reasonable to assume more construction 
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mega-projects will be undertaken in the immediate future to satisfy demand. The need is greater than 
ever for audits and careful oversight of large public sector capital projects and mega-programs. 
 
The question becomes one of how changes in administration and oversight  can be put in place to 
effect better control and delivery of these projects. “The challenge is whether effective governance, 
management, and assurance functions can minimize the micro failure events that add to macro 
failures, and effectively deliver a mega-project executed according to a well thought out plan, 
according to the expectations of its stakeholders and according to a sustainable future [13].” Obstacles 
can be expected in defining success and managing stakeholder expectations. 
 
Above all, when it comes to capital expenditures and public funds, stakeholders want confidence and 
risk visibility. Those may be internal stakeholders, who are part of the organization receiving and 
expending the funds, and external stakeholders (government and the general public). However, while 
many stakeholders understand they want assurances regarding the use of public funds, those 
expectations might be inadequately verbalized or may actually conflict. Part of the challenge becomes 
working with those stakeholders to identify the biggest risks to the program, and find a way to monitor 
and manage those through to completion. 
 
A vision of the path forward involves adopting an assurance mentality, focusing on accountability, and 
facilitating oversight by merging risk assessment and more sophisticated audit methodologies.  
 
Accountability to the public is achieved through periodic reporting on status and expenditures. “The 
simplest form of accountability is the requirement for an administrative organization to render an 
account of what it has done. The report should be made to some external, independent organization—
a legislature, an auditor, even the public at large—through a published report, so that the assessment 
can be reasonably public and objective. … It involves making public what has been done in the public 
name. This form of accountability highlights the notion that at the most basic level, accountability is 
about transparency, about making it possible for actors outside a public organization to identify, and 
question, what has happened [14].” Audit reporting should occur on an annual basis, at a minimum, 
and more frequently if possible (status reporting by the program management team should occur on a 
monthly basis).  
 
Some entities make publicly available both their status reports annual audit reports, by posting these 
to their website. By rendering these reports accessible on-demand to the general public, these entities 
are providing their external stakeholders with a certain level of confidence that progress is being made, 
expenditures are under control, and processes are being put in place as part of a continuous 
improvement plan to mitigate risks and overcome challenges.  
 
Proper and continuous oversight empowers the Owner to direct appropriate resources as needed to 
manage and mitigate risk. But, in order to be monitored, risks need to be known and understood. “The 
main intent (of a risk assessment) is to identify the precise ways in which an existing program is liable 
to break down in the future and to warn politicians and managers accordingly. The audit body has to 
give reasons for overseers and managers to be concerned that ineffectiveness or other kinds of severe 
shortcomings could result from the program’s continued operation along the same lines. Although risk 
assessments are future-oriented, the reasons for concern are backed up with systematically collected 
data about the existing programme [15],” This can be achieved by conducting a limited engagement 
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prior to scoping the audit, in which stakeholders and team members are gathered for open discourse 
about potential risks to satisfactory completion of the capital program, and their impacts. Periodic 
evaluation of those risks can be incorporated into the audit plan, along with appropriate scoping to 
match the desired results. 
 
The next step involves applying audit methodologies that fit the need of the capital program. This may 
mean combining techniques from different kinds of audit, and even borrowing from the practice of 
peer review, pushing the boundaries of audit well beyond expenditure testing. Some government 
entities have already taken steps along this path, specifically in the area of audit scope. “Categories 
such as traditional or compliance auditing, performance auditing and programme evaluation can be 
conceptualised …. But when we look at the actual activities of GAO and of state and local audit 
agencies in the US, we find that most of them are hybrids [16].” The audit scope should include some 
components of expenditure review and contract compliance, along with performance assessment. 
 
The audit team should be comprised, at a minimum, of appropriate subject matter and industry 
experts, blending accounting, auditing, capital program management and project controls skill-sets 
with social sciences techniques such as interviewing, forensic investigation, and evaluation research 
methods. More industry expertise can be added to address the specific requirements of targeted 
audits, such as systems analysts, architects, sustainability consultants, or engineers. The quantity 
surveyor is a natural choice for team member, because of the breadth of education and experience, 
and depth of understanding of the entire capital project lifecycle including management, controls, 
contracts and cost accounting.  
 
One might even conceive an audit team on which the CPA is a secondary team member, available in a 
capacity to conduct review of accounting systems and (if desired) ensure compliance with auditing or 
consulting standards (even though those standards’ relevance to performance auditing is questionable 
[5]) but, significantly, the CPA would not lead the engagement. 
 
A rational approach to auditing a very large program involves a high-level overview of the program in 
the first year, enabling the auditors to gain perspective on the entity as a whole and provide 
recommendations for controls and procedural improvements early in the capital program lifecycle. 
Tables 2 and 4 can be used as a guideline in determining the essentials of the audit scope. 
 
In the second year, continuous broad oversight should continue, and be supplemented by targeted 
focus on areas of perceived risk, effectively breaking down the review of the capital program into 
manageable and discrete pieces. Overarching review of the construction program remains a constant 
in every audit, because “… in addition to the aspects of performance that are relevant to a specific 
program element, there are cross-cutting performance aspects that apply as expectations to every 
element of the program. These include compliance with laws and regulations; reliability, validity, and 
availability of information; maintenance of underlying governmental values, such as ethics, integrity, 
and equity; and continuous improvement [2].” The targeted focus may be included as part of the 
broader scope of one performance audit, or may take the form of separate special-purpose audits 
(judgmentally selected).  
 
The list of potential areas to audit is exhaustive, but may include (in descending order of quantitative 
findings and cost recovery possibilities):  
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 Contracts 
 Change orders 
 Soft costs 
 Assets 
 Projects 
 Project phases 
 Deliverables 
 Departments 
 Systems 
 Processes 
 Policies and procedures 
 
Note that in the past not all of these areas have been defined as ‘auditable’ activities. This new 
assurance philosophy involves broadening the perception of what can be assessed. By selecting specific 
aspects of the program to review, and utilizing the skill-sets of industry specialists, any endeavor that 
consumes project resources (staff, equipment, materials, labor, etc.) can be evaluated using a 
methodology similar to peer review or quality assurance/quality control. It is anticipated that deeper 
review will provide stakeholders with increased confidence in the forward progress and positive 
achievements of their capital program. 
 
The client may also elect to undertake an annual audit plan that conducts audits year-round, rotating 
special investigations and random sampling through certain aspects of the capital program over the 
course of a several-year cycle.  
 
The methodology for selecting expenditures to test should be reviewed carefully. “By reviewing a 
greater population of expenditures in context and possibly in sequence or batches, it is more likely that 
in conducting a detailed expenditure audit the auditor will gain a greater understanding of the history 
and relationship from period to period that is reflected in the invoices or payment applications. This 
may in effect increase the number of questioned costs and thus the overall effectiveness of the audit 
[5].” It is easier to select a contiguous batch of payment applications in a contract audit or project audit 
scenario, than in a performance audit of a very large program with many projects and contracts. Thus it 
makes sense to advocate for project and contract audits to be commissioned to supplement the 
performance audit, as separate scopes of work. 
 
An increase in demand for construction audit will likely create employment opportunities for staff with 
appropriate skill-sets. Audit, social science, and expenditure review techniques should be included in 
university curriculum for construction programs, so engineers, architects, project managers, quantity 
surveyors, construction managers, project controls, and facilities staff can become valued members of 
the audit team. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
From this study of more than 600 performance and expenditure audits, it could be concluded the types 
and magnitude of findings (both improvement opportunities and questioned costs) for most of the 
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audits likely failed stakeholders’ expectations of an in-depth evaluation of their bond construction 
program and provided confidence to only those most gullible individuals.  
 
The study illustrated the sizeable gap between the types of findings that resulted from existing 
performance and expenditure audit methodologies and scope, and the potential results that could be 
reaped from a reinvention of the audit process. 
 
The need is greater than ever for audits and careful oversight of large public sector capital projects and 
mega-programs, and a new approach is needed to address performance concerns and cost and 
schedule overruns. A vision of the path forward involves adopting an assurance mentality, focusing on 
accountability, and facilitating oversight by merging risk assessment and more sophisticated audit 
methodologies. Above all, this new philosophy requires a broader perception of what can be assessed, 
increasing the level of confidence that can be provided to internal and external stakeholders. 
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APPENDIX J: 
PUBLICATION #6  
STAKEHOLDER EXPECTATIONS REGARDING PUBLIC PROJECT OVERSIGHT 
 
This technical paper was presented at the 2011 IPMA conference in Brisbane, and 
summarized literature review on different types of internal and external stakeholders, their 
expectations, and the potential impact they could have on a complex capital project. Detailed 
discussion featured two groups of stakeholders: Boards of Directors and the general public. 
Recommendations for both clients and auditors included identifying and prioritizing 
stakeholder groups, understanding their need for information about program status and 
progress, and educating stakeholders so that audits can be appropriately scoped and procured, 
and expectations managed. 
 
This publication contributed to capital program audit literature by focusing heavily on the 
stakeholder element of audits. Program stakeholder research was a hot topic at the time of 
this study, and had the potential to expand in the future to include other areas of study such as 
stakeholder attitudes to risk and audit. 
 
  
IPMA 25th World Congress – Brisbane, Queensland, 2011 
1 
 
Stakeholder Expectations Regarding Public Project Oversight 
 
Abstract 
 
Complex capital projects often result in overspending and significant delays in completion. Careful 
oversight of these projects is needed, especially for those using public funds. Stakeholders have 
certain expectations regarding the efficiency, economy and effectiveness of monies spent on these 
projects, and they rely on oversight mechanisms to report project status. Although audit is one of 
the most often used mechanisms for such oversight, traditional methods may not be effective for 
the construction industry, as indicated by results from a study of over 600 public project audits.  
 
One implication from the study is that audit techniques need to be adaptable to the industry and 
situation. The question becomes one of how audit methods can be improved to address stakeholder 
concerns about the management and delivery of complex capital projects. As a step towards 
developing such a framework, this paper studies stakeholder expectations in the context of audit, 
project governance and accountability, through literature review.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Due to a combination of aging infrastructure, population growth, urbanization, and changing 
demographics, more than $2.2 trillion is needed over the next five years in the United States 
(American Society of Civil Engineers, 2009) and more than $40.0 trillion globally over the next 25 
years (Daltorio, 2010) to construct new and improve existing public capital assets. Very few 
industries experience the risks and volatility faced by the construction industry (Guo, 2004), in 
which project success is historically poor (Wood & Gidado, 2008); a high percentage of public 
projects fail to meet cost, schedule, quality and performance goals (Butts & Linton, 2009). Because 
construction projects often result in completion delays and budget inflation, careful oversight of 
these public expenditures and ongoing assessment of performance are demanded.  
 
Fiscal responsibility is the current global trend. Stakeholders require accountability and risk 
visibility throughout the project lifecycle, instead of at the end of the project. These stakeholders 
have certain expectations regarding monies spent; above all, they demand the maximum possible 
be constructed with available funds, such that the most benefit may be derived from it. Although 
audit is the most frequently used mechanism for validating the protection of public interest and 
ensuring common good, traditional audit methods barely scratch the surface of available cost and 
performance data, as evidenced by recent review of over 600 public project audit findings 
(Nalewaik, The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction Audits, 2011; Nalewaik, Insights into 
Capital Program Audit Effectiveness, 2011).  
 
The question becomes one of how audit methods need to evolve to appropriately address 
stakeholder concerns about the control and delivery of capital projects. In order to develop such a 
framework, stakeholder expectations need to be better understood. Such is the objective of this 
literature review. 
 
2. Governance of Capital Projects 
 
For large projects, a project team is created and organized to execute the project. This team is a 
temporary construct (Huemann, 2004) of companies and individuals dedicated to attainment of a 
common goal (John, Wardle, & Fairhurst, 2008), who may also seek to satisfy their own objectives 
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of profit and achievement. These companies and individuals, along with beneficiaries and overseers 
of the project, constitute the bulk of the stakeholder population. The hierarchy of accountability to 
both internal and external stakeholders creates a network of interdependencies and obligations. 
With multiple stakeholders, “the concepts of ‘success’ and ‘value’ become harder to define, 
especially where the project is subject to direct and indirect influence by stakeholders” (Nalewaik, 
The Need for Assurance in Project Management, 2011). Success is evaluated according to different 
definitions, and over different timeframes (Turner, Zolin, & Remington, 2009), consistent with the 
stakeholders’ interests (Mian, 2005). Indeed, the perspectives of owner and stakeholder may differ, 
and thus “a project can be both a success and a failure at the same time” (Klakegg, 2009). 
 
The concept of governance “generally refers to the processes by which organizations are directed, 
controlled and held to account. It encompasses authority, accountability, stewardship, leadership, 
direction and control exercised in the organization” (Stretton, 2010). Internal controls for the 
organization, project controls specific to the capital program, policies and procedures, software, 
systems, project management, reports, and organizational leadership – all these can be considered 
as governance mechanisms, and all are capable of being evaluated through audit.  
 
3. Stakeholders, Expectations, and Accountability 
 
One may evoke the image of an all-powerful stakeholder to whom the project must be accountable 
but, in reality, the list of potential stakeholders in public capital projects is nearly infinite (Rasche & 
Esser, 2006). The definition of stakeholder includes any entity who has provided financing, may be 
affected by the construction process, has a vested political or profit interest in the project’s success, 
may derive direct or indirect benefit from the use or ownership of the capital asset, and more. The 
stakeholders most frequently identified by participants in a study (Beach, Brown, & Keast, 2010) of 
public agencies are, in descending order: 
 
1. Government departments 
2. Peak bodies and lobby groups 
3. Staff 
4. Community and Citizens 
5. Other levels of government 
6. Politicians 
7. Central agencies 
8. Industry groups 
9. Networks 
10. Partners and alliances 
11. Business investors 
12. Clients 
13. Scrutineers 
14. Unions 
15. Universities 
16. Customers 
17. Interest groups 
18. Suppliers 
 
In order to optimize responsiveness to stakeholders, a system must be devised to identify the 
principal stakeholders of the project (Beach, Brown, & Keast, 2010), recognize expectations, engage 
stakeholders, and manage stakeholder relationships for results (Poister & Streib, 1999). This is 
similar to efforts undertaken in quality improvement initiatives (Wart, 1995), wherein 
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organizations adopt a ‘stakeholder perspective’ to focus on goals and objectives (Klakegg, 2009). 
Once identified, the list of stakeholders may be prioritized, using as measure their power, and the 
legitimacy and urgency of their claims (Rasche & Esser, 2006). Here, ‘power’ is defined as “the 
ability to influence the actions of organizations, ‘legitimacy’ as the appropriateness of claims, and 
‘urgency’ as an indicator of whether or not these claims require immediate attention” (Rasche & 
Esser, 2006). Stakeholder interests can be further defined in terms of “mission, mandates, values, 
and vision” (Poister & Streib, 1999). Once stakeholder interests are understood, their expectations 
can be defined and managed.  
 
One important group of stakeholders is the governing body of the organization, such as a Board of 
Directors (also: Trustees, Governors, etc.). The Board’s role is different from the Chief Executive 
Officer (CEO), because the CEO serves in an administrative and management capacity with 
authority delegated by the Board. The Board serves “not only as a link between the organization’s 
staff … and its constituents … but also as the organization’s ambassadors, advocates, and 
community representatives” (Miller-Millesen, 2003). The Board has certain statutory 
responsibilities, and is responsible for ensuring adherence (by the organization and those acting on 
its behalf) to legal standards and ethical norms. In the public sector capital project environment, 
there exists a principal-agent relationship between the Board and the project team, wherein those 
imbued with authority by the Board are obligated to behave in the organization’s best interests and 
advise and report to their client accordingly (Morledge, 2010). Where the Board is charged with 
behaving on behalf of its constituents (Smith & Mize, 2011), the same responsibility is assigned to 
the project team. Board duties apply to each board member, individually, but responsibility is held 
by the Board as a whole (Smith & Mize, 2011). In certain jurisdictions and circumstances, when the 
construction project spirals out of control or is not formally completed, the Board may be held 
liable where they can be shown to have breached fiduciary duty and/or statutory responsibility 
(State of California, 2010). Thus the Board has a vested interest in the timely and economical 
completion of the capital asset, and the power to influence the project through decision-making. 
 
The largest and least manageable group of stakeholders in the public capital project is ‘the general 
public’, which includes “…those with an interest…other than a proponent, operator or responsible 
authority” (Susilawati, Wong, & Chikolwa, 2010). Here, too, one may include those who have 
influence but no direct contractual ties, such as activist groups (Beach, Brown, & Keast, 2010). The 
general public can be considered to be one of the ‘owners’ of public assets, from which they benefit 
directly. The self-appointed defender of the public is the media, who can substantially affect the 
continuation and reputation of the capital project. 
 
Creating a construct as an example: The ‘average Joe’ of American demographic studies, who reads 
at an 8th grade level and never attended university, has paid taxes toward the construction of 
certain infrastructure, education, or healthcare assets. He wishes to derive the maximum personal 
benefit from the completed product. It may be astounding to him that the project costs so much. He 
can easily watch the construction progression (or lack thereof), but he does not understand the 
complex process of construction, nor the long sequence of invisible events (including design, 
engineering, and regulatory approvals) that must occur prior to physical construction. He is fed 
information (and misinformation) by community groups, the media, official sources, friends, family, 
and coworkers, which lead to false assumptions and accusations (Angerbauer & Spencer, 2011). He 
understands implicitly that “government officials entrusted with public resources are responsible 
for carrying out public functions legally, effectively, efficiently, economically, ethically, and 
equitably” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007). He looks to reports from and audits of the 
construction program to provide reassurances that funds have been expended appropriately, 
although that information is likely provided to him through non-neutral third parties and may be 
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twisted beyond recognition or reality. When he perceives that the project is not achieving his or 
others’ expectations, he takes personal offence and demands that someone fix the problem, be held 
accountable, and be punished. 
 
The three ‘e’s of performance audit, listed below, can be used to describe the primary focus of 
stakeholders’ concerns.  
 
 ‘Economy’ means minimizing the resources used, while achieving equal quality and 
usefulness (International Congress of Supreme Audit Institutions, 2004). ‘Thriftiness’ is a 
synonym. 
 Efficiency is related to economy, focusing on optimal use of said resources (International 
Congress of Supreme Audit Institutions, 2004). The intent is to minimize waste and use all 
available resources (such as staffing and technology) more productively. 
 Effectiveness is concerned with the relationship between the achievement of goals, outputs 
and impacts (International Congress of Supreme Audit Institutions, 2004) and is closely tied 
to the notions of ‘success’ and ‘customer satisfaction’ (Kestenbaum & Straight, 1995). 
 
These tenets resulted from “demands by [the] public for information about the use of taxes in the 
aftermath of scandals concerning waste and corruption” (Halachmi, 2002). The implicit 
accountability discussed from the public stakeholder perspective is informal, and reaches beyond 
mere financial accountability (Glynn, 1996). “Formal mechanisms are based on judicial, legislative, 
and executive or hierarchical controls, whereas informal mechanisms derive from society’s mores, 
[and] its political and social philosophies” (Roberts, 2002). The concept of accountability implies 
prudence, judgment, and moral probity (Luke, 2010) on the part of those held responsible for the 
performance of the capital program, in accordance with agreed-upon expectations (Office of the 
Auditor General of Canada, 2004). The general public might not explicitly state their expectations, 
yet they expect the organization to be prepared to explain and justify its judgments, intentions, acts, 
and omissions (Rasche & Esser, 2006).  
 
4. Malfunction of the Audit Mechanism 
 
The most frequently used mechanism for demonstrating accountability is audit. The objective of the 
audit may be to satisfy audit requirements (internal or external), or may be otherwise prompted. A 
recent study gathered qualitative and quantitative results from over 600 audit reports representing 
$37 billion in public bond funded project expenditures in the State of California (United States) for 
construction in the education sector. The capital programs, in 73 districts between the years of 
2002 and 2010, ranged in size from $4 million to $14 billion, with expected completion timelines of 
two to 15 (or more) years. The study compared and contrasted data from 378 expenditure audits 
and 240 annual performance audits (Nalewaik, The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction 
Audits, 2011; Nalewaik, Insights into Capital Program Audit Effectiveness, 2011).  
 
For the purposes of this discussion: 
 
 An expenditure audit is a review of a contract, project, or any subset thereof, with the 
objective of determining whether expenditures are made in compliance with contractual 
and regulatory requirements, and identifying errors and irregularities. 
 A performance audit is an assessment of how well goals and objectives are being achieved. 
Traditional performance audits evaluate effectiveness, economy, and efficiency (Waring & 
Morgan, 2007), and may also include review of expenditure compliance and controls.  
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On average, the expenditure audits in the study questioned only 2.65% of program expenditures; in 
comparison, the performance audits questioned only 0.03% of billions of dollars spent. The ratio 
was readily explainable, as the nature of expenditure audit was to review expenditures in greater 
depth than performance audit and test a higher percentage of expenditures. However, the 
percentage of identified overcharges for both categories was very low, given the high risk of fraud 
and errors in the construction industry.  
 
Traditional audit methodology prescribes review of a sample of expenditures in the belief that 
issues identified will be typical for the entire population of expenditures. The sampling mechanism 
itself pulls expenditures out of sequence and out of context, and ignores the schedule of values 
relationship between payment applications (Nalewaik, The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded 
Construction Audits, 2011). This prevents visibility of expenditure dips and peaks over the course 
of the project, and limits the depth to which expenditure review can be performed (Nalewaik, 
Governance of Public Capital Projects, 2011). Such relationships and fluctuations are key in the 
identification of potential audit issues.  
 
Perhaps recognizing that past audits were insufficient, the State of California recently added a 
requirement that audits be conducted in accordance with government auditing standards (State of 
California, 2010). These standards address the administration of audits, but not the methodology 
used, instead prescribing an engagement framework and audit management steps such as entrance 
and exit conferences with the client, adequate supervision, collection of data to support findings, 
and quality assurance of reports (Nalewaik, 2010). However, “there are still no comprehensive 
standards for performance reporting and auditing” (Holmquist & Barklund-Larsson, 1996) that 
equate to those established in the field of compliance auditing. “Few generally accepted standards 
or performance measures exist for determining the quality, effectiveness, and efficiency of federal 
government organizations responsible for awarding and administering contracts” (Kestenbaum & 
Straight, 1995). As none of these new statutory requirements address the depth or breadth of 
investigation required, the percentage of testing or number of expenditures to be tested, or 
industry-specific guidance, the new legislation can be expected to have little to no positive impact 
on future public construction performance audit results. Indeed, this lack of correlation between 
standards and both qualitative and quantitative audit results was found to be true (Nalewaik, 
Insights into Capital Program Audit Effectiveness, 2011). 
 
The majority of the qualitative and quantitative findings in the study audit population focused on 
routine procedural, accounting, and controls errors; concepts of economy, effectiveness, and 
efficiency (key to the concept and definition of performance) did not appear to be addressed in 
depth in either category of audit. Indeed, the majority of the performance audits in the study (81%) 
were conducted as very limited agreed-upon procedures engagements, designed solely to meet 
public requirements established by Proposition 39 (The Office of the Secretary of State of California, 
2000). The procedures involved merely validating funds were expended against a list of approved 
projects, and ensuring a Citizens Oversight Committee had been established, with no detailed 
review of expenditures. As a result, 68% (the mode) of the ‘performance audits’ in the study 
reported no actual findings. It can be questioned whether the scope of work was intentionally 
minimized in order for the organization to spend the bare minimum while complying with annual 
audit requirements. Yet, by calling the effort a ‘performance audit’, the organization evoked the 
traditional concept of performance audit as an assessment of economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, 
and thus likely raised the expectations of stakeholders that a more comprehensive audit would be 
conducted. Referring to the earlier construct, ‘Average Joe’ is not likely to have read the specific 
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requirements of Proposition 39, but it is possible this stakeholder expected far more from the 
audits than was delivered. 
 
It can be very expensive to conduct a complete and traditional performance audit that evaluates in 
depth the performance of a capital program. Constraints of cost and time often limit the depth of 
investigation that can be performed by public agencies, especially when endeavoring to balance the 
cost of the audit against the benefits received from the audit. It is hoped that an audit will 
“contribute to the well-being of citizens in their roles as service recipients, direct beneficiaries, 
taxpayers, obligates and consumers of aggregate condition” (Barzelay, 1996). Thus, many findings 
and recommended improvements from annual performance audits are typically qualitative, such as 
the addition of preventive controls, and are difficult to assign a monetary value even though 
changes implemented mid-project can strengthen project and cost management. Stakeholders, on 
the other hand, tend to focus on quantitative findings, such as recoverable expenditures, which are 
more tangible. Due to the complexity of large programs, “it is not really possible for programme 
managers, let alone the auditor, to address certain elements of effectiveness.” (Glynn, 1996) Lacking 
well defined methods, it is often up to the audit team to rely on industry best practices and peer 
benchmarking to approximate fair evaluation of project performance and effect positive change. 
 
Stakeholder education is vital to convey how certain factors (audit team composition, sample size, 
standards, scope, methodology, and more) affect qualitative and quantitative audit findings, such 
that internal stakeholders can 1) appropriately scope and procure audits to address perceived 
project and organizational risks and 2) manage stakeholder expectations of audit. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Stakeholders’ expectations of audit may exceed what is realistically achievable by the audit team 
due to constraints of time and resources. With respect to the organizations represented in the 
study, by labeling the audits as ‘performance audits’ and purporting to report on accountability, 
they have essentially promised something to stakeholders that cannot easily be done or may not 
even be feasible to deliver at all. 
 
A new mechanism is needed to improve audit methods, and stakeholder education is warranted to 
appropriately scope and procure audit services to address and manage stakeholder expectations. 
Some organizations have tried to achieve this by expanding the audit scope, or supplementing with 
additional audits, often under the supervision of a centralized body imbued with substantial 
authority, such as an Inspector General’s Office.  
 
The implications of this review of stakeholder literature and audit results are that the audit study 
needs expanding, to include investigation of a risk-based assurance approach, hoping that the 
modified audit method and scope will generate findings that meet stakeholder expectations. 
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APPENDIX K: 
PUBLICATION #7  
INSIGHTS INTO CAPITAL PROGRAM AUDIT SUFFICIENCY 
 
Concluding the research conducted on data available at that time, and summarizing the 
research agenda, background, literature review, research methodology, and a recap of 
previously published results, this research paper was presented at the 2011 RICS 
Construction, Building, Real Estate and Research (COBRA) conference in Manchester. The 
paper included new observations from the data about expenditure audit and performance 
audit scope and testing methodology, and some comments about the newly-added population 
of risk-based audits. 
 
Statistical analysis was conducted using Microsoft Excel, addressing the research questions. 
Preliminary investigation yielded basic descriptive statistics and correlations (alluded to but 
not published in the final version of the technical paper, due to space constraints). 
Preliminary conclusions were drawn from the correlation matrix. The paper concluded with 
recommendations for further study in specific areas. 
 
This publication contributed to capital program audit literature by identifying areas for future 
study, and addressing the issues identified in the research objective and questions. With 
regard to research on international projects and projects and programs in areas other than the 
construction sector, this thesis provided valuable insight on performance audit, since the 
majority of prior research had focused on public sector but not project performance audit, 
even as global circumstances called for increased project accountability and monitoring. The 
study provided evidence on the variability of performance audits in the public sector.  
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Abstract:  
Complex projects and mega-programs tend to experience great volatility, resulting in 
overspending and significant delays in completion. The need is greater than ever for 
careful oversight of these endeavors, especially those using public funds. Although 
audit is the most commonly used oversight method, traditional performance audit 
techniques and standards are insufficient, providing a mere illusion of adequate 
administration. The question becomes one of how audit can be improved, and 
stakeholders satisfied regarding program management, expenditure visibility, and risk.  
This paper builds upon previous analyses of project complexity, stakeholder 
expectations, and obstacles to audit, and advocates an assurance-based approach that 
focuses on governance, accountability, and risk mitigation as project oversight tools. 
The approach is grounded in experience, supplemented by empirical research of audit 
findings from over 600 projects, and is being realized in practical application. This 
paper will also review more deeply the study population of audit data, providing more 
insight into audit results and effectiveness. 
Elements of the assurance methodology are currently being applied on: 
 Los Angeles Community College District, Bond program, $5.725 billion 
 MGM Resorts International-Dubai World, CityCenter Las Vegas, $9.1 billion 
 Autoridad del Canal de Panama, Third Set of Locks, $5.25 billion 
Keywords:  
Accountability, audit, construction, governance, risk management 
1 Introduction 
Where owners have more to construct than funds available, or are experiencing cost & 
schedule overruns, there is often a heightened atmosphere of expenditure awareness. On 
construction mega-programs, this is the norm rather than the exception. Consequently, 
stakeholders for both public and private sector construction programs are demanding 
greater accountability for and transparency of expenditures, and stricter governance.  
Audit represents one independent oversight method utilized in construction. However, 
variability in audit sampling and review techniques, team composition, quality and 
availability of data, and other factors significantly affect the results produced by the 
audit. Thus, the effectiveness of audit may be limited as a construction oversight 
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mechanism. Available literature on the topic of construction audit is sparse, and often 
designed to teach accountants about the industry of construction instead of providing 
audit methodology guidance. There is very little published information available for 
practitioners and / or academics, and next to none for the entities audited. Yet, in order 
to best define the scope of the audit, phrase a solicitation for services, and select the 
audit team, auditees need to understand the factors that impact audit results. 
The research agenda grew from a suspicion that construction program performance 
audits were not meeting stakeholder expectations and/or the audit scope did not include 
the depth and breadth of review promised. This stemmed from the author’s significant 
experience in construction audit and cost/risk management, and discussions with clients 
and peers. Specifically, the author observed that some audits appeared to be more 
effective (generate more qualitative findings and/or questioned expenditures) than 
others, and realized that certain audits conducted did not match the defined scope.  
An increase in the number of grand jury investigations of construction projects (per 
California Penal Code Section 933.5), conducted in response to citizen complaints, 
corroborated stakeholder concerns about the construction programs, especially when the 
grand jury surfaced more serious findings than the routine controls errors reported in the 
performance audits. Similarly, State and City Controller audits of construction projects 
validated stakeholder complaints, and caused consternation over the quality of audit 
reports when the supplementary audits resulted in jail time for construction program 
leaders, findings not discovered by the performance audits. During the course of this 
dissertation, ‘investigations’ of publicly-funded construction programs by local 
newspapers significantly increased, changes in legislation mandated stricter audit 
administration through the application of audit standards, and pending legislation (if 
enacted) would mandate transparency of expenditures – these, too, indicated a perceived 
failure of the existing performance audit mechanism. 
However, because the concepts of ‘quality’ and ‘expectations’ were subjective and 
difficult to evaluate, the concerns about audit effectiveness were next elucidated as 
several specific questions, which could be answered quantitatively: 
 How does audit scope impact the quantity of audit findings? 
 If a construction expert is on the audit team, are audit findings affected? 
 Does the application of audit standards affect audit findings? 
 Does a higher percentage of tested expenditures yield more findings? 
With answers to these questions, a new construction audit methodology could 
potentially be developed, providing a mechanism for appropriately deep capital program 
review, which could thus effect better control of capital expenditures and performance. 
Where stakeholders wish to receive the maximum benefit for monies spent, it is possible 
that better control of expenditures and performance would satisfactorily address 
stakeholder expectations and concerns. 
2 Literature Review 
Published construction audit theory, academic papers, and applied research were 
difficult to find. Thus, literature review on the topic of construction audit began with the 
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history of audit, including financial audit, and the evolution of performance audit from 
financial audit to government evaluation (Waring & Morgan, 2007; Penno, 1990; 
Newcomer, 1994) and oversight mechanism (Shand & Anand, 1996; Wheat, 1991). 
This included legislative requirements (Walsh, 1996), sampling theory, compliance 
(Trodden, 1996), iterative performance cycles (Steel & Van Scotter, 2003), and 
operational audits (Lane, 1983). The literature provided insight into the typical auditor’s 
skill-set (accounting and financial analysis), systems focus of audits (Glynn, 1996), and 
the statutory dominance of accounting- and controls- focused auditing (Sloan, 1996). 
A review of audit standards (Brown & Craft, 1980) led to questions about their 
insufficiency (Davis, 1980), and the near absence of performance audit standards 
(Holmquist & Barklund-Larsson, 1996). The literature review demonstrated that current 
audit standards created a framework for audit engagement oversight, adding a level of 
administration in order to improve report and work-paper quality. Yet, none of the 
standards addressed in depth such issues as auditor skills, sampling, risk, or testing. This 
gap begged the question of how requiring standards use could result in a ‘better’ audit. 
Building upon the concept of audit as a project management tool, literature review 
included the application of audit techniques in project management. This included Total 
Cost Management, PMI’s PMBOK, ISO certification, stage gate reviews & PRINCE2 
(Huemann, 2004), risk management (Barzelay, 1996; Rikhardsson et al., 2006), 
program evaluation (Goldenberg, 1983), quality assurance (Bowman, 1994), scenario 
planning (John et al., 2008), cost reporting (Rasche & Esser, 2006), and value 
engineering / peer review (Merrow, 1988). The literature confirmed that audit skills 
were utilized in construction projects (Huemann, 2004), and they translate well when 
applied as part of other mechanisms. However, although ‘risk’ was important to 
stakeholders (Chapman, 2003), there was little formal research available in the 
intersection between risk, governance, and internal controls (Rikhardsson et al., 2006). 
Subsequent literature review covered project governance (Stretton, 2010) and 
stakeholders (Beach, 2009), in order to put accountability expectations in context. This 
included stakeholder attitudes toward risk (Chapman, 2003), consequences (Behn, 2002; 
Roberts, 2002), success (Klakegg, 2009), continuous improvement (Goldenberg, 1983), 
and resource use (Roth, 1996). The differences between accounting and accountability 
(Barzelay, 1996; Newcomer, 1994) were studied. Most often associated with 
performance audit and accountability, the three graces of economy, efficiency, and 
effectiveness (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2007) were considered, 
including procurement performance measures (Kestenbaum & Straight, 1995). The 
literature surfaced a subtle difference between public accountability and financial 
accountability (Glynn, 1996), a distinction between systemic and substantive auditing 
(Trodden, 1996), and a new definition of satisfactory accounting (Barzelay, 1996). 
Together, these explained the need for both financial audit and performance audit, and 
supported the notion that the performance audit could reasonably be expected to go 
‘above and beyond’ a mere accounting of expenditures. The process of governance was 
seen to include accountability and stewardship (Stretton, 2010), where accountability 
equalled providing justification to stakeholders for actions and omissions and auditing 
was defined as a process of validating accountability (Rasche & Esser, 2006). 
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On capital mega-programs, where multiple powerful stakeholders mean overlapping 
accountability relationships, stakeholder expectations were seen to conflict (Beach, 
2009), creating a situation in which a project could simultaneously be both a success 
and a failure. To understand this, a literature review of construction megaproject theory 
was necessary. This included understanding project failure (Mian, 2005), cost overruns 
(Flyvbjerg, December 2005), schedule slippage (Merrow, 1988), the catch-22 of project 
planning (Flyvbjerg, Design by Deception: The Politics of Megaproject Approval, 2005; 
Butts & Linton, 2009), project complexity (Wood & Gidado, 2008), trust in project 
culture (Zuo & Ma, 2005), and the volatile nature of construction (DeCarlo, 2004; Guo, 
2004). The literature showed that cost overruns were common in megaprojects, and that 
audit was a necessary tool for accountability to stakeholders regarding the expenditure 
of funds, especially where those entrusted with the funds were expected to do so 
“legally, effectively, efficiently, economically, ethically, and equitably”. (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2007) 
3 Data Population 
Because documentation from taxpayer- funded projects were a matter of public record, 
audit results were obtained easily. With the objective of identifying a homogeneous yet 
broad data population, the author selected school (K-12) and community college bond-
funded construction programs in the State of California (United States of America), in 
which the Owner-entities were statutorily bound to conduct an annual performance 
audit. The construction programs represented by the population were unilaterally 
subject to the same public procurement laws, inspection requirements, State and Federal 
oversight requirements, and similar taxes and economic conditions.  
All agencies audited were also required to publish their audit reports. The publication 
requirement was not met by all agencies in the State, thus audit reports for some 
Districts were unavailable at the time of data gathering, even though the audits had been 
conducted. Not all public agencies abided by the annual audit requirement, and thus 
audit reports were completely unavailable for other Districts. By gathering the audit 
reports available at the time, 240 performance audit reports were obtained for meta-
analysis along with, for comparison purposes, 378 expenditure audit reports. The data 
population represented 73 discrete Districts, with audit reports published between the 
years of 2002 and 2010, and construction programs that varied in size from $4 million 
to $14 billion in capital improvements. The data population represented $37 billion, 
nearly half (by U.S. dollar value) of all bond-funded programs in the State of California, 
which totalled $76 billion at the time the data was gathered. 
Some of the audit reports were from the same construction programs, where the audit 
work represented different years, a different population of expenditures, and audit work 
performed by different audit firms or audit team members. There was no consistency in 
the timing of the expenditure audits, as the audits in the population were not statutorily-
required. There was consistency in the timing of the performance audits, as all the audits 
in the population were required to be conducted at fiscal year-end, which for all 
Districts was during the month of June. The expenditure and performance audits were 
conducted by many different audit teams and companies. There was little 
documentation about the composition and calibre of audit teams, in terms of 
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construction industry skill-set and education. It was likely there was also no consistency 
in the quality of documentation audited. However, it was assumed for this study that the 
audit firms, project management teams, and construction companies would be consistent 
in their inconsistency, thus maintaining data homogeneity. 
The data to be extracted from the population of audit reports included: audit type, 
contract type, total expenditures, expenditures tested, expenditures questioned, number 
of qualitative findings, type of qualitative findings, audit standards applied, total 
invoices, number of invoices tested, and construction expert as team member. In the 
population of 378 expenditure audits, only 114 reported the number of invoices tested, 
and only 100 reported the number of invoices available. Similarly, in the population of 
240 performance audits, only 63 reported the number of invoices tested, and only 10 
reported the number of invoices available. This lack of data did not significantly impact 
the analysis, as the number of invoices tested and available were not key to the primary 
research questions. However, the auditors failed to provide an accounting of the capital 
program ‘spending to date’ in 48 instances, and failed to report the total amount of 
expenditures tested in 128 instances. Because the audit firms were reluctant and/or 
unable to provide additional information, these data gaps rendered a portion of the data 
population useless for the purposes of analysis, and the sheer quantity of missing data 
called into question the very competence of the audit firms. 
4 Previously Published Results 
Preliminary review of the available data (618 audit reports) yielded basic univariate 
statistics, from which preliminary conclusions were formed. The expenditures 
questioned in the 378 expenditure audits were on average (mean) 2.65% of total 
expenditures, compared to a mean of 0.02% questioned in the 240 performance audits. 
These percentages raised questions about the methodology used by audit firms for 
selection of expenditures to be tested and for expenditure review. It was posited from 
the questioned cost percentages that, by reviewing both a high percentage of 
expenditures and high number of invoices in context and in sequence, the auditor could 
better understand the history of and relationship between expenditures from period to 
period than could be obtained by reviewing only individual expenditure records, thus 
leading to an increase in the questioned costs and overall audit effectiveness. (Nalewaik, 
Systemic Audit and Substantive Evaluation in the Built Environment, 2010) 
It was observed that a higher percentage of expenditures was tested in the population of 
expenditure audits (a mean of 59% tested, compared to 24% tested in performance 
audits). It was concluded this was likely because the size and scope of the expenditure 
audits were, by their very nature, limited to disbursements against a single contract 
(Nalewaik, The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction Audits, 2011), against 
which there may have been only dozens of invoices. In contrast, the performance audits 
were of large construction programs involving multiple projects and thus many 
contracts and hundreds (if not thousands) of expenditures, where a high percentage of 
those expenditures could not be tested within the constraints of audit cost and time.  
The low percentage of expenditures questioned raised concerns about the calibre of the 
auditors conducting the work, and their understanding of the construction industry. It 
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was wondered whether questioned costs were especially low where audits were 
conducted by accounting firms with only certified public accountant (CPA) staff, 
supporting the notion that advanced skills in accounting and application of financial 
auditing techniques might not be entirely appropriate for construction audits. Similar 
observations were made when the California League of Bond Oversight Committees 
(CALBOC) alleged fraud, deceit and misrepresentation in the profession by certain 
audit firms licensed by the California Board of Accountancy. CALBOC correspondence 
stated that “most, if not all, licensees of the board, engaged in the practice of public 
accountancy, lack the staff and expertise to measure the efficiency, effectiveness and 
economy of a facilities program. A typical CPA firm does not have experience and 
expertise in managing a school facilities program. We contend that one cannot judge 
and evaluate the performance of processes and systems in which one is not 
experienced.” (California League of Bond Oversight Committees, 2009) 
The low percentage of expenditures questioned, for all audits, also raised concerns 
about the methods used by audit firms to win audit work. “Audit firms routinely 
promise a certain high percentage of expenditure recovery or a return on investment in 
multiples of the [audit] fees charged. ... The data in this study...proves auditors’ 
salesmanship belies their ability to generate  questioned cost results.” (Nalewaik, The 
Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction Audits, 2011) If stakeholders expected a 
higher return on their audit investment, they were likely disappointed. 
Table 1. Effect of Audit Type on Audit Findings 
(Nalewaik, The Need for Assurance in Project Management, 2011) 
 
The differences between the categories of findings by audit type, shown in the table 
above, indicated that audit scope could have an effect on the audit findings, in that 
certain types of audit might be more suited to questioning expenditures and other types 
of audit might be better suited to yielding qualitative findings. Further, it was posited 
that stakeholders were likely unaware of this, and might not have appropriately scoped 
their construction audits, thus failing to receive expected benefit from the audits. 
It was questioned whether the traditional technique of statistical sampling was effective 
for the performance audits, where the capital program scope necessitated many design, 
engineering, consultant, procurement, services, and construction contracts. A 
preliminary conclusion was drawn from the data that “statistical sampling surfaced only 
routine contract compliance and accounting controls issues” (Nalewaik, Systemic Audit 
and Substantive Evaluation in the Built Environment, 2010). It was observed that 
Audit Findings
Expenditure 
Audit
Performance 
Audit
Contract compliance violation 32.01% 1.67%
Excessive or unallowable charges 27.25% 3.75%
Lack of expenditure support 23.28% 0.42%
Incorrect rates charged 16.67% 2.08%
Inadequate controls or accounting 7.41% 10.42%
Incorrect math 1.32% 0.42%
Duplicated scope of work or payment 0.26% 0.83%
Recommendations for program 
management improvements 0.00% 30.00%
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“certain types of high-dollar-value errors were not identified in the population of 
expenditures, which ... could be very relevant in the management and oversight of 
capital projects” (Nalewaik, The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction Audits, 
2011). The high incidence of “no issues” reported (128 in the performance audit 
population, and 164 of the expenditure audits) led to the question of whether a broader 
audit scope, different audit methodology, or more multifaceted audit team would have 
yielded more findings or better satisfied stakeholder expectations. 
It was noted that the expenditure audits contained no findings related to project / 
program management improvements. This was likely due to the scope of the 
expenditure audit; because expenditure audit scope did not include evaluation of 
performance, the qualitative findings concentrated on contract compliance and controls. 
Similarly, the heavy concentration of expenditure audit compliance- and controls- 
related qualitative findings may have occurred “because certain contracts [may] have 
been judgmentally (not randomly) selected by the Districts for expenditure audit due to 
concerns about the propriety of expenditures or contract performance” (Nalewaik, The 
Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded Construction Audits, 2011).  
The data population was comprised entirely of audit reports from school districts and 
community colleges in California, which issued General Obligation Bonds for 
construction. All the agencies were required by California State Proposition 39 and 
Assembly Bill 1908 (AB1908, State of California Education Code, Sections 15278 et 
seq.) “to ensure voters will be given a list of specific projects their bond money will be 
used for ... and to ensure that the proceeds from the sale of school facilities bonds are 
used for specified school facilities projects only, and not for teacher and administrator 
salaries and other school operating expenses, by requiring an annual, independent 
performance audit to ensure that the funds have been expended on specific projects 
only.” (The Office of the Secretary of State of California, 2000) A high percentage of 
the performance audits (195, or 81% of the population) self-identified in their audit 
reports as ‘agreed-upon procedures’ (AUP) audits. The scopes of these audits were 
designed solely to meet the statutory requirements. “The procedures for the audit 
involved validating funds were expended for approved projects, with no detailed review 
of expenditures. Thus, 164 (68%) of the audits reported no exceptions were found with 
Proposition 39 compliance.” (Nalewaik, The Inadequacy of Publicly-Funded 
Construction Audits, 2011) However, Proposition 39 also explicitly stated its primary 
objective is to “ensure accountability so that funds are spent prudently” (The Office of 
the Secretary of State of California, 2000). Referencing the literature review, by 
specifically requiring a ‘performance’ audit, Proposition 39 evoked the traditional 
definition of performance audit and implied an assessment of accountability. The 
CALBOC documentation likewise stated the “AICPA [American Institute of Certified 
Public Accountants] expects a performance audit to offer much more than a review of 
the agreed upon procedures [and] the California State Controller’s Office has concluded 
that an ‘agreed upon procedures review’ does not constitute a performance audit.” 
(California League of Bond Oversight Committees, 2009) From the data, a preliminary 
conclusion was drawn that the prevalence of extremely-limited-scope AUP audits 
indicated a desire on the part of the Districts to adhere to the letter but not the intent of 
the law, thus satisfying regulatory audit requirements at the lowest possible cost. 
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5 New Findings and Discussion 
By culling the audit reports to include only those containing all necessary data, the 
population was reduced to 467 audit reports (357 expenditure and 110 performance 
audits). Five audit reports were added to the population, from public and private sector 
construction projects on which a different audit methodology was applied.  
The ‘new’ risk-based methodology used for the five new audit reports involved testing a 
high percentage of expenditures (greater than 50%, in context and in sequence), 
including construction experts on the audit team, and auditing contracts and / or projects 
by judgmentally selecting those representing an element of organizational risk. This 
method redefined audit by substantially broadening its definition to include any activity 
that consumed project resources. The mechanism was designed to improve the audit 
process for expenditure and performnace audits, while also enabling ‘audits’ (deep 
analysis, using rigorous audit methods) of non-traditional audit areas such as: 
scheduling, design, policies and procedures, and program management. 
On whole, the results from the redacted population yielded slightly different statistics 
but were very similar to those from the originally published findings. The data 
population yielded the following descriptive statistics:  
 The expenditures questioned in the expenditure audits were on average (mean) 
7.21% of the total expenditures, compared to a mean of 0.08% questioned in the 
performance audits, and a mean of 44.65% in the risk-based audits.  
 The highest percentage of expenditures were tested in the population of risk-
based audits: 100% of expenditures were tested for the risk-based audits, 
compared to 77.79% tested in expenditure audits and 66.03% tested in 
performance audits.  
 Of the performance audits, 76.36% were conducted as agreed-upon-procedure 
audits, of which 86.71% (72 of 84) reported no findings and no questioned costs.  
From a correlation matrix and other data, the following was concluded: 
 Expenditure audits did not test a mixed group of expenditures. They tested either 
construction payment applications, or non-construction invoices. This was likely 
because such audits often tested a contract instead of a project, on which the 
sample type would be mutually exclusive.  
 Many of the performance audits followed an agreed-upon-procedures method, in 
which questioned costs and qualitative findings were rare. Most of the 
performance audits tested a mixed population of both construction and non-
construction expenditures. This was likely because the performance audits 
typically reviewed a sampling of all expenditures on a construction program, not 
just a contract. 
 The newly-added population of risk-based audits included construction experts 
on the audit team, tested a consistently higher percentage of expenditures 
yielded significantly more questioned costs than other audit methods evaluated, 
and were not conducted according to specific audit standards.  
 Where performance or expenditure audit scope was expanded to include 
qualitative review, there were often construction experts on the audit team, more 
qualitative findings (than other audit types) were generated, and the engagement 
was often conducted according to consulting standards. 
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 When construction experts were on the audit team, a higher dollar amount was 
tested (than other audit team configurations). This was likely related to 
correlation between dollar amount tested and audit type, and is not a significant 
correlation. Where a construction expert was on the audit team, more qualitative 
findings were generated. 
 In the full data population, the dollar amount of expenditures tested was higher 
when there was a mix of construction and non-construction expenditures. 
Corollary 1: Performance audits tested a higher dollar amount (not percentage) 
than expenditure audits. Corollary 2: Where the total expenditure population was 
high, the total amount tested was likewise high. This was likely because the 
performance audits typically reviewed an entire construction program, and the 
total expended on a program would be much higher than that on a single contract 
or project. 
 Where a higher number of invoices were tested, more qualitative findings were 
generated.  This may have occurred if the auditors gained greater understanding 
and identified trends by reviewing more invoices. 
6 Conclusion and Further Research 
Although audit is one of the independent third-party construction oversight mechanisms 
most often requested by governing boards and Chief Financial Officers (CFO), various 
factors significantly affect audit results and traditional audit techniques might not be 
effective in certain industries where expenditure interrelationships, context, and 
sequence are meaningful and provide necessary information. Available literature on the 
topic of construction audit is scarce. In order to best satisfy stakeholders, auditees need 
to understand the factors that impact audit results and use that understanding to 
appropriate scope and guide their construction program audits. 
This research reviewed over 600 audit reports, and answered the research questions: 
 Does audit type affect the number of qualitative and quantitative findings? Yes. 
 Does the risk-based audit yield significantly more quantitative findings? Yes.  
 Do performance audits classified as agreed-upon procedures yield fewer 
qualitative and quantitative findings? Yes. 
 Do performance audits with a broader scope yield more findings? Yes, they 
yield more qualitative findings. 
 Is the type of findings (qualitative, quantitative) affected by the type of contract 
audited? No. 
 If construction professionals are on the team, does the audit yield more findings? 
Yes, they yield significantly more qualitative findings, and slightly more 
quantitative findings. 
 If GAGAS standards are applied, are there more qualitative or quantitative 
findings? No. 
 Does a higher percentage (of expenditures or invoices) tested yield more 
qualitative or quantitative findings? More qualitative findings, yes, with a higher 
number of invoices tested. 
The next stages of the review will include further statistical analysis and contextual 
insights drawn from the correlations, cross-tabulations, histograms, and more. The 
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author has concerns about developing a predictive model, as the model could be used to 
generate false confidence of certain audit scopes yielding more findings. 
This research does have implications for industry, both audit and construction, and as 
such the author recommends further study in the following specific areas:  
a) In order to better understand stakeholder expectations, a survey should be 
conducted to identify stakeholders, and qualify both their expectations (audit 
‘success’) and their level of audit awareness. For the purposes of this 
dissertation, consideration of stakeholders was limited to the tax-paying public, 
District governing boards, and government agencies. This selection was based 
on the perceived level of stakeholders’ influence and urgency, as evidenced by 
vehement insistent outcry and subsequent impact. Further study will yield more 
information about these and other stakeholder groups. 
b) An assumption was made that audit firms, project management firms, and 
construction companies would be consistent in their inconsistency, thus 
maintaining a homogeneity in the data population. Further qualitative study of 
the composition and calibre of audit teams (in terms of leadership, experience, 
education, and construction industry expertise) could have an impact on the 
discipline of construction audit. Specifically, much deeper review is needed of 
the correlation between experts and audit effectiveness. 
c) The risk-based audit method is not likely to supercede traditional statutorily-
required audits, but could supplement them. Although the risk-based audit data 
for this study included both audits of contracts and specific expenditure 
categories, the audits yielded both qualitative and quantitative findings. This 
methodology considerably redefines audit by substantially broadening its 
definition to include any activity that consumes project resources. More study of 
the method is needed to understand its potential profound impact.  
d) Opportunities need to be explored for including audit as part of standard quantity 
surveyor, project management, and cost engineering academic curricula. 
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